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Obowiązkiem uczonego jest nieposłuszeństwo myślenia

Disobedience of thought is the scholar’s duty

Stanisław Ossowski

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PRZESTRZEŃ Społeczna
Social SPACE

Zgroza nagości na semiperyferiach

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1. Meritum

Od 2016 r. w brytyjskiej telewizji Channel 4 ukazuje się program randkowo-rozrywkowy pt. *Naked Attraction*, co w wersji polskojęzycznej jest emitowane pod nazwą *Magia nagości*. Program polega na tym, że ubrana osoba staje naprzeciwko sześciu nagich osób, ukrytych początkowo w kolorowych kabinach. Ciała i twarze tych osób są odsłaniane stopniowo, poczynając od dołu. Na każdym etapie osoba wybierająca eliminuje jedną nagą osobę, aż pozostaną tylko dwie z nich. Wtedy osoba wybierająca także się rozbiera, aby dokonać ostatecznego wyboru osoby, z którą chce się umówić na randkę w ubraniu. Na zakończenie pojawia się informacja uczestników o powodzeniu albo niepowodzeniu randki z perspektywy czasu, zwykle paru tygodni (*Naked Attraction*, b.d.).

Od 2017 r. program ten jest nadawany w wersji niemieckiej, od 2019 r. w duńskiej, od 2020 r. w fińskiej, od 2021 r. natomiast we włoskiej oraz w norweskiej (*Naked Attraction*, b.d.). Od 2021 r. powtórki poszczególnych wersji narodowych są emitowane w polskim kanale Zoom TV. Program ten jest także emitowany w Afryce Południowej, Argentynie, Australii, Brazylii, Chile, na Filipinach, we Francji, w Hiszpanii, Holandii, Kanadzie, Kolumbii, Korei Południowej, Indiach, Irlandii, Japonii, Malezji, Meksyku, Nowej Zelandii, Portugalii, Rosji, Stanach Zjednoczonych, Szwecji, Tajlandii i Turcji (*Netherlands*…, b.d.). Polska znajduje się na czwartym miejscu oglądalności tego programu – za Stanami Zjednoczonymi, Wielką Brytanią i Szwecją, a przed Holandią (tamże). W dniu 15 maja 2021 r. miała się rozpocząć emisja wersji polskiej *Magii nagości*, która jednak – w okolicznościach omówionych niżej – została wstrzymana.

Program ten mieści się w sferze kultury ekshibicjonizmu, a nawet konsumpcjonizmu (Bachowski 2021), bynajmniej nie nowej w telewizji, zwłaszcza jeśli ekshibicjonizm ten dotyczy nie tyle obnażania się fizycznego, lecz – być może bardziej intymnego – psychicznego. Program odwołuje się do rozczarowania portalami randkowymi i opiera się na założeniu, że ludzie poznają się w ubraniu, gdy zaś dochodzi do rozebrania się, bywają sobą rozczarowani. Stąd dość śmiały intelektualnie wniosek, że zmiana tej kolejności może być skuteczna.

Procedura wyboru partnerów obejmuje osiem etapów: (1) odsłanianie osób w kabinach od pasa w dół, (2) odsłanianie torsów, (3) odsłanianie całej postaci wraz z twarzą, (4) odsłuchanie głosów osób wybieranych, (5) rozbieranie się osoby wybierającej, (6) wybór jednego partnera albo jednej partnerki, (7) randkę w ubraniu oraz (8) ewentualną drugą randkę po paru tygodniach. Na każdym z sześciu pierwszych etapów osoba wybierająca rezygnuje z jednej osoby wybieranej. W Danii, Finlandii i w Polsce wybiera się spośród pięciu osób, w związku z czym etap trzeci jest połączony z czwartym.

Co ważne, program jest nastawiony na eksponowanie różnorodności biologiczno-psychicznej uczestników, prezentując ich różne tożsamości płciowe (osoby binarne i niebinarne), różne orientacje seksualne (hetero-, homo-, bi- i panseksualne oraz poliamoryczne), różnorodność biologiczną (obejmującą także osoby transpłciowe, różny dystans poszczególnych osób od kanonów piękna, nieukrywane defekty biologiczne, zróżnicowane kolory skóry oraz różny wiek występujących osób) oraz różnorodność kulturową, obejmującą różny zakres usuwania włosów z różnych części ciała, różny zakres ingerencji chirurgiczno-kosmetycznych, kolczyki w różnych miejscach i takież tatuaże. Ten program nikogo zatem nie wyklucza (*Magia*…, 2021), może więc otworzyć widza na inność (Gawot 2021), chociaż istnieje możliwość wykluczania na etapie doboru uczestników programu.

Jako swą motywację udziału w programie osoby wybierające deklarują zazwyczaj poszukiwanie stałego partnera, implikując swą samotność, a spora grupa szuka prawdziwej miłości (Gawot 2021). Nie da się jednak wykluczyć, że niektórzy uczestnicy chcą zamanifestować samoakceptację lub potrzebę „ekshibicjonistycznego zaistnienia" (Bachowski 2021), chociaż prowadząca polską wersję tego programu

wyklucza tę ostatnią motywację (Głowińska 2021). W procesie wyboru partnerów osoby wybierające komentują wygląd poszczególnych części ciała osób wybieranych, z reguły natomiast nie krytykują wyglądu osób wybieranych i nie szczędzą pozytywnych lub miłych słów osobom odrzucanym.

We wszystkich wersjach narodowych programu osobą prowadzącą jest ubrana kobieta. Zagaduje ona osobę wybierającą o upodobania dotyczące różnych zachowań seksualnych. W tej warstwie programu można zauważyć implikowaną mizoandrię. Od mężczyzn bowiem zarówno prowadząca, jak i ewentualnie osoba wybierająca domaga się niekiedy szczegółowego odsłaniania narządów płciowych, co w przypadku kobiet niemal się nie zdarza; co więcej, rozbierającym się wybierającym kobietom zdarza się stosować różne formy kamuflażu miejsc intymnych, a kamera miejsca te eksponuje bez nachalności.

Kryteria wyboru kandydata są indywidualne, a wielkość pierwszo- i drugorzędnych cech płciowych nie ma – wbrew obawom lub oczekiwaniom publiczności – zasadniczego znaczenia.

Poszczególne wersje narodowe programu mają swą specyfikę. W wersji fińskiej na przykład nie pokazuje się całej sylwetki ani twarzy kandydata odrzuconego w pierwszym etapie, a osoba prowadząca nie pyta osoby wybierającej o powód odrzucenia kandydata. W wersji brytyjskiej barwa głosu kandydata jest mniej istotna od jego akcentu etnoregionalnego, podczas gdy w wersjach niemieckiej i duńskiej ten ostatni element ma mniejsze znaczenie, a w wersjach fińskiej i polskiej nie występuje.

Przerywnikami programu są przedstawiane ciekawe i pożyteczne krótkie filmiki rysunkowe ilustrujące poszczególne kwestie psycho-biologiczne seksualności ludzkiej.

2. Krytyka

Optymistycznie można by uznać, że *Magia nagości* jest „eksperymentem telewizyjnym, który próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytanie, czy wybór partnera lub partnerki" (*Magia*…, 2021) wyłącznie na podstawie cech fizycznych „determinuje […] powodzenie związku" (tamże). Analiza emitowanych programów wykazuje jednak niezbicie fałszywość pierwotnego założenia, implikującego, że nagość człowieka

ujawnia prawdę o nim, a wybór partnera na podstawie jego wyglądu zewnętrznego jest trafny. Z takiego założenia wynika uprzedmiotowienie ludzkiego ciała (Bachowski 2021).

Na podstawie analizy oglądanych programów można oszacować, że 90% par dobranych w tym programie rozstaje się przed kontaktem seksualnym, albo wkrótce po nim. Odzwierciedla to, być może, fakt, znany zresztą z plaż naturystycznych, że ludzie ubrani są bardziej atrakcyjni, a zwłaszcza intrygujący, niż rozebrani. Skupienie się na wyglądzie potencjalnego partnera abstrahuje bowiem od jego osobowości i pozycji społecznej, co – implikując istnienie społeczeństwa bezklasowego – prowadzi do rozczarowań. To ostatnie spostrzeżenie potęguje fakt, że osoba wybierająca nie może nie wybrać żadnej z osób wybieranych, te ostatnie nie mają zaś żadnego wyboru, swą ewentualną dezaprobatę lub rozczarowanie mogą więc zamanifestować dopiero na randce. W rezultacie cała procedura jest bardziej selekcją niż wyborem.

Krytyce merytorycznej można też poddać słownictwo okołoseksuologiczne stosowane w programie. W wersji polskiej oraz w polskojęzycznej wersji programów zagranicznych, zwłaszcza brytyjskiego, używa się łacińskich zamiast polskich nazw narządów płciowych, w tym prezentuje się – tradycyjnie dla współczesnych mediów – niezrozumienie terminu „wagina" (łac. *vagina* – pol. pochwa), co dotyczy też anglojęzycznej wersji programu. Uczestnikom proponuje się zatem „oglądanie wagin", co byłoby trudne bez skorzystania z fotela ginekologicznego. Prowadząca polską wersję programu utrzymuje, że „najtrudniejsze podczas pracy na planie [jest n]azywanie części ciała, głównie genitaliów" (Głowińska 2021), gdyż język polski jest rzekomo „ubogi pod tym względem, [a] wiele słów to wulgaryzmy albo jakieś prześmiewcze słowa" (tamże). Prowadząca twierdzi więc, że chciała „wprowadzić pewien rodzaj klasy" (tamże), cokolwiek to znaczy, co – jak wskazuje przykład „waginy" – niespecjalnie się udało.

Krytykę merytoryczną brytyjskiej wersji omawianego tu programu przedstawiano wkrótce po emisji pierwszego jego odcinka. Twierdzono, że jest to „najgłupszy program randkowy w telewizji" (Scott 2016), pokazujący, „jak nisko może upaść ten program" (O'Donovan 2016), tym bardziej że „mówi się nam […], że osobowość jest tak samo ważna, jeśli nie ważniejsza niż wygląd" (Scott 2016). Jak stwierdza Jo-

anna Flis, trudno „uwierzyć, że cokolwiek wspólnego z akceptacją ma […] demonstrowanie anatomicznych cech ciała, które w domyśle mają reprezentować uczestników. Tworząc taki skrót na poziomie cielesnym, amputuje się znaczenie ludzkich potrzeb, wartości, duchowość itd." (Bachowski 2021).

Poza krytyką merytoryczną pojawiła się również krytyka obyczajowa. Zgłaszano mianowicie liczne skargi do brytyjskiego Urzędu Komunikacji (Ofcom) z powodu przedstawianej w programie frontalnej nagości uczestników. Urząd zdecydował się jednak nie przeprowadzać dochodzenia, gdyż nie naruszono obowiązujących zasad, program był bowiem wyłącznie programem randkowym, nie prezentował żadnej aktywności seksualnej i został wyemitowany w godzinach przeznaczonych dla dorosłych (*Naked Attraction*, b.d.).

Na gruncie polskim krytyka merytoryczna była natomiast śladowa, w przeciwieństwie do krytyki obyczajowej i formalnej. Sprzeciw wzbudziły plany uruchomienia polskiej wersji programu, podstawą sprzeciwu były natomiast opinie prezentowane na podstawie informacji pośrednich o treściach wersji brytyjskiej i niemieckiej – emitowanych w telewizji polskiej. Na podstawie sensacyjnej informacji czasopisma plotkarskiego (*Program…*, 2021), w którym stwierdzono, że doboru partnerów dokonuje się w programie na podstawie wyglądu genitaliów, skarżący narzekali na „negatywny wpływ na psychikę widzów" (tamże). W dyskusji na forum internetowym przeciwnicy programu twierdzili (tamże), że (1) wprawdzie go nie widzieli, ale się wypowiedzą, (2) a ponieważ oni programu nie lubią, to trzeba go zakazać, (3) programem zgorszą się dzieci (po godzinie 23!) i starcy (przymuszeni do oglądania?), (4) a cały program przypomina targ niewolników, zapewne z powodu uprzedmiotowienia uczestników programu, których jednak nikt nie zmusza do udziału w tym programie.

Zwolennicy programu wskazywali natomiast (*Program…*, 2021), że: (1) w programie można obejrzeć nieretuszowany obraz ciał ludzkich, (2) co jest pożyteczne informacyjnie względem różnorodności biologicznej ludzi i (3) wzbudza szacunek dla inności, (4) nie ma obowiązku oglądania programów, których się nie lubi, (5) zgorszenie dzieci programem emitowanym po godzinie 23 obciąża zaś ich rodziców. Wskazywano także (tamże) na hipokryzję zwolenników zakazów, utożsamia-

nych z katotalibami, którym (1) nie przeszkadzają programy telewizyjne propagujące nienawiść ani (2) objazdowe billboard'y z widokiem abortowanych płodów, (3) są zaś oni skłonni akceptować tylko nagość zagraniczną, chociaż w brytyjskiej wersji programu Polacy są dość licznie reprezentowani, a zagraniczne wersje programu są dostępne w polskiej telewizji.

W przeciwieństwie do brytyjskiego Urzędu Komunikacji, polska Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji nie kierowała się względami merytorycznymi, lecz obyczajowymi obsesjami hiperkonserwatywnych hipokrytów. Rada zablokowała więc planowaną emisję polskiej wersji programu (*Telewizja*…, 2021). Co więcej, Rada nałożyła karę finansową na stację telewizyjną za pokazanie brytyjskiej wersji programu (*20 tys. zł*…, 2021). Podstawą kary była ustawa zabraniająca dyskryminacji (*Spór*…, 2021), chociaż w programie, zwłaszcza w wersji brytyjskiej, dominują postawy antydyskryminacyjne. Co jednak kuriozalne, Rada w swej decyzji cenzorskiej powołała się na przepis, który stanowi, że „audycje lub inne przekazy nie mogą propagować działań sprzecznych z prawem, z polską racją stanu oraz postaw i poglądów sprzecznych z moralnością i dobrem społecznym, w szczególności nie mogą zawierać treści nawołujących do nienawiści lub dyskryminujących ze względu na rasę, niepełnosprawność, płeć, wyznanie lub narodowość" (*Spór*…, 2021). W swej opinii Rada stwierdziła naruszenie standardów dotyczących treści programów, tj. zakazu „propagowania postaw i poglądów sprzecznych z moralnością i dobrem społecznym, w szczególności ze względu na prezentację scen i treści uprzedmiotawiających kobiety i mężczyzn oraz przedstawianie ich w roli obiektów seksualnych, a przez to naruszające ludzką godność obu płci" (*20 tys. zł*…, 2021), chociaż Radzie nie przeszkadza emisja „innych programów komercyjnych, w których nagość jest zamazywana, ale widać czynności seksualne [i] słychać wulgarny język" (Głowińska 2021).

Stacja odwołała się od tej decyzji, najwyraźniej skutecznie, gdyż 3 września 2021 r. rozpoczęto emisję polskiej wersji programu. Program jest jednak poprzedzony informacją, że jest on skierowany do widzów pełnoletnich i pojawiają się w nim zbliżenia nagich intymnych części ciał uczestników. Dodano także, iż ciała ludzkie są atrakcyjne bez względu na rozmiar, kształt i wiek, a nagość ukazano w programie z należytym szacunkiem (Sawicka 2021).

Z powodu początkowych trudności z uruchomieniem polskiej wersji programu, ta ostatnia rozpoczyna się od wyświetlania haseł: MAGIA NAGOŚCI POLSKA; KAŻDY JEST WYJĄTKOWY; SZCZEROŚĆ I GODNOŚĆ; SZACUNEK; TYLKO DLA DOROSŁYCH; MAGIA NAGOŚCI. Opiera się też na starannie opracowanych założeniach programowych, które przedstawiła prowadząca ten program Beata Olga Kowalska.

To „najwyższy czas na rewolucję i to naprawdę może być przełom. Od kilku lat w wielu dziedzinach się cofamy. Czas coś zmienić. […] Musieliśmy przekonać osoby nieprzekonane, że *Magia nagości* to nie jest nic zdrożnego, nic niemoralnego" (Głowińska 2021). Nieufny stosunek do *Magii nagości* wynika z „polskiej tradycji, z dulszczyzny, z powierzchownego przywiązania do tradycyjnych wartości, z wychowania w wierze katolickiej. Z polskiej mentalności. Jest w nas pewne zamknięcie. Mamy niezdrowy stosunek do ludzkiej nagości i seksualności. […] Jesteśmy zbyt poważni. Za mało w nas poczucia humoru. Brakuje nam dystansu do siebie i świata. […] Mamy w sobie pewną gnuśność. [W]olimy sobie ponarzekać, jednocześnie nic […] nie robiąc. Zamiast wziąć się za siebie albo pokochać swoje ciało, popadamy w kompleksy i wolimy krytykować innych. Obarczamy winą wszystkich dookoła. Tę frustrację widać w komentarzach w internecie. […] Wydawałoby się, że rewolucja seksualna z lat 60. i 70. XX w. coś zmieniła. Tymczasem mam wrażenie, że znów się cofnęliśmy, zamknęliśmy w jakiejś skorupie. […] Ale […] kropla drąży skałę. Musimy tę skorupę rozbić. […] Żyjemy w świecie ideałów z Instagrama, na którym wszyscy są piękni, młodzi i bogaci. W mediach widzimy piękne kobiety, które są 'zrobione' od stóp do głów. […] Z tego biorą się później kompleksy odbiorców, różne problemy natury psychicznej. W *Magii nagości* tego nie ma, pokazujemy ludzi takimi, jacy są. Myślę, że odbiór tego programu w Polsce byłby zupełnie inny, gdyby istniała normalna edukacja seksualna. […] Uczmy się szacunku do własnego ciała. Tego, że seks to nie gimnastyka, tylko rodzaj intymnej więzi" (Głowińska 2021).

Na pytanie, czy powyższe wywody nie są dorabianiem „ideologii do rozbieranej randki" (Głowińska 2021), B. O. Kowalska odpowiada, że „ten program wbrew pozorom wcale nie jest tak kontrowersyjny, jak się niektórym wydaje. […] *Magia nagości* pokazuje, jak wyglądamy naprawdę. Pokazuje, że ludzi idealnych nie ma. […]

Co prawda przez zabiegi estetyczne, operacje plastyczne często upodabniamy się do siebie, ale 90[%] z nas to cielesne indywidualności. […] I ten program to pokazuje" (tamże). Ten program „pomoże przełamać wyidealizowane spojrzenie na ludzkie ciało, przełamie jakieś tabu, spowoduje, że ludzie zrozumieją, że są jedyni w swoim rodzaju i że to jest normalne i [...] piękne. […] Ten program daje nam szansę, żebyśmy spojrzeli na drugiego człowieka, jak na wyjątkowość. […] Jesteśmy niepowtarzalni, jedyni w swoim rodzaju i to jest w nas piękne" (Głowińska 2021).

Magia nagości „odwraca kolejność randkowania. Para najpierw widzi się nago, a dopiero później idzie na randkę, już w ubraniach. To właśnie wtedy uczestnicy przekonują się, czy jest między nimi chemia, czy potrafią się porozumieć. To dowodzi, że samo ciało tak naprawdę się nie liczy. Nieważne, jak będzie piękne i jak bardzo będzie pasowało do naszych wyobrażeń[;] jeśli nie będzie czegoś jeszcze między ludźmi, nigdy się w sobie nie zakochają. […] Bo decyduje 'to coś', czyli osobowość, charakter, intelekt" (Głowińska 2021).

Specyfika wersji polskiej polega na tym, że – wbrew założeniom oryginalnej wersji brytyjskiej – osobom wybierającym zdarza się krytykować wygląd osób wybieranych. „Ale […] tacy [właśnie] jesteśmy. Taką mamy mentalność […]. Lubimy krytykować, oceniać" (Głowińska 2021).

Trudno też nie zauważyć, że prowadząca polską wersję programu jest spięta, co robi wrażenie braku profesjonalizmu.

3. Konkluzja

Nie jest nowe spostrzeżenie, że na semiperyferiach nagość – w przeciwieństwie do nienawiści – budzi zgrozę. Jeśli coś się nie podoba skrajnie konserwatywnej mniejszości, to w najlepszym wypadku należy tego zakazać, zwolenników wolności wyboru zaś spacyfikować. Nie znaczy to bynajmniej, że piszący te słowa jest entuzjastą mało ambitnych intelektualnie telewizyjnych programów rozrywkowych, z których *Magię nagości* należy mimo wszystko ocenić wyżej niż występy kabaretów, których dowcipy ogniskują się wokół czynności wydalniczych. Propagowanie zaś pseudochrześcijańskich zasad nienawiści bliźniego nie budzi obiekcji Krajowej Rady co do sprzeczności „z prawem, z polską racją stanu oraz […] z moralnością i dobrem

społecznym, w szczególności […] nawołujących do nienawiści lub dyskryminujących ze względu na rasę, niepełnosprawność, płeć, wyznanie lub narodowość" (*Spór…*, 2021).

Wspomniane wyżej zasady nienawiści bliźniego Sylwia Chutnik jest skłonna wiązać z silną sterowalnością społeczeństwa. Ludzie nieznający innych „okopują się na swoich pozycjach, mają[c] poczucie moralności, które nie dopuszcza innych scenariuszy życia" (Dudko 2021), w istocie zaś „strasznie się tym fascynują" (tamże), czego potwierdzeniem jest popularność portali plotkarskich i tabloidów. Interesujące jest bowiem ekscytowanie się skandalami połączone z następującym zaraz potem świętym oburzeniem. Wynika z tego „egzotyzacja 'innego'" (tamże), prowadząca do dyskryminacji. Nadzieja więc w różnorodności, gdyż dzięki jej uświadomieniu można „inaczej patrzeć na drugiego człowieka" (tamże).

Dotychczas programy randkowe w Polsce pokazywały głównie ludzi młodych i „atrakcyjnych". Warto więc żywić nadzieję, że *Magia nagości* nie zostanie zdjęta z anteny, jest bowiem „skutecznym antidotum na zaklinaną przez popkulturę […] rzeczywistość ludzkiej seksualności i wygląd[u]" (Sawicka 2021), nie jest bowiem tylko odsłanianiem ciała, ale i odsłanianiem siebie (Głowińska 2021). To wprawdzie „ekscentryczna i […] kontrowersyjna rozrywka, ale […] w kraju negującym edukację seksualną […] potrzebna" (Sawicka 2021). Nie podważa tego poglądu nawet spostrzeżenie, że edukacja seksualna – nawet jeśli odmiennie niż omawiany tu program – ma na celu upodmiotowienie, nie zaś uprzedmiotowienie seksualności ludzkiej (Bachowski 2021).

Pożyteczność programów takich jak *Magia nagości*, mimo całej jego płytkości i błędnych założeń wstępnych, polega na przyczynianiu się do podważenia tradycji „polskiej rodziny – patriarchalnej, przemocowej, toksycznej, obrzydliwej, w której [dzieją] się potworne rzeczy, bo ktoś chce, by działy się za zamkniętymi drzwiami" (Dudko 2021). Czas już może najwyższy, „by przewietrzyć Polskę, rodzinę, otworzyć okna na oścież, żeby ten przeciąg wywalił całą toksynę" (tamże) hipokryzji. I cała nadzieja w tym, że „to się kiedyś skończy, […] bo nie możemy dłużej tkwić w tym grajdole" (tamże) peryferializującej się semiperyferii.

Na zakończenie warto zwrócić uwagę, że przedmiotem niniejszego tekstu jest, wynikająca z kompleksów, zaściankowa hipokryzja, semiperyferyjna nietolerancja oraz pseudokatolicki imperatyw nienawiści bliźniego – ukazane w kontekście kultury ekshibicjonizmu. Jeśli zaś chcieć by się tu dopatrywać egzaltacji osób o ograniczonych horyzontach, to wyłącznie w kontekście analizy socjologicznej.

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PRZESTRZEŃ Społeczna
Social SPACE

Naked horror in the semi-periphery

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1. The issue

Since 2016, a television dating game show called *Naked Attraction* has been broadcast on Britain's Channel 4. In the programme, a clothed person is faced with six naked people who are initially hidden in coloured booths. The persons' faces and bodies are gradually revealed from the feet up. During each round, the chooser eliminates one naked person until only two are left. Then the chooser also takes off their clothes to make the final choice of a person to go out with for a fully clothed date. The programme then presents their feedback after the date, usually a few weeks later (*Naked Attraction*, n.d.).

Versions of the show now air in other countries: it has been broadcast in Germany since 2017, in Denmark since 2019, in Finland since 2020, and in Italy and Norway since 2021 (*Naked Attraction*, n.d.). As of this year, reruns of individual national versions have been broadcast on the Polish channel Zoom TV. The programme is also broadcast in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, India, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and the United States (*Netherlands*…, n.d.). Poland ranks fourth in the audience ratings for this programme – behind the United States, United Kingdom and Sweden, and before the Netherlands (ibidem). On 15 May 2021, the broadcast of the Polish version of *Naked Attraction* was to begin, however, as is detailed below, it was suspended.

This programme is part of the culture of exhibitionism and consumerism (Bachowski 2021), which is by no means new to television, especially if this exhibi-

tionism is not about physical exposure, but – perhaps more intimately – mental exposure. The programme alludes to disappointment with dating sites and is based on the assumption that people get to know each other in their clothes, and when it comes to undressing, they are sometimes disappointed with each other. Hence the intellectually bold conclusion that changing this order can be effective.

The procedure of selecting partners includes eight stages: (1) exposing people in booths from the waist down, (2) revealing the middle parts of their bodies, (3) revealing the entire figure with the face, (4) listening to the voices of the selected persons, (5) undressing the chooser, (6) choosing one partner, (7) a fully clothed date, and (8) a possible second date after a few weeks. At each of the first six steps, the chooser eliminates one naked person. In Denmark, Finland and Poland five people are selected; therefore, the third stage is combined with the fourth.

Importantly, the programme is focused on exposing the biological and mental diversity of participants, presenting their different gender identities (binary and non-binary), different sexual orientations (hetero-, homo-, bisexual, pansexual and polyamorous), biodiversity (including transgender persons, different distance of individual persons from the canons of beauty, undisguised biological defects, different skin colours and different ages of the participants) and cultural diversity, including the different scope of hair removal from different parts of the body, different forms of surgical and cosmetic interventions, as well as earrings and tattoos in different places of the body. This programme does not exclude anyone (*Magia*..., 2021), so it can open the viewer to otherness (Gawot 2021), although there is a possibility of exclusion at the stage of selecting programme participants.

Choosers usually declare that they are motivated to participate in the programme by their desire for a permanent partner, implying their loneliness among a large group that is looking for true love (Gawot 2021). It cannot be ruled out, however, that some participants want to manifest their self-acceptance or the need for "exhibitionist existence" (Bachowski 2021), although the host of the Polish version of this programme excludes the latter motivation (Głowińska 2021). In the process of choosing partners, the choosers comment on the appearance of individual parts of the body of the naked persons, but they usually do not criticise the appearance of

those persons and they often have positive or kind words for the eliminated contestants.

In all national versions of the programme, a clothed woman is the presenter. She asks the choosers about their preferences regarding sexual behaviours. In this layer of the programme, implied misandry can be seen. Men are sometimes asked by both the presenter and, possibly, the chooser, for a detailed revealing of the genitals, which extremely rarely happen in the case of women; moreover, in case of undressing female choosers various forms of camouflage are used to protect intimate places, and the camera exposes these places without intrusiveness.

The criteria for selecting a candidate is subjective, and the size of the primary and secondary sexual characteristics is not – contrary to the fears or expectations of the audience – essential.

Individual national versions of the programme have their own specificity. For example, in the Finnish version, the entire silhouette and face of the candidate rejected in the first stage are not shown, and the presenter does not ask the chooser why the candidate was rejected. In the British version, the tone of the candidate's voice is less important than his ethno-regional accent, while in the German and Danish versions the latter element is less important and is absent in the Finnish and Polish versions.

During the interludes of the programme, interesting and useful cartoons are presented, illustrating individual psycho-biological issues of human sexuality.

2. Critique

Viewed optimistically, *Naked Attraction* is "a television experiment that tries to answer the question of whether the choice of a partner" (*Magia*..., 2021) rests solely on the basis of physical characteristics, and whether this "determines [...] the success of a relationship" (ibidem). However, the analysis of the broadcast programmes shows that the original assumption, implying that human nudity reveals the truth about the person and that the choice of a partner based on his or her external appearance is accurate, is clearly false. This assumption results in the objectification of the human body (Bachowski 2021).

Based on the analysis of the programmes watched, it can be estimated that 90% of couples matched in this programme part before sexual contact or soon after. This is perhaps reflected in the fact, known from naturist beaches, that dressed people are more attractive, and especially intriguing, than undressed. Focusing on the appearance of a potential partner disregards his or her personality and social position, which – implying the existence of a classless society – leads to disappointment. The last observation is intensified by the fact that the chooser cannot choose none of the naked people, and the latter have no choice, so they can only manifest their disapproval or disappointment on a date. As a result, the entire procedure is a selection rather than a choice.

Substantive criticism can also be given to the sexological vocabulary used in the programme. For instance, in the Polish, British and German programmes, as well as the Polish-language version of the two latter, the term *vagina* is being misused to describe the vulva, which is incidentally common for today's media; the choosers are therefore offered to "watch the vaginas", which would be difficult without the use of a gynaecological chair. The host of the Polish version of the programme maintains that "the most difficult thing when working on the set [is] to name parts of the body, mainly genitals" (Głowińska 2021), because the Polish language is allegedly "poor in this respect, [and] many words are profane or mocking" (ibidem). The host claims therefore that she wanted to "introduce some kind of class" (ibidem), whatever that means, which – as the example of "vagina" shows – has not worked very well.

Criticism of the British version of this programme was presented shortly after the first episode was broadcast. This was argued to be "the most utterly stupid show on TV" (Scott 2016), leaving critics wondering "how low can this […] dating show go" (O'Donovan 2016), especially since "aren't we told all the time that personality is just as, if not more important than looks when it comes to dating?" (Scott 2016). As Joanna Flis states, it is difficult to "believe that acceptance has anything to do with [...] the demonstration of the anatomical features of the body, which are implicitly intended to represent the participants. By creating such a shortcut at the bodily level, the meaning of human needs, values, spirituality, etc. is amputated" (Bachowski 2021).

Apart from the content-related criticism, there was also moral criticism. "Numerous complaints about the programme were made by viewers to the broadcasting watchdog Ofcom [the Office of Communications] due to the full-frontal nudity that is featured. Ofcom chose not to investigate as there was nothing that breached their rules: the show was purely a dating show and did not contain any sexual activity and was shown after the watershed" (*Naked Attraction*, n.d.).

On the contrary, there was hardly any content-related criticism in Poland, as opposed to moral and formal criticism. Opposition was raised against the plans to launch the Polish version of the programme on the basis of indirect information about the content of the British and German versions – which are broadcast on Polish television. Based on the sensational information from a gossip magazine (*Program*..., 2021), which stated that the selection of partners on the programme is based on the appearance of genitals, the applicants complained about the "negative impact on the psyche of viewers" (ibidem). In the discussion on the internet forum, the opponents of the programme claimed (ibidem) that (1) they had not seen it, but they would comment, (2) and because they dislike the programme, it must be banned, (3) children will be offended by the programme (after 11 p.m.!) as well as the old people (forced to watch?), (4) and the whole programme resembles a slave market, probably because of the objectification of the programme participants, who, however, are not forced to participate in this programme.

On the other hand, supporters of the programme pointed out (*Program*..., 2021) that: (1) in the programme one can see an un-retouched image of human bodies, (2) which is useful in terms of information about human biodiversity and (3) awakens respect for otherness, (4) there is no obligation to watch programmes that one does not like, (5) and the scandal caused to children by a programme broadcast after 11 p.m. is the burden of their parents. Supporters of the television show also highlighted the hypocrisy of those advocating for bans (ibidem), who they identified as Catho-Taliban, since they (1) do not mind TV programmes promoting hatred or (2) travelling billboards with a view of aborted foetuses, (3) they are inclined to accept only foreign nudity, even though Poles are represented in considerable numbers in the

British version of the programme, and foreign versions of the programme are available on Polish television.

Contrary to the British Ofcom, the Polish National Broadcasting Council was guided not by substantive considerations, but by the moral obsessions of hyper-conservative hypocrites. Therefore, the Council blocked the planned broadcast of the Polish version of the programme (*Telewizja*..., 2021). Moreover, the Council imposed a financial penalty on the television station for showing the British version of the programme (*20 tys. zł*…, 2021). The punishment was based on the law prohibiting discrimination (*Spór*..., 2021), although the programme, especially in the British version, is dominated by anti-discrimination attitudes. Curiously, however, in its censorship decision, the Council referred to the provision that "broadcasts or other messages may not propagate actions contrary to law, the Polish raison d'état, as well as attitudes and views contrary to morality and social welfare, in particular they may not contain inciting hatred or discriminating on the basis of race, disability, sex, religion or nationality" (*Spór*..., 2021). In its opinion, the Council found a violation of the standards regarding the content of the programmes, i.e. the prohibition of "promoting attitudes and views contrary to morality and social welfare, in particular due to the presentation of scenes and content that objectifies women and men and depicting them as sexual objects, and thus violating the human dignity of both sexes" (*20 tys. zł*…, 2021), although the Council does not mind broadcasting "other commercial programmes in which nudity is blurred, but one can see sexual activities [and] hear vulgar language" (Głowińska 2021).

The station appealed against this decision, evidently effectively, because on 3 September 2021 the Polish version of the programme was broadcast. However, the programme was preceded by a disclaimer which explains that the show is aimed at adult viewers and features close-ups of the participants' naked private parts. The disclaimer also adds that human bodies are attractive regardless of size, shape and age, and clarifies that nudity is shown in the programme with due respect (Sawicka 2021).

Due to initial difficulties with launching the Polish version of the programme, the latter starts by displaying the following entries: NAKED ATTRACTION PO-

LAND; EVERYONE IS UNIQUE; HONESTY AND DIGNITY; RESPECT; FOR ADULTS ONLY; NAKED ATTRACTION. It is also based on carefully developed programme assumptions presented by Beata Olga Kowalska, who hosts this programme.

It is "high time for a revolution and it really could be a breakthrough. We have been going backwards in many areas for several years. It's time for a change. […] We had to convince the unconvinced that *Naked Attraction* is nothing wrong, nothing immoral"(Głowińska 2021). The distrustful attitude towards the *Naked Attraction* results from "Polish tradition, prudery, superficial attachment to traditional values, from being brought up in the Catholic faith. From the Polish mentality. There is a certain closure in us. We have an unhealthy view of human nudity and sexuality. […] We are too serious. We have too little sense of humor. We lack distance to ourselves and the world. […] We have a certain indolence within us. [We] prefer to complain, while doing nothing […]. Instead of getting into ourselves or loving our body, we fall into complexes and prefer to criticise others. We blame everyone around. One can see this frustration in the comments on the internet. […] It would seem that the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s changed something. However, I have the impression that we have retreated again, locked ourselves in a shell. […] But […] the drop hollows the rock. We have to break this shell. […] We live in a world of Instagram ideals where everyone is beautiful, young and rich. In the media, we see beautiful women who are made up from head to toe. [...] These are later followed by audience complexes, various psychological problems. There is no such thing in *Naked Attraction*, we show people as they are. I think that the reception of this programme in Poland would be completely different if there were normal sex education. […] We learn to respect our own body. That sex is not gymnastics, but a kind of intimate bond" (Głowińska 2021).

When asked if the above arguments do not add "ideology to a stripped date" (Głowińska 2021), B. O. Kowalska replies that "this programme, contrary to appearances, is not as controversial as some people think. […] *Naked Attraction* shows how we really look. It shows that there are no perfect people. [...] It is true that through aesthetic procedures, plastic surgeries we often look like each other, 90[%] of us are

bodily individuals. […] And this programme shows it" (ibidem). This programme "will help to break the idealised view of the human body, break some taboo, make people understand they are one of a kind and that it is normal and [...] beautiful. […] This programme gives us a chance to look at other people as exceptional. [...] We are unique, one of a kind and this is beautiful about us" (Głowińska 2021).

Naked Attraction "reverses the order of dating. The couple first see each other naked, and only later go on a date, already in their clothes. It is then that the participants find out if there is chemistry between them, if they can communicate. This proves that the body itself does not really count. No matter how beautiful it is and how much it will fit our imaginations[;] if there will not be something else between people, they will never fall in love with one other. [...] Because 'the something' decides, that is, personality, character, intellect" (Głowińska 2021).

The specificity of the Polish version is that – contrary to the assumptions of the original British version – choosers often criticise the appearance of the selected persons. "But […] that's who we are. This is our mentality […]. We like to criticise, evaluate" (Głowińska 2021).

It is also difficult not to notice that the host of the Polish version of the programme is tense, which gives the impression of a lack of professionalism.

3. Conclusion

The observation that nudity – as opposed to hatred – is terrifying in the semi-periphery is not new. If something is disliked by an extremely conservative minority, then at best it should be forbidden, and supporters of freedom of choice should be pacified. This does not mean, however, that the present author is an enthusiast of intellectually unambitious television entertainment programmes, of which *Naked Attraction* should nevertheless be assessed higher than the performances of cabarets, whose jokes focus on excretory activities. On the other hand, the promotion of pseudo-Christian principles of hatred of one's neighbour does not raise the objections of the National Council as to its contradiction "to law, the Polish raison d'état and [...] morality and social welfare, in particular [...] inciting hatred or discriminating on the grounds of race, disability, gender, religion or nationality" (*Spór*..., 2021).

Sylwia Chutnik is prone to associate the above-mentioned principles of hatred of one's neighbour with the strong controllability of society. People who do not know others "dig into their positions, hav[ing] a sense of morality that does not allow for other life scenarios" (Dudko 2021), while in fact "they are terribly fascinated with it" (ibidem), which is confirmed by the popularity of gossip sites and tabloids. What is interesting is getting excited about the scandals, combined with the holy indignation that follows. This results in the "exoticisation of the 'other'" (ibidem), leading to discrimination. Hope is in diversity, because thanks to its awareness one can "look at other people differently" (ibidem).

So far, dating programmes in Poland have mainly shown young and "attractive" people. Therefore, it is worth hoping that *Naked Attraction* will not be suspended, as it offers "an effective antidote to the false enchantment of pop culture through the reality of human sexuality and the appearance of the human body" (Sawicka 2021), since it is not only revealing the body, but also revealing oneself (Głowińska 2021). It is admittedly "eccentric and [...] controversial entertainment, but [...] in a country that negates sexual education [...] it is needed" (Sawicka 2021). This view is not undermined even by the observation that sexual education – even if unlike the programme discussed here – is about empowerment rather than the objectification of human sexuality (Bachowski 2021).

The usefulness of programmes such as *Naked Attraction*, despite all its shallowness and erroneous initial assumptions, consists in undermining the tradition of "the Polish family – patriarchal, violent, toxic, disgusting, in which monstrous things occur, because someone wants them to take place behind closed doors" (Dudko 2021). Perhaps it is high time, "to ventilate Poland, the family, open the windows wide so that this draft will remove the whole toxin" (ibidem) of hypocrisy. And the whole hope is that "it will end one day, [...] because we can no longer be stuck in this outlandish spot" (ibidem) of the peripherising semi-periphery.

To conclude, it is worth noting that the subject of this editorial is parochial hypocrisy, semi-peripheral intolerance and the pseudo-Catholic imperative of hatred of one's neighbour – resulting from complexes – presented in the context of exhibi-

tionist culture. If one would like to see the exaltation of people with limited horizons here, it could be found merely in the context of sociological analysis.

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Social SPACE

Investigating the impact of ethnicity on citizens' reflecting urban problems of urban deteriorated areas in Iran: the case of Takab city

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Abstract

Even though Iran is one of the most diverse countries in terms of ethnicity, and numerous articles in urban studies have emphasised the key role of citizens' views in urban issues, the connection between these two has remained less investigated in this country. This study tried to answer two important questions. Firstly, whether citizens' ethnicity impacts their view on reflecting urban problems; and, secondly, if so, whether ethnicity could act as a predicting factor in this regard. For this, 150 Azeri and Kurd residents of urban deteriorated areas in Takab city were interviewed by questionnaires. To analyse the outcomes of the questionnaires, different statistical tests including rank-biserial, Pearson chi-square, and Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) were employed. The results revealed that ethnicity does have a significant impact on the level of citizens' reflecting urban problems. More importantly, the ORL model outcomes suggested that the Kurd ethnic group showed less level of complaining about urban problems. After investigating the underlying reasons for this outcome, it appeared that Kurds tend to "acquiesce" after many years of being discriminated against as a minority ethnic group. Consequently, these results further underlined how influential factor ethnicity is in citizens' conception of their neighbourhood.

Keywords: citizens' ethnicity, ethnic discrimination, level of urban problems reflection, Azeri and Kurd ethnic groups, urban deteriorated areas

1. Introduction

Citizens' perspectives have a pivotal role in determining problems of urban facilities, services and conditions, especially when it comes to the urban problems in urban deteriorated areas (UDAs) – (Najd Ataei Sarkarabad et al., 2021). Alex Y. H. Loa and C. Y. Jim (2012) believed that the citizens' conceptions and expectations should be solicited and factored into the planning of urban public spaces. They stated a simple reason for this is that the citizens' appreciation and taking care of urban facilities and services emanate from their pragmatic needs, which they could properly distinguish rather than anyone else. Therefore before urban planners and authorities could come together to plan for a neighbourhood, they need to identify urban shortcomings from residents' views, and residents' ethnicity has always been

a central influential feature of this identification (Howell 2015). This especially applies to Iran that is the second country in the Middle East and North Africa in terms of ethnic diversity (Hosseini, Erfani, 2014). However, the relationship between urban planning and ethnicity is not simply a story about the inclusion or exclusion of statically defined demographic groups; rather, it is about respecting the influence of their viewpoint concerning the neighbourhood and the city they live in (Howell 2015).

Finding out about citizens' viewpoints toward urban facilities, services and conditions has been important not only for scholars but also for urban administrators (Ryzin 2004). Thus, much research has been conducted by urban administrators to evaluate the level of citizens' satisfaction toward urban services (James 2007). However, these evaluations are not only having general managerial purposes (James 2007), but also misleading due to two reasons: first, the technical method of the survey that may cause to not reflect actual service performance, and, second, lack of knowledge of statistical science to correctly analyse the outcomes (Stipak 1979). So to address the theoretical questions and to have a more accurate analysis the scientific approach toward the issue seems inevitable.

Consequently, several scientific studies have shown the importance of this subject and have suggested indicators for its evaluation. For instance, Ocean Howell (2015) encapsulated the residents' reflections and expressions of urban problems as "desirability", and highlighted its significant importance. He mentioned that the "desirability" of a neighbourhood could be determined by weighing several attributes including land use accessibility, age and condition of structures, urban roads and transportation conditions, ethnic and socioeconomic characteristics of the population, among other considerations. Likewise, Sebastian Zenker, Sibylle Petersen and Andreas Aholt (2009) illustrated four distinct dimensions that could affect citizens' urban problem reflection and their satisfaction level toward a city. The four dimensions in their study were urbanity and diversity, nature and recreation, job chances, and cost-efficiency. As they concluded, among these four dimensions, "urbanity and diversity" has the strongest impact on citizens' satisfaction and their level of problem reflection. In their article, "urbanity and diversity" is described as the services offered to the citizens by the city and the openness and tolerance of a city for dealing

with multiple cultures and ethnic groups. As a result, the cities and the neighbourhoods where can offer these two qualities could enjoy a high level of their citizens' satisfaction.

Moreover, studies illustrated that citizens' expectations and their perceived quality of urban facilities, services and conditions have a significant and independent influence on their level of satisfaction (Roch, Poister, 2006). That is, the wider the gap between citizens' expectations and perception of urban facilities, services and conditions, the less level of satisfaction. As Rob Weymouth and Janette Hartz-Karp (2019) suggested, one potential solution to close the gap between citizens' expectations and satisfaction is to invoke their participation in urban governing. Moreover, they saw this solution as effective in stimulating trust, a vital component of citizens' confidence in public authorities. More importantly, Jarl K. Kampen, Steven van de Walle and Geert Bouckaert (2006) has shown the breaking down of trust happens easier than its building up. Therefore, they believed that the impact of citizens' negative experiences with urban authorities needs a lot of effort to be compensated and rebuilt the broken trust.

Maciej Kowalewski (2019) discussed the concept of the urban residents' "propensity to complain" and describe it as expressing dissatisfaction with an urban service. However, he stated that not all citizens equally reflect and complain about urban problems. Some scholars investigated this variation. For instance, Peer Smets and Marion den Uyl (2008) stated there is an evident difference in the cultural and ethnic appreciation toward urban environments like urban green spaces. Similarly, Ray Hutchison (1987) pointed out that differences in citizens' perception of urban facilities and services, e.g. urban parks and recreation centres, may be a consequence of distinctive ethnic subcultures, the social class positions of a particular group, or a more complex interplay between the two.

The findings of some studies suggested that the marginalised social groups have distinct identities, based on ethnicity, language and religion, and these demand a form of difference-specific citizenship that respects their interests and needs regarding public space (Li 2014). Also, some scholars argue that, because of the unequal provision of urban facilities, segregation of housing markets and unequal distri-

bution of incomes, minority ethnic groups are expected to have value orientations and social activities which differ systematically from those of the dominant society (Hutchison 1987; Heynen et al., 2006). However, some believed residential segregation is along class lines rather than racial and ethnic ones (Smets, den Uyl, 2008).

According to Florina Maria Bente (2014), the satisfaction level of citizens is influenced by their ethnicity. Either community-level or individual characteristics reasons can be attributed to this (van Ryzin et al., 2004).

At the community level, four reasons have been proposed to explain this correlation. Gregg G. van Ryzin, Douglas Muzzio and Stephen Immerwahr (2004) argued that one reason for the ethnic gap in the level of community for reflecting urban problems are disparities in socio-economic status (SES), (e.g. income, level of education and suchlike), among ethnic groups, particularly in urban areas. They believed disparities in SES could influence satisfaction with urban services in several ways. They also stated that the ethnic differences in reflecting urban problems may depict underlying SES differences among ethnic groups in the city. Citizens with lower SESs reflect the level of urban problems less severe because of a tendency to "acquiesce"; that is, they stated "there is no problem" regardless of the survey questions (Ross, Mirowsky, 1984). This group of citizens, as Catherine E. Ross and John Mirowsky (1984) explained, are reluctant to be seen as too critical of their living environment and government performance, thus it is more likely to give "socially desirable" answers. The other reason, apart from SES status, is that many cross-cultural studies have found some consistent ethnic differences in survey response; for instance, they found out that minority ethnic groups tend to choose the extremes scales of Likert more often than majority ethnic group and tend to show acquiescence by giving "socially desirable" answers (Bachman, O'Malley, 1983; Hui, Triandis, 1989; Marin et al., 1992). The next reason is that the different neighbourhoods and the ethnic groups living in them may enjoy different levels of urban facilities, services and conditions (van Ryzin et al., 2004). This simply is because of the discriminated attitude of urban administrators in providing urban facilities and services concerning neighbourhoods' SES (van Ryzin et al., 2004). The final reason at the community level is that the ethnic

minorities reported less confidence and trust in government than the majority ethnic group (Hero, Tolbert, 2004).

Along with community-level reasons, personal characteristics emanated from individuals' ethnic group membership could explain the correlation between the citizens' level of urban problem reflection and their ethnicity. Fredrik Barth (1969) discussed that personal characteristics could emanate from the person's ethnic identity. Moreover, as Deniz Akgul (2012) mentioned, "personal characteristics" is one of the influential factors on the citizens' level of demands and expectations. Besides, the essential reason for the difference in reflecting urban problems between minority and majority ethnic groups may spring from ethnic discrimination. Discrimination against minority ethnicity has different features, from lack of opportunities to maintain their own heritage language and identity (Thapa, Adamson, 2018), to disparity in housing, employment, education and other socio-economic conditions and qualities (Chae et al., 2011). Ethnicity boundaries which were set between minority and majority, who possess the central government power, caused the minority ethnicity to be perceived as too alien or politically unreliable for incorporation or amalgamation (Wimmer 2008), like Kurds to their central states. These boundaries follow from the isolation which implies: ethnic and cultural differences, social segregation and language barriers, and even enmity. This has the potential of seriously limiting an individual's rights and quality of life (Ullah, Chattoraj, 2018). Discrimination over time can give rise to cumulative disadvantage and this, in turn, can lead to long-term exclusion (Dolinski 1996). This exclusion shows its negative impact in situations where social networking matters, e.g. employment, education, health care and access to urban facilities and services (Dolinski 1996). Hence, it goes without saying that discrimination has very grave consequences both for ethnic minority groups in general and their members in particular (Dolinski 1996). One obvious result of ethnic discrimination is the reduction of personal self-esteem and low self-worth (Dolinski 1996; Verkuyten 2003; Eccleston, Major, 2006; Armenta, Hunt, 2009; Stark et al., 2015). As Russell Eisenman and Terry D. Townsend (1970) found, low self-esteem leads to acquiescence in answering.

Nowadays multi-culturalism and ethnic diversity are increasingly acknowledged in urban settings (Li 2014). Furthermore, many studies on citizens' perceptions and attitudes towards a service revealed that ethnicity is one of the most important predictors if not the only one (Vigoda-Gadot 2006; Bente 2014). However, most of these studies have focused on service satisfaction in other fields (i.e. customer services, police services and banking) rather than urban studies and only a few (van Ryzin et al., 2004; Bente 2014) have investigated this field. As a result, considerable negligence is obvious in the field. Moreover, these urban studies have mainly highlighted a link between minority ethnicity and their conception of urban facilities and services in the West (Zang 2007). Xiaowei Zang (2007) believed that the persistent emphasis of ethnic studies in the West, on the link between minority ethnicity (non-whites) and attitude toward urban issues, is probably because of constant changes in the composition of the ethnic population due to new immigrants from less developed countries. Despite the studies that have been conducted in this regard, M. Kowalewski (2019) believed that the relationship between ethnicity and the citizens' viewpoint toward urban problems still needs to be further studied.

Few studies have been conducted on the relationship between ethnicity and urban issues in Iran, and hardly any have examined how ethnicity affects citizens' perceptions of urban problems in this country.

The research questions of the present article are, firstly, to find out whether there is a significant impact of ethnicity on citizens' reflecting and expressing urban problems, and, secondly, to understand whether the citizens' ethnicity could be a predicting factor for the reflection of urban problems.

To answer these questions, the 150 randomly chosen residents of urban deteriorated areas (UDAs) in Takab city in West Azerbaijan province of Iran were studied as the case study by application of questionnaires. Residents of UDAs were face to face questioned. After a brief introduction of Kurds as the minority ethnic group, by use of rank-biserial correlation, the Pearson chi-square, and subsequently Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis, the hypotheses were tested. The hypotheses were that ethnicity has a significant impact on citizens' reflecting and expressing urban problems and could serve as a predicting factor in this regard.

2. Kurds as a minority ethnicity in the north-western Iran

Iran is a multi-ethnic society that is ranked as the second country in the Middle East and North Africa and the 28th country among 160 nations in the world in terms of ethno-cultural diversity (Hosseini, Erfani, 2014).

After the first world war, despite being promised to have their own state, eventually Kurds were mostly divided among Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria (O'Leary 2002). This turned them into an ethnic minority in these countries with their disunity in language, religious behaviour and, especially, tribal structure to their central governments (Harris 1977).

In Iran, the Kurdish population is concentrated in the north-western provinces (with a smaller population in the northeast) bordering on Iraq and Turkey (Tezcür, Asadzade, 2019). They predominantly live in four western border provinces of Iran: Ilam, Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan. West Azerbaijan is home to another ethnic group, i.e. Azeris. A majority of Kurds in Iran are Sunnis but a sizeable number of the Shiite and Yarsani (also known as Ahl-e Haqq) Kurds also live in Iran (Tezcür, Asadzade, 2019). While Iranian censuses do not collect information about ethnic identity, some scholars estimate that ethnic Kurds make up around 10% of the Iranian population (Tezcür, Asadzade, 2019).

Kurds as a stateless ethnic group are under tight political control while being permitted few or no cultural expression, which further has led to their cultural and ethnic isolation as a minority (Harris 1977). They have been subject to various discriminative and repressive policies ranging from restrictions on the Kurdish language to genocidal massacres, e.g. the Anfal Campaign involving chemical gas attacks against civilians in Iraq in 1987-8 (Tezcür, Asadzade, 2019).

Government discrimination policies in the distribution of public services, the allocation of public resources and the bureaucratic promotion system have undermined Kurd ethnicity as a minority (Tezcür, Asadzade 2019). In such a context, Kurdish people have been treated as a minority group of populations that are socially, economically and politically discriminated against. Moreover, relative to Azeris, Kurdish populations are socio-economically disadvantaged, which have disproportionately less access to government and public job positions, feel greater injustice and

social exclusion and lack social mobility (Hosseini, Erfani, 2014). These discriminations even led to some ethnic conflicts and segregation between Kurdish and Azeri ethnic groups in the province of West Azerbaijan (Sarvar et al., 2014).

3. Study area

The West Azerbaijan province is located in the northwest of Iran. In the province, Kurds and Azeris have been living together for many years (Hosseini, Erfani 2014). The population of this province is largely made of two major ethno-religious groups of Shiite Azeris and Sunni Kurds (Hosseini, Erfani 2014).

According to the Statistical Centre of Iran (2016), Takab is a small city in the south of the West Azerbaijan province, where was the sixth populated city in this province with 49,677 people in 2016. Takab, sized 44,043 in 2011, was the ninth city in West Azerbaijan (Taghvaei, Akoochekian, 2014). This shows the cities' population rank growth within five years. This city ranks the eighth in terms of urban services hierarchy (Ziari, Mousavi, 2005)

The city of Takab has two separate cultural groups, the Kurds and the Azeris (Aghdam et al., 2017). Kurds have generally migrated to the city in recent decades. As a result, there is obvious urban segregation in the city, based on the ethnicity, between Kurds and Azeris; However, the segregation in the central part of the city (the study area) is lessened, yet considerable (Aghdam et al., 2017).

A total of 115.2 ha of Takab city have been designated as urban deteriorated areas (UDAs) by the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development of Iran, based on three criteria[1].

The study area was located in urban deteriorated areas (UDAs) of Takab, situated in the central part of the city (Fig. 1). It is noteworthy that, based on the land-use database, the study area is relatively homogenous in terms of urban facilities, services and conditions.

[1] According to the resolutions of the Supreme Council of Urban Planning and Architecture of Iran in 2006, UDAs are urban blocks where over 50% of urban plot have met three criteria: 1– less than 200 m^2 area, 2 – unstable buildings with lack of structural system, and 3 – access to the street with a width of less than 6 m (Najd Ataei Sarkarabad et al., 2021: 5).




Figure 1. Location of the study area in Takab city and the city in West Azerbaijan. Source: Authors' elaboration based on Takab municipality

4. Method

4.1. Participants

One hundred and fifty participants were being questioned as a part of the residents of UDAs of the Takab city. These included 76 males and 74 females. Their mean age was 38.3 years (SD = 14.32), with ages ranging from 16 to 86. Of the participants, 59 were of Kurdish and 91 of Azeri ethnicities.

4.2. Materials

Structured face-to-face interviews by application of questionnaires were conducted to avoid ambiguity in questions. The respondents were interviewed in the Farsi language. The respondents were selected randomly based on their urban land plot locations in the study area while interviewed. To have a random distribution of respondents in the neighbourhoods and to undertake an unbiased analysis, a one-stage area sampling, which is a common form of cluster sampling, was employed. In this sampling, first, areas (urban land plots in the study area) served as the primary sampling units, then the population (total area under investigation) was divided into

mutually exclusive and exhaustive subareas using maps, and, finally, a random sample of subareas (selected urban land plots) were selected. To implement this sampling, Subset Feature Selection (SFS) method was conducted in ArcGIS software. SFS method, which is an Equal Probability of Selection Method (EPSEM) (Kitchin, Thrift, 2009), uses randomised sequential forward feature selection (Tracy et al., 2018) to create 150 random feature subsets (Figure 1). Participants were questioned about 24 urban problems in four categories, as follows:

(1) urban roads problem, including driving accidents, pedestrian safety, asphalt quality of roads, roads width, roads slope, residential car access;
(2) urban safety and security, including insecure places, crimes, poverty, joblessness, providing suitable housing, buildings quality;
(3) lack of urban infrastructures and services, including sewage, surface water disposal, waste-collecting, night lights, electricity, gas;
(4) lack of accessibility to urban facilities, including schools, local retail stores, parks and playgrounds, cultural centres, banks, clinics.

Accordingly, they reflected their viewpoint on whether they think they have each specific problem in their neighbourhood.

The review of the relevant contemporary materials from textbooks, journal articles and conference papers was done to extract the indicators regarding urban facilities, services and conditions, which, in turn, was used for collecting the citizens' reflections of urban problems. To sum up, all problems were categorised on a 5-point Likert scale as reflecting the level of urban problems (1 – very low number of problems, 2 – low number of problems, 3 – moderate number of problems, 4 – high number of problems, 5 – very high number of problems).

4.3. Analyses

To organise and clean the dataset, as well as to conduct rank-biserial correlation, Pearson chi-square test, and Ordinal Logistic Regression that appears within the results section, SPSS 26.0 was used.

First, a rank-biserial correlation was used to see whether there is a significant relationship between ethnicity and the reflecting urban problems levels, then the

Pearson chi-square test revealed that whether reflecting urban problems levels are significantly different between Kurds and Azeris, and finally, an ordinal logistic regression (OLR) was conducted to determine whether ethnicity as a factor has a significant impact on the reflecting urban problems levels in the study area.

An ArcMap 10.3 was used to present the maps and do calculations about spatial features and random selection of the target respondents by Subset Feature Selection. This selection method creates a random sequence used to create the subset features from the main feature. The features are selected by generating random values from a uniform [0,1] distribution. So it provides a randomly selected urban land plot out of all UDAs' urban land plots in Takab for the survey from their residents.

5. Results

5.1. Rank-biserial correlation and the Pearson chi-square test

If one variable is nominal and the other is ordinal, then the rank-biserial correlation coefficient can be used to measure association (Khamis 2008). Accordingly, the rank-biserial correlation coefficient between ethnicity and reflecting urban problems levels is significant, rrb (N = 150) .393, $p<.001$. Therefore, there is a moderately strong association between ethnicity and reflecting of urban problems level.

The Pearson chi-square test suggested that the reflecting urban problems levels differ significantly by residents' ethnicity, $\chi 2$ (4, N = 150) = 27.851, $p <.001$.

5.2. Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR)

Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) is a type of logistic regression, which is geared to response target variables with an ordinal effect. The OLR is commonly used to test or model the association between the ordinal target variable and some potential predicting variables, with each association estimated in terms of an odds ratio (OR) (Warner 2008).

Within the scope of the study, the dependent variable was ethnicity. Ethnicity is a categorical variable with two categories including category 1: Kurds, and category 2: Azeris.

Ordinal logistic regression analysis showed that there was a significant influence (Harrell 2015) of ethnicity on reflecting urban problems level ($\chi 2$ (1) = 24.216, p<.001). The model explained 15.5% of variance in reflecting urban problems levels (Nagelkerke R^2). The results showed that as compared to Azeri ethnic group (category 2), Kurdish ethnic group (B = -1.581, Wald $\chi 2(1)$ = 22.601, p<.001), the odds for reflecting urban problems level is .206 times. Accordingly, the results of the OLR analysis was summarised in Table 1.

Table 1. Result of Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis

Variables		B [95% C.I.B]	S.E. (B)	Wald	Odd Ratio [95% C.I.Exp(B)]
Threshold	[Level of Urban Problems=1.00]	-2.616 [-3.220, -2.012]	.3082	72.038**	.073 [.040, .134]
	[Level of Urban Problems=2.00]	-1.321 [-1.781, -.860]	.2351	31.572**	.267 [.168, .423]
	[Level of Urban Problems=3.00]	.630 [.218, 1.042]	.2103	8.972*	1.878 [1.243, 2.835]
	[Level of Urban Problems=4.00]	2.492 [1.765, 3.220]	.3714	45.031**	12.091 [5.839,25.040]
Ethnicity = Kurds (1)		-1.581 [-2.233, -.929]	.3325	22.601**	.206 [.107, .395]
Omnibus χ^2 (1) = 24.216, p<.001, R^2 = .149 (Cox & Snell), .158 (Nagelkerke)					
*p<.01, **p<.001					

6. Discussion and conclusion

This study addressed two questions: first, whether there is a significant impact of ethnicity on citizens' reflecting and expressing urban problems; and second, whether the citizens' ethnicity could be a predicting factor for the reflection of urban problems. For this, 150 residents of UDAs of the Takab city consist of two Azeri and Kurdish ethnic groups who were questioned about their view on urban shortcomings in their neighbourhoods. The results showed that the Kurdish ethnic group reflected less level of urban problems in a relatively homogenous urban area in comparison to

Azeri ethnicity.

There are two possible explanations for these results. The first possible explanation is that ethnicity plays a pivotal role in predicting residents' views on urban problems and should be considered by urban planners and authorities in their plans and decisions. Another possible explanation is that the Kurdish ethnic group complained 4.85 times less often than Azeris when concerning urban problems. Many research has shown that Kurds have been discriminated against as a minority ethnic group for many years (Harris 1977; Hosseini, Erfani, 2014; Sarvar et al., 2014; Tezcür, Asadzade, 2019). Consequently, the discrimination has affected their socio-economic status negatively and push them to the lower socio-economic classes in comparison to Azeris. According to Robin M. Kowalski (2002), the lower classes neutralise their complaints, when their underprivileged situation is perceived as "natural", "invariable" and affects everybody. Similarly, G. van Ryzin et al. (2004) showed that minority ethnic groups, like Kurds, tend to "acquiesce" and to give "socially desirable" answers; also C. Ross and J. Mirowsky (1984) concluded that minority ethnic groups are reluctant to be seen as too critical of their living environment and government performance. Aside from community-level reasons, low self-esteem caused by discrimination against the members of minority groups like Kurds could lead to the tendency to acquiescence (Eisenman, Townsend, 1970). As a result, it could be concluded that the low level of reflection of urban problems may be related to this chain of prolonged events involving discrimination on the Kurdish ethnicity. As a solution to eliminating discrimination, it is suggested to enhance the involvement of minority ethnicity in the decision-making processes, especially in planning for urban problems. Studies showed that decision-makers strongly favour their own group candidates when deciding with someone from their own group, however, not when deciding with someone from the other group (Daskalova 2018). Co-decision-making behaviour and diversity in decision-making committees might be helpful in reduction of discrimination and increase trust in policymakers and having a more realistic reflection of problems and perceptions of their neighbourhood.

Much of the previous research that focused on the effect of ethnicity on urban issues was conducted in western countries, where their ethnic texture is different

than in Iran. Moreover, in Iran, mainly studies about Kurdish and Azeri ethnic groups are concentrated on the socio-economic field (Harris 1977; Hosseini, Erfani, 2014; Sarvar et al., 2014; Tezcür, Asadzade, 2019) while urban ethnic studies are few and far between; they typically focus on physical segregation (Aghdam et al., 2017) rather than exploring a more complex aspect of ethnicity in urban contexts. This research is one of the first tests of the ethnicity impact on a mixed-ethnic society's reflection of urban problems in Iran.

This could open a new line of research to understand this very issue, and hunting new solutions to tackle the urban problems in developing countries like Iran.

This study had two main limitations. First, more urban services, facilities and problems could be investigated to give a more comprehensive view of the matter. However, given the small number of studies in the field and the character of the study, viz. that many problems are location-oriented and distinct between cities, the 26 items were selected based on the prior research, personal experience and nature of Takab city. Furthermore, ethnicity significantly explained a good variation of urban problems, so it is unlikely this limitation could affect overall results. Second, because of time limitation and because it was a side project for the company, the sample size was relatively low. However, the results were significant despite the low sample size. This showed the great impact of ethnicity on levels of urban problems reflected by citizens.

This research could be extended by examining how the perception of different ethnic groups of citizens towards their neighbourhoods can be altered by urban authorities interacting with them. Also, the effect of implementing some special compensatory programmes, facilities and learning programmes for those ethnic groups which have been excluded in the past, i.e. Kurds, could be studied (Hutchison 1987). Moreover, the "neighbourhood effects" as a solution for urban planners and authorities for improving deprived ethnic groups' condition could be investigated (Smets, den Uyl, 2008). Finally, assessing urban governance in multi-ethnic urban areas by the "just development" approach (Harpham, Kwasi A.B., 1997) could be the next step to extending this study.

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PRZESTRZEŃ Społeczna
Social SPACE

Menace of street urchins in Nigeria

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Abstract

Large and increasing numbers of children live in the streets and the exact numbers are never known due to their roaming lifestyle. Paradoxical developments are allowing societies to grow in extremes: the rich and the poor. Poverty leads many to the streets; however poverty alone is not responsible for children entering street life, violent, unhealthy and inhuman behaviour patterns towards children seem to be some of the major reasons. Many children facing physical abuse escape to street life. Moreover, the irresponsible and uncaring attitude of individuals and organisations aggravates the problems of children in the street. Many children are being abused and deprived of care and protection from family and society. The abuse voluminously affects their mental and physical health which

in turn affects optimum use of manpower and limits the growth of Nigeria. The Nigerian government has policies in place for its children but the lacuna in its implementation adds to the problem of physical abuse and street children. Prevention of physical abuse and curative facilities offered to the abused children can lead to their positive growth and well-being. This study proposes interventions that can assist children, accompany them from the pathetic street condition to the mainstream, sustain their healthy growth in the families and add to their human development. The government, NGOs and citizens of the society are challenged to become partners in promoting holistic development of children considering them as assets and not liabilities.

Keywords: Nigeria, street urchins, child abuse, child labour, urban space.

1. Introduction

Children are an inseparable and indispensable part of every society. Childhood is a natural and distinct phase of human life during which children learn skills, socio-cultural norms, values and attitudes (Kamp 2001). Society perceives children as dependent, immature and vulnerable, growing up to be healthy and responsible members of society. Their normal growth takes place only through the healthy process of socialisation, which can help children gradually adapt to the social and cultural roles and finally develop into normal, contributing and mature human persons (Prout, James, 1997; James et al., 1998). To achieve a healthy and balanced growth children are expected to stay in family, school or in other social institutions where they can grow up under the care and supervision of responsible adults. The vast number of street children who, alone or in a group, work and/or live mostly in streets in almost all the major cities of the world, has captured academic attention in the recent past (UNICEF 2016). In the current social scenario, children are studying in various fields, working or living in deprived and wounded situations, and a bigger group in homeless street situations. Every society has to support the rights of children and provide them necessary possibilities for growth and development (Kumar 2002).

The phenomenon of street urchins or, as commonly known, street children is usually an unfortunate one wherever it occurs. In Nigeria, the activities of street urchins constitute one of the many social ills and challenges the country is facing today (Mamman et al., 2020; Yusuf 2020). As O. Fakoya (2009) notes, the phenomenon of

street children "constitutes a leprous arm" of the alarming social ills that have degenerated into the "production of adult social delinquents", armed robbers and the like. This phenomenon which in many ways has posed problems to business people, road users, government, indeed the civil society as a whole, seems to have defied solutions from government, NGOs, etc. There is still a high prevalence of street children and their activities in almost every major city of Nigeria. The alarming prevalence is not out of lack of efforts at finding solution but perhaps a lack of the right, sustainable and an enduring solution. It is in this regard that this paper sets out to contend that philosophers should rise to their billing as those capable of asking fundamental questions about human existence and contribute their quota towards addressing this societal nuisance.

This work explores the meaning, activities, dynamics and aetiology of the phenomenon of street urchins. This work gives a brief review of attempts by governmental and non-governmental organisations to deal with the issue and show that philosophical inquiries is important in stimulating the lopsided governance in Nigeria to better the lot of street urchins. Some suggestions are proposed in this work to reduce the problem of street urchins in Nigeria.

2. Societal malfunctions and abuse of children

Physical abuse of children is caused by multiple factors, e.g. parents, family, and community (Kolko, Swenson, 2002). However, family is the fundamental factor of the healthy growth and development of children. Any compromise with a healthy family environment can disrupt the family, inflict violence and abuse on innocent children. Societies witness every day an influx of children entering the streets due to physical and sexual abuse, indifferent attitudes of their parents, family disruption and poverty. Parents are the most appropriate persons to care for children. Parents, friends, the physical environment and the wider society can make a valuable contribution to the holistic development of children (Burfat et al., 2012). However, maltreatment, neglect, deprivation and indifferent parental behaviour towards them can cause serious and irreversible damage, forcing the children to opt the street for their survival.

Families occupy an important place in the vicious cycle of physical violence (Öncü et al., 2013). Every day in Nigeria, at least 20 children escape the abusive environment of their homes to live in the streets and become victims of exploitation and abuse (Ogunkan, Adeboyejo, 2014). A UNICEF study finds that a vast majority of children suffer physical punishment in their families and more than one-third experience severe punishment with implements. Boys are appeared to be at greater risk of physical abuse than girls (Schumacher et al., 2001). Unhealthy familial risk factors cause a greater risk for children and domestic violence harm children (Buzava 2013; Akpan, Bassey 2020). Chronic family physical violence disrupts healthy family relations, resulting in high anxiety, distrust and chaos within the family (Annoshian 2005). Divorce, separation, desertion and death of parent(s) harm children (Goode 2007). Aggressive, violent, verbally abusive behaviours and partner conflicts are common in the families of abused children (Kolko, Swenson, 2002). Violence in the family affects each child's development adversely and also increases the risk of cruelty for children in other environments. Studies reveal that violence within the household and local community is the key factor which pushes children into the streets (Conticini, Hulme, 2006). The physically abused and vulnerable children must be removed from the families for their protection, especially when the immediate protection of children is essential (Trotter 2004). Moreover, a lot of time is lost in intervening the abusive behaviours instead of nurturing members of the family (ibidem).

World declaration on children's rights focuses on the survival, protection and development of children. Along with many nations, Nigeria is a signatory to this (Ogunkan, Adeboyejo 2014). The national plans for children stress care and protection, keeping in mind the 180 mln children in the country (Okwuonu et al., 2021). The actual situation is far from what is expected. Many of the street children in Nigeria are being abused and neglected by their family members and many others are separated from their parents. Exposure to excessive physical maltreatment and emotional deprivation is common among children living in street situations, which affect their behaviour and development (Sondhi-Garg 2004). Children depend on parents for help and protection but they are hurt by their parents. Hence, they fear their parents rather than trusting them. This further teaches them that a home is an unsafe place

for learning and exploration. This adds to factors that cause the children to make the street their home. Their innocence is shattered as they are deprived of parental care and guidance in their formative years. They live in an atmosphere devoid of the affection, love, care and comfort of family life. They are denied protection, supervision or direction from any friendly or responsible adults, letting them fend for themselves and to survive in a hostile environment. They develop distorted personalities and undesirable and socially unacceptable habits of crimes and vices (Agrawal 2002). They become victims of divorce, domestic violence and other related familial and social problems (Thomas 2007). They do not go to school often because they have to work. Moreover, they do not have nutritious food or quality health care. They are at the risk of exploitation, abuse and discrimination (ibidem). The phenomenon is further worsened by the increasing number of children being forced to the streets due to the negligence of their families and communities. Consequently, the issue has become pervasive and complex (Kacker 2007).

A vital development pathway for children is formed by healthy family relationships. Relationship weakens owing to the inability of the family to satisfy the needs of its members, e.g. basic necessities, education and safety. In such families negativity of parents controls children's lives and harms their well-being. Family, school and peers are essential elements in moulding behaviour and emotional wellness of children. Power-based and authoritarian methods are harmful to relationship patterns (Wolfe 1999). Physical punishment is illegal and abhorrent. Instead of adopting the forceful method, warmth and sensitivity towards children's needs, love and logic with firmness, can help in shaping socially desired behaviours (George et al., 2014). Children suffer the rupture of a bond due to broken family ties which are expected to be a source of nurture and protection. The presence of poor family relationships and lack of support among the members of the family, limited social networks and absence of positive interactions create an unhealthy environment for children (Kolko, Swenson, 2002). Interpersonal difficulties in family, e.g. spousal disagreement, tension, abuse, verbal and physical conflict among family members, including domestic violence and isolation from friends and community, can become risk factors (Miller-Perrin, Perrin, 2013). For the maltreated children, the diversity of social situa-

tions may be restricted for several reasons, e.g. the family's reduced social circle (Luke, Banerjee, 2013). The abusive family condition of these children impairs the development of attachment, emotional self-regulation, empathy and sympathy, self-concept, and social skills (Berk 2007). The exploitative and victimising pattern within the family can have serious and cumulative developmental consequences as they enter the street environment. Such disruptions in relationship during their early years of growth can lead them to grapple with complex issues.

Poverty aggravates stress on already vulnerable families, causing some adults to exploit children (Egbeji 2019; Onyemachi 2020). It can be understood in several ways, e.g. insufficient resources, lack of transport facilities, the experience of violence and inadequate legal protection (Thomas 2007). Besides, it includes social exclusion, unemployment, homelessness and environmental poverty which seriously affect the parents (Beckett 2007). The situation of poor households and neighbourhoods, with limited access to basic services and opportunities, can offer the children a tempting illusion of freedom in the street. Good parenting involves having the required life opportunities and facilities. The lack of such life supports can prevent even the best parents to do good to their children (ibidem). A study confirms that dead-end hopeless poverty drives many children to the streets of the cities. However, a study in Tripura reveals that there is more physical violence in high-income families and their academic performance is found to be poor (Deb, Modak, 2010). Children leave home for street life because of changes in family structure within the context of poverty and a wider culture that accepts violent child-rearing practices (Thomas 2007). Poverty is an important risk factor for physical abuse. It can cause families to abandon their children. Though physical abuse exists across all socio-economic levels), an overwhelming number of physically abused children face acute poverty at home and their families expect them to earn money. Families are stressed by limited financial resources, e.g. low income, unemployment, poor housing, large family size and single parenthood (Kolko, Swenson, 2002). Such stressed situations can develop poor self-esteem, weak sense of purpose, fragile mental and physical health (Beresford et al., 1999).

Some children come from very poor households in slums headed by single mothers who cannot meet even the basic survival needs (Mercer 2009). The majority of the householders in slums are engaged in rickshaw pulling, garbage collection, begging and illegal activities. Children are pushed to the streets as they lack the guidance and support of the family (ibidem). They are illiterate and their children do not attend school (Pathak 1998) and are forced to leave school due to poor economic conditions. So, understanding their educational levels is important (Pareek 2012). Illiteracy, ignorance and struggles for survival adversely impact poor families (Deb, Modak, 2010). Illiteracy is rampant among street and working girls. They are occupied with gainful employment, e.g. rag picking, shoe polishing and begging. They do not have access to civic facilities and basic amenities (ibidem). Though not every poor family necessarily experiences all the adverse circumstances, poverty as a stressful condition can develop situations that might result in the family being identified with more risk factors for physical abuse (Miller-Perrin, Perrin, 2013).

Deprivation in the family can result in child labour, which can be categorised as, first, those who work in factories, workshops and mines; second, those working as bonded labour; third, street children who live in and off the streets and are found in urban and semi-urban centres; and some children become part of family labour (Kacker 2007). A vast majority of families of developing nations are mostly situated in villages. India is progressing but the villages are growing poorer and the cities growing richer. Family is the institution that can help children to grow and become empowered human beings. Families experience extreme poverty, which interferes with their physical and mental development (Ogunkan, Adeboyejo, 2014). Poverty denies their basic requirements, e.g. food, safe water, sanitation, housing, primary health care, basic education and protection from violence and abuse. Such deprivation damages their physical, emotional and mental growth.

3. Street urchin: meaning, modus operandi, aetiology and problems

Street urchin is a tag given to a child who spends most of his/her time in the streets; either roaming or living in the streets, or as it were surviving in the streets. N. Bernard (1915) defines street urchin as a mischievous and often poor and raggedly

clothed youngster often seen roaming and living in the slum area. In many areas, such children are often seen as devilish, rascals, rogue, etc. Meanwhile, this definition shows the negativity (in all its senses) attached to street urchins. The reason for this negativity is not farfetched. It is as a result of their predicaments which often push them into some nefarious activities undertaken for survival.

O. Fakoya (2009) distinguishes between two different categories of street urchins found in Nigerian cities. He notes that some live and work in the streets (usually tagged children of the streets) and those who work in the streets full or part-time but return to their houses each night (children in the street). Though this is actually the case, it is important to note that there is only a slight demarcation between the two categories because each interact and are bonded by their common burden of the demands of the rough street life and the woe of abandonment to struggle for survival. The street urchins are also seen by many as the rejects and outcasts of the society. A. Akpan (2015) citing the case of the street urchins in Calabar, known as the *Skolombo* boys, says that these are gangs of homeless boys and girls, bonded together by the common misery of being abandoned into the streets by their parents or guardians.

In regard to the problem and focus of this work, street urchins are referred to as those children who are below eighteen years, abandoned into the street, which they then make a living abode, and a means and avenue for survival. As a mode of operation, the street urchins are known to move mostly in groups and always hanging around street corners. Some of them are scavengers who feed on refuse dumps and bins. Those who do not have any place to return to after the day's business (children of the street) sleep in gutters, uncompleted buildings and motor parks. By living, feeding on filthy bins and sources, and working in the streets, they are exposed to hard life and are dehumanised. More so, they become toughened as they associate with bigger criminals on a daily basis. As they grow and graduate from one level to another in the street business, some of them are recruited into gangs of armed robbers and kidnappers who constitute security risk and menace to society. Some of these urchins are engaged in petty thieveries using some crude weapons. They dispose of unsuspected people of their valuables, e.g. phones, bags, money, etc, through pickpocketing (Lawal 2019). Apart from being recruited into armed robbery and kid-

napping gangs, there are shreds of evidence that some street urchins are also engaged in many ethno-religious conflicts that threaten national security. N. Nte et al. (2009) cite cases where street urchins took part in major ethno-religious conflicts, e.g. witnessed in recent times in Kano, Bauchi, Jos, Kaduna, etc. In Lagos, they note that the the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) crises between 1999 and 2001, for example, involved a lot of street urchins-recruited as foot soldiers. The same can also be said of ethnic crises in the south and eastern part of Nigeria.

Given the fact that street children constitute some security risk to the Nigerian nation, one could then ask, what factors birthed this unfortunate situation. How did Nigeria get to this level where urchins terrorize the streets and engage in social vices in a manner that sometimes threaten social security and national unity? The phenomenon of street urchins is attributable to many causes, most prominent among them being poverty, child abuse, false religion, displacement, domestic crises, peer influences and lack of sustainable policy by the government to address this problem. It is a known fact that poor families who cannot take care of their children sometimes send them out into the streets either deliberately or inadvertently. Most times, these children engage in mini-treading and hawking and are sometimes influenced by peer groups into abandoning trading to pick-pocketing, petty thievery and so on. Child abuse by parents and guardians also causes some children to abandon themselves into the street. This oftentimes is to escape from severe violence and torture against them. Many children are abandoned into the street as a result of displacement and domestic crises. The displacement could be caused by ethnic or religious crises, and such children might choose to run to cities; and with no means of livelihood, they could choose to roam the streets in search of greener pastures. There is also the case of religion as a factor. Some children have been thrown out into the streets on the pretext of false prophecy and revelation that they are witches or wizards (Harry 2017). Besides the case of false prophecy by some Christian churches, the Islamic religion sanctions a doctrine where some children known as the *almajiris* are forced to leave their houses to be under the tutelage of Islamic religious teachers (Anugwom 2018). These children are seen in groups with ragged dresses begging for alms for survival (Adibe 2019). The nuisance they constitute is, indeed palpable.

4. Urban space and the problem of street urchins

The nineteenth-century Industrial Revolution was the transition to new manufacturing processes in Europe and the United States, in the period from between 1760 to 1820 (Evans, Rydén, 2017). This era witnessed an amazing transformation in the political and economic life of Europeans and Americans alike (Bassey 2020). New methods of industrial production, new cityscapes and new techniques of government and social regulation became evident. This acceleration in the processes of technical innovation brought about an array of new tools and machines. It also involved more subtle practical improvements in various fields affecting labour, production and resource use. People in the rural areas began to migrate to the urban areas due to economic reasons.

The World and, in particular, Africa are currently witnessing rapid and wide-ranging socio-economic and political changes, due to the wake of industrialisation of the nineteenth century which began in Europe. The introduction of structural adjustment programmes and globalisation are changing the very fabric of African society. This leads to the "pull" of the excitement and glamour of living in urban areas and the hope of raising one's standard of living. Families are therefore forced to move to urban areas in search of employment and a way out of the poverty trap. Once in the cities, many families break up with children being forced into the streets. For many families, the perceptions that larger towns offer greater economic opportunities make the street a more attractive destination compared to a poverty-stricken rural economy. However, a life waiting in the city is often difficult. The migrants often do not have the education and basic skills necessary to deal with the risk factors and cope with adversity. While all of the above are substantive factors contributing to the existence of street children, increasing mass poverty stands out as a major factor for the existence of street children. It is poverty that is breaking up homes and families, it is poverty that makes grown-ups turn children into sources of income or articles for sale, is poverty, particularly in rural areas, that are making young children from their homes and it is poverty that is turning society into a vicious and uncaring society.

In Tanzania they are known as *watoto wa mitaani*, in Kenya they are known as *chokorra* and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) they are called *moineaux* (Evans 2002). In Calabar, Cross River State of Southern Nigeria, they are called *skolombo.* By whatever name they are called, what stands out is the sad fact that in almost all urban areas in Africa, street urchins are often ignored, scorned, mistreated and misunderstood by society and by governments. J. Barrette (1995: 2) correctly observes that "yesterday, street children (street urchins) were no more than a footnote. Today, street children are a major issue. Tomorrow, if present trends continue, they could be a blight on urban civilization". For Africa, the 'tomorrow' is already here. Street urchins are not only a blight on urban civilisation; they pose a serious obstacle to overall socio-economic development in Africa. The problem of street children has been growing steadily in the last two decades. In the 1980s, an estimated 10 mln children in Africa live without families, mostly in towns as 'street children' (UNICEF 2016). In the year 2020, R. Miamingi (2020) observed that UNICEF estimates the number of street urchins in Africa to stand at about 30 mln. It is most likely to grow in the next few years.

Some argue that the emergence of street urchins is bound up with the totality of urban problems, that the phenomenon is exclusively urban; there are no "rural street urchins". While it is true that street children are usually found in urban areas, many of these children have rural origins. So the problem extends beyond urbanisation. Some of the children have taken refuge in the city from natural or man-made disasters. Others are the offspring of prostitutes. Handicapped street children, rejected by their families, also constitute a distinct and relatively large category. A number have been disowned by a "respectable" parent unwilling to acknowledge the embarrassing outcome of an affair. In such cases, the children do not invariably come from the poorest families. In West Africa, fieldworkers have discovered street children from various backgrounds, including a son of a taxi driver, a nephew of a dentist, even the grandson of a former minister. One main characteristic of street urchins is that they live alone in the streets, without proper or reliable shelter; they have lost contact with their parents and, as such, they do not enjoy parental protection, love and care (Usman 2009). Street urchins share the streets with millions of adults, many

of whom regard them as nuisances, if not as dangerous mini-criminals. Poverty is one of the major factors of an increasing number of street urchins in the streets. Street urchins face untold hardship and danger in the streets – the lack of food, clean water and adequate health care. Living and 'working' in the streets exacts a terrible toll on street urchins. They are often prey to every physical and moral danger and as they grow older they often become a danger to others. After such precarious childhoods, most of them are condemned to spend their lives excluded from mainstream society. Clearly, the increasing numbers of street children also indicate a constellation of other trends, e.g. cutbacks in government social and educational budgets, as well as the breakdown of traditional family and community structures, which leaves children unprotected.

It is argued in this paper that street children in Africa are the victims of short-sighted policies or lack of policies. They are victims of an uncaring community that is increasingly being characterised by poverty, breakdown of family life, violence and economic hardships.

5. Attempts by government and non-governmental organisations to address the menace of street urchins

Undoubtedly, there have been both government and non-governmental attempts in addressing this problem, but these attempts still leave much to be desired as there is still a high prevalence of the street urchin phenomenon in almost all cities in Nigeria. This is majorly because there is no well spelt out and systematic attempts in the form of legislation to address this problem. This is why J. Adibe (2019) notes that he is "not aware of any governmental intervention to cater specifically to the needs of the street children in Nigeria as done in other countries". Shockingly, according to him, Nigeria does not, either, seem to recognise 12 April as the day set aside, since 2012 as the International Day for street children. This work agrees with him that this day set aside to arouse the attention of the public and government on the predicament of the street children is not usually pronounced in Nigeria. But if there is a day internationally recognised, it suggests that there ought to be well-articulated programmes aimed at acknowledging the predicament of street urchins,

at least periodically, and perhaps to address this phenomenon to a reasonable measure. Unfortunately, the Nigerian factor of treating issues of the downtrodden with levity still leaves society in this precarious situation of street urchin menace. The case of the child's right act signed into law since 2003, but not put into practice or respected by successive government is apt.

Meanwhile, whether Nigerians are aware of the International Day for street children or not, J. Adibe (2019) argues that the Nigerian "government has not done anything" to address the street urchin menace. There have been a few instances where government and even non-governmental organisations, religious bodies and the like have waded into this problem either for good or for bad. From the government angle, former military head of state, Ibrahim Babangida, established People's Bank which offered micro-credits to many *street boys* to start small businesses (Anyanwu, Uwatt, 1993). The programme suffered, however, from insufficient funding and adequate sustainability. In Lagos State, B. Tinubu as the governor of the state set up a skill training centre to rehabilitate the street boys. However the programme also collapsed as others because of lack of commitment and poor implementation. In Calabar, the capital of Cross River State, O. Imoke used government resources as the then First Lady of the State (the Governors' wife) and initiated a scheme – The Mother against Child Abandonment (MACA), which culminated in the establishment of the Destiny Child Centre in October 2009 (Adegbamigbe et al., 2020). This was a rehabilitation centre for street children. However laudable as this initiative was, it became moribund because of non-commitment by the successive government and an influx of other street urchins that the available funds could not contain with.

Recently the Lagos state government has been making frantic efforts to partner with UNICEF to rid Lagos streets of the urchins and enable them to get back to school (UNICEF 2016). But how this will pan out is something one cannot be optimistic about. This is because there have been such programmes of collaboration earlier in several other states which did not bear the expected fruit. For example, some years back, there was a five-year counterpart funded programme between the Cross River State Government and the United Nations International Children's Educational Fund (UNICEF) on how to curb the phenomenon of street children, but the government

failed to keep their own side of the bargain and so the project was dead on arrival (Isine 2016).

Another form of common intervention to stop the menace of street urchins is the launching of armed operations by some government agencies. T. Harry (2017) narrates how operation *skolombo* was used brutally in Calabar, the capital of Cross River state, to either kill the street boys or dump them into some dungeons. The above is only typical example of how the Nigerian government sometimes brutally reacts towards the street urchins. There are many of such cases in other states. The problem, however, is that dumping urchins into some dungeons will only toughen them the more. Killing a few unfortunate ones caught misbehaving does not put an end to the ugly phenomenon, either. Instead, Nigerians are even witnessing an upsurge as their numbers and nefarious activities have increased. The urchins who survive such operations, instead of repenting, usually vent their anger on the common masses as they steal, vandalize, rape and commit some unprintable crimes in the society.

From the narrative above, it could be inferred that some NGOs, sociologists, psychotherapists, the clergy, economists and the like have in one way or the other contributed their quota in helping to proffer solution to this menace, yet with no remarkable and essential success to tell of.

6. Suggestion to reducing street urchins problem in Nigeria

6.1. Poverty alleviation

This work has shown that family is the fundamental risk factor for physical abuse and the children being in the street. Economic support is crucial for the children of poor families (Pillay 2018). Physical abuse occurs due to the parental stress caused by poverty. The study reveals that all the respondents are from rural areas and are affected by poverty. Consequently, children are pushed to or pulled by street factors. Poverty alleviation schemes need to be devised to assist poor families or foster parents to have better opportunities to improve their earning capacity to overcome poverty and to provide adequately for their children. Government can provide various schemes to assist single parents, especially women, to get involved in in-

come-generating activities, e.g. self-help women groups. This will enhance their income, improve their capability and will enable them to provide for their children.

6.2. Training on appropriate parenting problem

Study reveals that instability in the families develops due to parental conflict, domestic violence, broken relationship, divorce and re-marriage (Animasahun 2014). Children leave home because of their parents' inappropriate parenting. Many of them are addicted to alcohol and other substances. They are ignorant of the problems of children and are incapable of controlling their impulses, stress and depression. Consequently, children are physically abused by their parents. Many of the street children who are physically abused belong to the younger age group. The lower their age, the higher the frequency and severity of physical abuse.

Marriage preparation and family guidance are needed for young parents to understand and take up the responsibility of the family. They need techniques and self-control skills to manage heightened anxiety, anger arousal and cognitive distortions. They require training to use alternative non-physical use of punishment instead of physical discipline or harsh punishment of their children. It is suggested that government must set up *parenting schools* at the primary schools in rural areas to equip parents with useful information and skills on parenting. Positive reinforcement, e.g. appreciation, praise and reward for accomplishments are more helpful for children to become optimistic, achievement-oriented and fostering pro-social behaviour. It can be taught to potential parents and new parents for learning good child-drearing practices to reduce the physical abuse of children. It must become a way of life for parents and teachers.

Parents need to give adequate care, protection and education to children from a young age. In addition, the assistance of grandparents can play a vital role in preventing physical abuse and they can provide proper care for grandchildren. The family support programme can help families to develop resilience, healthy coping strategies and capabilities to participate in mainstream society. Consequently, children can receive better care, improve the child-parent relationship and fewer children will run away from home.

6.3. Alternative family care for children problem

This work has shown that children migrate to the streets because of the adverse circumstances of families, severe to very severe, and fatal physical violence from father, mother, brother, uncle, aunt, stepfather, stepmother and relatives. It is further aggravated by domestic violence and family conflicts. The government must provide alternative care for those who cannot obtain care from their families. Public awareness to promote people's concern for the miserable young children can encourage the culturally viable traditional role of the neighbourhood, extended family and other kin in rearing young children. The government's provision of necessary economic support to extended family, kin and to the neighbourhood will further encourage their involvement in helping these children.

6.4. Child care centres problem

This study shows that children in some families are in danger, as some parents can inflict severe physical abuse and even kill them. Normally, parents who physically abuse or abandon their children are not punished and no support services have been developed for these children. In such situations, it is recommended that children be removed from the guardianship of dangerous abusive parents and kept in alternative family care. Small child care centres inaccessible areas or arrangements for foster care can help as alternative ways to support unfortunate children. As a result, fewer children may aimlessly migrate to the urban streets. As E. Munro (2007) suggests, children need to be removed from the home while the parents receive treatment, after which the child can be returned. Parents who have the psychotic illness are not deemed treatable and so their children will need permanent alternative care.

6.5. Outreach programme and in-street support problem

As children are deprived of basic facilities, they collect scraps, engage in begging and other unhygienic and unhealthy activities to obtain money and food. Lack of necessary provision and protection often turns street children to negative survival strategies, e.g. substance abuse and delinquent activities. Outreach Programme can target all street children wandering in the street and provide them with food, emer-

gency medical care, counselling and temporary shelter. It can help to prevent them from using negative and risky strategies for survival. Besides taking care of the immediate needs of the children, they can be significantly helped to find a more socially acceptable direction in life. This programme not only provides first aid to the street children but also serve to connect them with other service programmes, e.g. institutional care, foster care or family integration.

In-street support must be provided to children to build healthy networks, prevent physical violence and reduce exposure to physical violence in the dynamic and unprotected environments of the street. Hence, it is necessary to facilitate access to non-violent shelters and emergency and other support services. Initiating the rehabilitation process of street children at an early stage is imperative before they are trapped in substance and other abusive activities, as it can be a major impediment to their rehabilitation.

7. Conclusion

The work set out to expose the menace of street urchins in Nigeria. This phenomenon constitutes part of the social ills that the country is currently facing. It was shown that attempts by both government agencies and non-government organisations to address the problem have failed. The reason adduced is that they failed to ask fundamental and broad-based questions. The research journey with children has been very enriching and interesting. However, the shocking incidents and impact of physical abuse is challenging. The country that is hosting the larger number of children in the world is not able to cater to the development and needs of children. Hence the researcher feels strongly that a lot more time, finance and human power are to be invested to enhance the lives of millions of children. Many are involved in promoting the lives of children on a regular basis. The street children phenomenon is large and has an extensive area to explore and study. The present study reveals the experience and perception of physically abused street children in their family and in the street and the way they deal with the problem and its consequence. There is an urgent need of further in-depth studies in this area. Future research need to explore

links between children's environments and strive to understand their interconnected nature.

There is a clear gap between academic research and government policies as the schemes and policies do not reflect the knowledge acquired from the academic research (Thomas 2007). Policy makers need to fill this gap by utilising the findings from academic research while planning for the welfare of street children. Academic research is fragmented into separate disciplines and, therefore, they need to be systematised and streamlined. Research must include a wide range of relevant disciplines, which can include law, finance, economics, public policy, criminology, social policy, media studies, political science, social work, medicine and urban planning.

The policies and programmes of NGO and government in Nigeria have touched upon the areas of abused children. However, the requirement is far from desirable. Hence, enlightened public policy and the replication of high-quality publicly supported interventions are needed to successfully combat child physical abuse. Public needs to be reminded that child abuse and neglect are serious threats to children's healthy development. Physical violence toward children and a persistent lack of attention to their care, protection and supervision are unacceptable. Individuals have the ability and right to accept personal responsibility for reducing acts of child abuse and neglect by providing support and protection to all children within their family and community. The recommendation of research can help reduce the problem of street urchins in Nigeria.

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The parasite syndrome. Urban and metropolitan social inequality – a global, European and Polish outlook

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Abstract

In this article, the authors analyse selected outlooks of social inequality as it can be observed in cities and metropolises. Attention is paid to three aspects of the question: income inequality, housing inequality and the risk of poverty. The text points out the spatial dimension of urban and metropolitan inequality and also differences in levels of inequality on the global, European and local scales. The analysis of available data shows that inequality most seriously affects cities located in the developing world (mainly in Africa), but it appears to a similar extent in the US cities. The situation of European cities regarding inequality looks much better. This does not mean, however, that European cities have avoided inequality and its negative results. In Europe, the "urban paradox" can be observed as the cities accumulate wealth and growth multipliers and concentrate social inequality. Although the cities of Central and Eastern Europe appear to be in a better position, their situation must be seen in the context of their more difficult demographic situation. The most significant inequalities in Poland, as in other European countries, can be observed in metropolitan cities. The increasing income differential may be considered the basis of the distinction between the well-qualified workers of specialised metropolitan services and the workers in traditional occupations; this confirms a division in the metropolitan class, as well as urban middle and lower classes. The revealed factors lead to two principal conclusions. The first one highlights the multidimensionality of urban and metropolitan inequality,

resulting in a *dual city*. The second factor concerns the potential social conflicts, known as the *parasite* syndrome. The two are connected with a rise in the level of intra-metropolitan inequality.

Key words: social inequality, metropolis, city, poverty, parasite syndrome.

1. Introduction

The issue of social inequality is frequently addressed in analyses devoted to social and urban development (cf. Pobłocki 2017; Modai-Snir, van Ham, 2018; Hryniewicz 2019; Nijman, Wei, 2020; Tonkiss 2020; Zhu et al., 2020). The interest in this topic stems from at least two sources. The first one is the noticeable increase in inequality around the world. The deepening of inequality is associated with changes in the global economic system resulting from the mechanisms for functioning the information-based economy (Nijman, Wei, 2020) and with the advent of crises set off by finance capitalism (Pobłocki 2017; Hryniewicz 2019). This situation is also reflected in the logic of urbanisation, which, in contrast to the 20th century, present nowadays the most significant dynamics in developing and low-income regions (Gleaser, Henderson, 2017).

The second reason for the current interest in social inequality is the presence of this issue in the most important documents relating to global, urban and metropolitan development. The question of inequality and its adverse global effects is raised in, among other places, the UN's "2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" (2015) and "The New Urban Agenda" (2016), while the European perspective of the inequality issue is treated in the European Commission's "Towards a Sustainable Europe 2030" (2019). The perception of inequality as one of the fundamental challenges of the contemporary world (along with the climate and demographics) has caused the analysis and multidimensional understanding of this phenomenon (cf. Nijman, Wei, 2020; Tonkiss 2020) to become an academic, economic, social and political task.

Therefore, the present article makes a contribution to the contemporary discussion on social inequality. The authors aim to present certain aspects of urban and metropolitan inequalities considered on various scales – global, European and national (Polish) – and discuss the possibilities of their reduction. The reference to the Polish situation points to the specific forms of social inequality in the Central European

countries. In these countries, the logic of city formation in the second half of the 20th century and the resulting social structure of urban residents were different from those observed in Western Europe (de Lille 2009, 2012, 2016; Lorens 2012). These differences, as shown by data cited later, can still be observed.

Three main fields displaying inequality are emphasised in the paper: income inequality, housing inequality and poverty risk. Data presented in the article justify a thesis that the failure to stop the growth of inequalities will lead to more frequent and violent social conflicts related to the growing social stratification. In this text, special attention is paid to metropolises, which are more exposed than other categories of cities to increases in social inequality.

2. The specificity of social inequality in cities – a conceptual framework

The issue of social inequality is situated in the context of analyses of social structures and their hierarchical diversity. The diversity may pertain to social positions and access to social resources, e.g. power, prestige, income or cultural goods. Similarly, inequality itself may be described as a form of diversity, which takes the form of a hierarchy of resources (Domański 2004: 23-34). Three basic categories of inequality are distinguished, corresponding to particular resources: economic (including income, employment, property and living conditions), social (including prestige, lifestyle, participation in culture and social capital) and political (including differences in access to power and in civic engagement) – (Wnuk-Lipiński 2008: 66; Wójcik-Żołądek 2013; Mikuła 2016). This general division takes on a particular form in cities and metropolises, even though many kinds of inequality are not strictly connected with cities; rather they are generated by global, national or regional systems of distribution and capital flows (Castells 2007; Pobłocki 2017; Tonkiss 2020). Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that cities, and even more metropolises, are main hubs in networks of capital flow (Castells 2007). Therefore it is within them that inequalities become particularly evident.

Spatial distribution is characteristic of urban social inequality. This feature was already discussed in studies conducted by the Chicago School of sociology (e.g. Anderson 1923/1961; Zorbaugh 1929), especially those ascribed to urban ecology

(Czekaj 2007). More recently it has been stressed that the spatial distribution of urban social inequality is harnessed to the crisis-prone logic of global finance capitalism (Glaeser et al. 2009; Pobłocki 2017; Brossaud et al., 2019). The higher profits that result from market speculation propel the growth in inequality. And in this context, gentrification emerges as a particularly significant phenomenon in creating inequality (Lees 2019; Couture et al., 2020). It is evident that gentrification is associated with re-urbanisation, often in a policy of interwoven urban redevelopment (Lees 2019) and, in connection with that, it is harnessed to the mechanism for the global flows of speculative capital (Lees 2019; Couture et al., 2020). Urban renewal causes specific outcomes related to increases in social segregation and the incidence of inequality in access to urban amenities. And the inability to obtain access to public services (in particular education, health and transit), green areas and potable water is a key dimension of urban inequality (Gleaser 2011a; Lelo et al., 2018; Rose 2019: 307-407; Couture et al., 2020; Nijman, Wei, 2020: 5-6). Moreover, as studies in American cities have shown, intra-urban mobility of lower income groups, who often belong to ethnic minorities, does not lead to the improvement of residential areas but often to the reproduction of lower social indicators in other disfavoured neighbourhoods (De Luca, Jang-Trettien, 2020).

Gentrification also impacts the social conditions of those in the suburbs, which have become ever more diversified (Florida, Adler, 2019; Nijman, Wei, 2020: 3). Near the suburbs inhabited by middle- and upper-class residents, there is an increase in suburban housing estates occupied principally by members of the lower classes and underclass. In extreme cases, such housing estates become urban slums (Davis 2009; Roy et al., 2018). Housing inequality thus appears as the second most significant aspect of social inequality in cities after income inequality, to which it is closely related.

A contemporary overview of cities, and particularly those forming metropolises, leads to some key observations. First, it can be distinguished the "patchwork metropolises" regarding the spatial dimension of social inequality (Florida, Adler, 2018). The challenge is to recognise their patterns; Richard Florida and Patrick Adler (2018), based on an analysis of 12 American metropolises, identify three such types: core-

oriented, class block and fractal. This is an intriguing starting point for further research. Second, in the context of urban inequality one can refer to a paradox noted by Edward Glaeser (2011b; cf. Sampson 2019): inequality in cities also rises because cities generally provide greater opportunities for people to improve their social position, and this attracts immigrants. Only a small fraction of the new urban inhabitants, however, actually succeed in their social improvement. At the same time, the remainder further enlarges the categories of the urban poor, leading to an increase in social inequality. Third, it must be emphasised that the specific form of urban inequalities is their multidimensionality, but income inequality is a universal factor of other forms of social inequality (Nijman, Wei, 2020: 5-6).

The overlapping of social inequalities is described in the present article as the *parasite syndrome*, in reference to Bong Joon-ho's Oscar-winning film *Parasite* (2019). This film's depiction of the social relations between two families living in a metropolis perfectly illustrates the fact that, aside from the income factor, social inequality affects living conditions, possessions, educational and employment opportunities, and access to the internet, and is also expressed in the aroma and variety of foodstuffs (Liu 2020; Octavia 2021; Sihombing, Sinaga, 2021; Turner 2021). It is not an exhaustive list of social inequalities manifestations. However, it should be emphasised that they are interrelated and significantly affect metropolitan inhabitants. Therefore, the term *parasite syndrome* is used to emphasise that the statistical data cited in this article conceal a multidimensional phenomenon affecting the entire ways of life of the inhabitants of cities and metropolises.

3. Data sources and specificity

This article is devoted to analysing urban and metropolitan inequality on different scales: from local (various categories of Polish cities) through European to global. In this context, data were drawn from various sources, including the databases of the World Bank, Eurostat and the Polish General Statistical Office (GUS), which is supplemented by information from official reports. The authors' compilation of global, European and, specifically, Polish data permits a new light to be cast on urban social inequality.

The most frequently employed indicator of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which is also often referred to in this article. "It provides information about the degree of concentration of particular goods (salaries, property, etc.) in a society" (Wójcik-Żołądek 2013: 2). In this text, it is referred to as income diversity. It has to be acknowledged that the methodology of calculating the Gini coefficient differs from country to country. In Poland, the most frequently presented data were collected based on survey responses. In other countries, the most frequently used data may come from tax returns. The source of the data, i.e. input, influences the results of the analysis, as it was demonstrated by Paweł Bukowski and Filip Novokmet. These authors, in calculations based on data gathered from tax forms, indicated a higher value of the Gini coefficient (0.44) that than produced by the statistics of GUS (0.33) – (Bukowski, Novokmet, 2017: 19; cf. Brzeziński 2017). Regardless of these discrepancies and contrasts, data used in this article were supplied by statistical offices or international comparative studies.

In the case of data derived from the Eurostat archives, particularly useful were those which incorporated the degree of urbanisation indicator, DEGURBA ("degree of urbanisation"), which arose a few years ago as a joint initiative of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union. While recognising the blurred transition in today's world from one category to another, DEGURBA distinguishes three levels of urbanisation, i.e. (1) cities, (2) towns and suburbs and (3) rural areas[1]. In such a division, cities are characterised as clusters, comprised of adjacent cells of single units of 1 km^2 with a population density of at least 1,500 each (Dijkstra, Poelman, 2012). This way of aggregating data is particularly useful in analyses of suburbanisation and human migration between metropolitan areas and their surroundings; it also facilitates the analysis of the diversity of selected dimensions of inequality among the three types of area.

[1] The DEGURBA classification is also applied to the territorial units of the EU on the basis of their population density of and spatial continuity on a grid of 1 km^2. The degree of urbanisation identified by DEGURBA defines the character of an area in a uniform way throughout the EU. It is used for, among other things, designating functionally urban areas, and also helps to create a typology of metropolitan areas. In Poland, this classification is based on the administrative unit of the *gmina* (*Polska w Unii...*, 2019: 15).

The remaining types of data and indicators (e.g. the inequality index S80/20, household infrastructure or indices of poverty) are less extensive and used in the standard indication of social distinctions.

4. Income inequality

In the last few decades, social inequality has been rising notably faster in the metropolitan areas of the United States than in those of Europe. This is clearly shown by the Gini coefficient, which in many US metropolitan areas has significantly exceeded 0.5. In 2019, the highest coefficient was noted for Atlanta (0.573), followed by Miami (0.567), New Orleans (0.562), New York and Cleveland (0.547) – (Bach 2020). Higher values than these for the metropolitan inequality coefficients can be noted only for some cities in Africa, e.g. Durban and Johannesburg (0.63), Bamako (0.62) and Addis Ababa (0.61), as well as in South America, e.g. Rio de Janeiro (0.63) and La Paz (0.57) – (da Cruz et al. 2020). European cities are in the opposite situation. Among the 58 metropolises on all continents included in the study carried out by Nuno F. da Cruz, Do Young Oh and Nathalie Badaoui Choumar (2020), the lowest Gini coefficients were recorded for Berlin (0.29), Barcelona (0.30) and Manchester (0.31). From this quick review of the data, it is evident that the issue of income inequality affects particular cities of developing countries and those in the United States. In contrast, the indices for European cities and metropolises are rather favourable.

The Gini coefficient for Polish cities is close to that for other European metropolises. In the GUS report (*Income levels*..., 2019), the inequality indices are presented under six categories of places (Table 1). The values of the Gini coefficient indicate that income inequality in Polish cities and villages has decreased over recent years. It is also worth noting that the value of the Gini coefficient in Poland (0.278) is below the EU average (0.308), as has been revealed by Eurostat data for 2018.

Table 1. Comparison of measures of disposable income differentiation by class of localities, 2008, 2015 and 2018

Indicator	Year of survey	Class of locality						
		Urban size (,000)						Rural
		Total	500 or over	200-499	100-199	20-99	< 20	
Gini coefficient*	2008	31.6	36.9	29.5	28.7	29.3	27.8	29.1
	2015	29.9	32.5	29.3	27.0	28.4	28.6	29.3
	2018	27.3	28.7	27.2	26.7	25.8	26.1	26.5
S80/20	2008	5.0	6.3	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.2	4.5
	2015	4.7	5.1	4.5	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.6
	2018	4.1	4.4	4.0	4.1	3.8	4.1	4.0

Source: after *Dochody i warunki*... (2019: 99).

* In the source material the Gini coefficient is presented on a scale of 0-100 (where 0 indicates lack of inequality and 100 indicates full inequality).

In the context of the observed data, it should be noted that the most significant inequalities in Poland, as in other European countries, occur in metropolitan cities. This, in turn, suggests that the division into a metropolitan class (now also called *transnational* – Pobłocki 2017: 502-503) and urban middle and lower classes, implied by Bohdan Jałowiecki (2000: 95-101), has not lost its relevance. This increasing income differential, which may be considered the basis of the distinction between the well-qualified workers of specialised metropolitan services and the workers in traditional occupations (sales, transit, health and social services), has also been noted by J. Nijman and Y. D. Wei (2020: 2-3).

It is also necessary to point out the income differentials between metropolises, cities and towns (Table 2). To make the extreme comparison – between metropolitan cities and rural areas – the income of the latter's inhabitants reaches only 66.2% that of the former, and the inhabitants of small towns (sized less than 20,000) earn an average of just 78.1% that of the residents of metropolitan cities. When referencing data

of this kind, however, it should be kept in mind the respective differences in the cost of living (which is much higher in metropolitan areas) and the fact that great differences of income exist within, as well as between, all localities. It is also worth pointing out that the differences between the metropolises and the smaller cities are being reduced. This reduction may be connected with the burgeoning of policies of social transfer ("redistributive policies") in recent years, e.g. the "500+ programme" (Wołoszyn, Wysocki, 2020: 363, 367).

Table 2. Average disposable income, median and ratio of median to income by classes of localities, 2018

Indicator	Currency	Urban size (,000)						Rural
		Total	500 or over	200-499	100-199	20-99	< 20	
Disposable income	PLN	34293	40264	35293	33652	32396	31469	26671
	EUR*	8050	9452	8285	7900	7605	7387	6260
Median	PLN	30553	35913	31306	30577	29238	29034	24144
	EUR*	7172	8430	7349	7178	5863	6815	5668
Median to average ratio of disposable income (%)		89.1	89.2	88.7	90.9	90.3	92.3	90.5

*Authors' estimate, average annual exchange rate (2018) according to data from the National Bank of Poland: 1 EUR = 4.26 PLN

Source: *Dochody i warunki…* (2019: 93).

The analysis of inequality based on the Gini coefficient presents a general outlook of the situation in a given city or metropolitan area. However, social inequality most commonly has also a spatial dimension, which is reflected in socio-spatial segregation. The metropolitan cities are particularly concerned as their boundaries en-

compass a mosaic of cultural zones (to use this term in the classic form propagated by the Chicago School of sociology), which include neighbourhoods homogeneous in terms of social status. It is often connected with the ethnic affiliation of the communities (cf. Lelo et al. 2018; Modai-Snir, van Ham, 2018; Mossay, Picard, 2019: 481). The situation looks somewhat different in post-socialist cities, where housing estates built during the 20th century (including block housing estates) mostly retained their heterogeneity (Szafrańska 2016). Irrespective of these historical distinctions, however, phenomena associated with inequality in large cities tend to accumulate: from income, through access to transport and other public services, to political inequality and health. As an illustration of the latter, one can review recent figures for average life expectancy. In Warsaw, according to 2012-2014 data, the average life expectancy for the most advantageous district (women 86.0, men 80.9) was almost by ten years higher than that for the most disadvantageous (women 79.4, men 71.1) – (Olsińska 2016). In London, the difference in average life expectancy between residents of the wealthiest and poorest boroughs is as much as 20 years (Rose 2019: 391), and in São Paulo reaches 25 years (*Public good*…, 2019: 34).

5. Housing inequality

Socio-spatial segregation is directly associated with access to housing and the cost of purchase or rent an apartment. Surveying the spatial distribution of urban social inequality in the city from a global perspective, one can find that the most serious issue involves the number of people inhabiting informal housing settlements or slums[2]. It is a problem taken up in a series of international documents and reports concerned with global urban development. It was addressed in the Urban Agenda (Habitat II, 1996), and then, in connection with the persistence of this problem, in the New Urban Agenda (Habitat III, 2016), where it was considered in reference to section 11.2 of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals to 2030 (2015). The data testify to the scale of this phenomenon. According to UN Habitat, the global proportion of urban dwellers living in slums in 2014 was 29.7%. Admittedly this percentage had fallen by 1.9% from 2001 (31.6%), while, in absolute terms, the number of people

[2] The term *slums* is used herein for informal or unauthorised urban housing, rather than, as frequently in North America, for any disadvantaged neighbourhood.

living in informal housing increased from 689 mln in 1990 to 881 mln in 2014 (World Cities Report 2016: 14).

This indicates that about a quarter of all inhabitants of urban areas on the Earth live in slums (*Quartiers informels*…, 2015: 3-4). According to the World Bank figures, in countries with the lowest incomes, this figure equals to 64.4%; in three African countries, the figure is higher than 90%, and in two others higher than 80% (Data Bank, World Bank 2020). The UN estimates that the number of people living in non-permanent housing will rise to 1.2 bln by 2050. The chances for newcomers to a slum to leave it are not high. For example, in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa for every 10 mln new urbanites, 7 mln live in slums, yet only 2 mln of them have a chance to leave them (*Quartiers informels*…, 2015: 3-4). The process of urbanisation in Africa is, therefore, often described as "urbanisation without development" (Bairoch 1996: 47-48), highlighting the increase in the number of people living in urban areas and the persistence of infrastructure shortage and difficult living conditions. Living in slums is also associated with other forms of inequality, e.g. in education, health and transport, and even more deleterious phenomena, including crime, prostitution, child labour, etc.

Inequality is also expressed in unequal access to sanitation services. A lack of access to running water and sanitation was characterised by Mike Davis as "living in shit" (Davis 2009: 194-201). The global urban population in 2017 generally had better access to this kind of basic amenity than the rural one (globally the access was reported for 84.4% of the urban population and 58.7% of the rural one). The access to basic sanitation is closely correlated with the income levels of individual categories of countries (Table 3). In the countries and regions of the world with the lowest incomes this access in urban areas was 44.8% in 2017, while at the same time for urban inhabitants of countries with the highest income levels it was 99.0%.

Table 3. Percentage of people with access to basic sanitation infrastructure, 2000-2017

Region/Country	People with access to basic sanitation infrastructure			
	Urban (%)		Rural (%)	
	2000	2017	2000	2017
Poland	94.0	98.5	77.2	99.2
World	77.5	84.4	34.3	58.7
East Asia & Pacific	76.5	89.3	45.0	74.1
Europe & Central Asia	96.1	98.0	84.0	93.1
Latin America & Caribbean	82.0	91.3	46.4	68.5
Middle East & North Africa	90.6	94.1	71.4	81.2
North America	100.0	99.9	99.8	99.8
South Asia	50.8	70.5	8.1	52.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	36.9	44.9	16.6	21.7
Low income	35.1	44.8	13.9	23.6
Lower-average income	58.8	71.9	19.0	53.6
Higher-average income	82.6	91.9	50.6	78.3
High income	99.0	99.3	96.2	98.9

Source: Data Bank, World Bank (2020).

In the case of regions, the access to basic sanitation is lowest in sub-Saharan Africa (44.9%). This is also the only region in which the access to sanitation in recent years rose more quickly in urban than rural areas. In Southern Asia, access to sanitation for urban populations has reached 70.5%.

In Poland, the access to basic sanitation in cities rose from 94.0% in 2000 to 98.5% in 2017, and in rural areas from 77.2% to 99.2% (Data Bank, World Bank 2020). Access to the other infrastructure amenities, e.g. water from municipal mains, connection to gas mains and central heating, has been rising for the last two decades (*Mały Rocznik*…, 2019). Still, however, basic infrastructural amenities are inaccessible for everybody, and the availability is higher in cities than in rural areas (Muzioł-Węcławowicz, Nowak, 2018: 41-44). Therefore Poland's situation is similar to that of

other regions (even though on different levels of indicator value) and the living conditions are higher in the cities than in rural areas.

From the Polish perspective, the inadequate sanitation infrastructure is connected with substandard housing[3]. At the beginning of the 2010s (based on data from the National Census), "more than 1.3 [mln] housing units in Poland were substandard, which comprised 10.7% of the total of permanent usable housing. In the cities, there were 0.6 [mln] substandard units, and in rural areas 0.7 [mln]. […] 5.3 million people inhabited these units in 2011, comprising 14.1% of the total population, of which 2.2 [mln] lived in cities and 3.1 [mln] in the rural areas. […] Substandard conditions are found relatively frequently in the housing stock of local authorities and in private housing stocks with a long term of use" (Muzioł-Węcławowicz, Nowak, 2018: 41-44). It can be supposed that since 2011 this situation has somewhat improved, it is certain, however, that the problem of substandard housing has not been resolved.

A related issue is the question of the indebtedness of housing units in Poland. The difficulties with the payment of rents most seriously affect the tenants of municipal apartments – for whom the average amount of arrears owed by indented tenants was 10,728 PLN in 2018 (the average for Poland in 2018 was 3,407 PLN, the total indebtedness being almost 6.5 bln PLN, and there were 7.5 mln indebted units or 25.5% of the total number of units). A similar scale of indebtedness was found only in case of company-owned flats (9,709 PLN on average), but debts on these apartments totalled only 3.2% of the total indebtedness on apartments in Poland, and that on municipal apartments 64.7% (*Gospodarka mieszkaniowa*…, 2019: 19). It is also municipal apartments and subsidised housing that most frequently include units categorised as substandard.

Arrears in rent (especially in municipal apartments) illustrate a problem of the urban housing policies, which is related to the insufficient supply of subsidised housing. Data from 2018 show that more than 85,000 households (of which 91% were urban) sought this type of housing unit (*Gospodarka mieszkaniowa*…, 2019: 29). The

[3] According to criteria employed by GUS, substandard housing is that in which "all apartments lack basic utilities, with inconveniences resulting from the absence of repair work, all apartments are excessively cramped, and all apartments have defects and inconveniences such as poor layout of rooms, insufficient natural light, or lack of elevators in multi-storied dwellings" (Muzioł-Węcławowicz, Nowak, 2018: 44).

lack of subsidised housing points to another issue related to housing policy in Poland, viz. the lack of rental units outside the commercial market. In Poland, as in cities in the Central European countries, the structure of the housing supply is dominated by private ownership (according to Eurostat data from 2018, 84% in Poland, compared to an EU average of 69.3%). Commercial renting, particularly in metropolitan cities, is, because of high costs, simply unavailable to many individuals from the urban middle and lower classes. This fact significantly contributes to the increase in spatial segregation and the growth in suburbanisation that is driven by lower real estate costs (also for rental properties) on the peripheries of metropolitan areas.

Gentrification is another key factor of spatial segregation. This has been particularly observed in North American cities, although it is also present in European cities. Gentrification is identified with the modernisation of housing structures and the accompanying increase in the cost of real estate in central, or other desirable, quarters of a city, which leads to the displacement of low-income urban inhabitants to other districts where housing costs and rents remain low. Thus, rapid increase in the cost of buying or renting a housing unit negatively impacts the household budgets of residents, throwing some of them into poverty and hardship, or forcing them to leave the area (cf. Gądecki 2012: 29-57; Drozda 2017: 79-90; Sagan 2017: 112-125; Florida, Adler, 2018; Nijman, Wei, 2020: 3). Sometimes it can even lead to protests, such as that in the summer of 2019 in the working-class Lyon neighbourhood of La Croix-Rousse, which had been invaded by developers.

Case studies of individual metropolises well describe the contemporary process of socio-spatial segregation. The spatial order composes of mosaics (Florida, Adler, 2018). In the European metropolises, most often the privileged districts are wealthy and gentrified central neighbourhoods of the cities and affluent suburbs. Deprived urban areas are problem central districts and depressed suburbia with a poor transport system, often distant from workplaces and urban amenities (Lelo, et al. 2018; Modai-Snir, van Ham, 2018; Haddad 2020). In such cases, it is easy to see the accumulation of urban inequalities. Access to some services by the internet does not reduce inequality, either. Thus, it is still the spatial distance, especially in the case of suburbs, that plays an important role in maintaining inequality. Rather, one can

agree with E. W. Soja (2009) that social processes create today the spatial forms of the city, just as the spatial arrangement creates social relations (Beauchamps 2012). It is worth mentioning that facing the challenge of contemporary socio-spatial segregation in urban areas refers to the aim of the 11th point of the UN's 2030 *Agenda for Sustainable Development*.

The question of housing inequality may also be looked at from the perspective of household cost of housing. This is how Eurostat presents this issue. The most important indicator used by this agenda to permit identification of housing problems impacting people's material situation is the percentage of people living in households in which net housing costs exceed 40% of disposable income. In 2018, for the entire EU this indicator stood at 9.9%[4]. A significantly higher percentage of households affected by excessive housing costs were observed in cities (12.4%), while for those living in smaller towns and suburbs (9.8%) and the rural areas (7.5%) the percentages were below average. In only four countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Lithuania – the indicator was higher for rural than urban areas. Therefore, this problem concerns mainly cities, especially of Western Europe (Table 4).

Table 4. Housing cost overburden rate by degree of urbanisation, 2018 (%)

Country	Cities	Towns and suburbs	Villages
Greece	43.9	41.3	31.7
Denmark	21.2	12.5	10.7
Luxembourg	18.0	7.9	7.6
Germany	17.6	13.3	10.4
United Kingdom	16.2	13.1	14.9
Bulgaria	16.1	15.6	22.0
Belgium	14.6	6.9	6.0
Czechia	12.9	7.0	4.4
EU-28	12.4	9.8	7.5
Netherlands	12.1	6.4	4.6

[4] Authors' estimate based on Eurostat data, 2020.

Italy	11.7	7.2	5.0
Austria	11.6	5.6	4.0
Hungary	11.3	7.8	9.6
Sweden	10.1	7.5	6.2
Spain	10.0	9.6	6.0
Poland	8.3	6.0	4.8
Slovenia	7.6	4.8	3.7
Romania	7.0	8.7	13.2
Latvia	6.9	7.2	6.2
France	6.3	4.5	2.4
Portugal	6.0	6.0	5.1
Slovakia	5.6	4.9	2.7
Finland	5.4	4.4	2.7
Estonia	4.6	4.7	2.7
Ireland	4.5	3.9	2.2
Croatia	4.2	4.8	6.0
Lithuania	4.1	8.3	6.7
Cyprus	3.1	1.0	0.6
Malta	1.7	1.6	-

Source: Eurostat Data Explorer (2020)

It can be concluded that, except for Greece, which reflects the financial crisis overwhelmed that country, high (and indeed excessive) housing costs affect in particular the heartland of the European Union, which may be related, among other things, with the high cost of housing disbursements (rents or fees) and the high cost of real estate services. These costs are particularly burdensome for the lower-earning members of the urban middle and lower classes.

6. Risk of poverty

The analysis of urban inequality is worth ending with data relating to the risk of poverty. Factors of poverty include not only low, or a lack of, income but also ex-

cessively high costs of living, which is illustrated in, among other phenomena, the increase in the number of the working poor (cf. Muster 2012; Pobłocki 2017: 207).

The risk of poverty index has been used in analyses of Eurostat for several years. According to these calculations, 21.8% of the inhabitants of the European Union were at risk of poverty in 2018. In cities, this figure amounted to 22.0%, in small towns and suburbs to 19.9%, and in the rural areas to 23.5%. A detailed analysis of the data allows to find interesting contrasts between Central and Eastern European countries and the "old" EU's countries. In the CEE countries, populations at risk of poverty and social exclusion live predominantly in rural areas or suburbs, and urban residence significantly reduces the statistical chance of impoverishment. However, in Western Europe, although the cities are marked by a decidedly higher level of affluence, the risk of poverty is more significant than in small towns, suburbs, and rural areas (Table 5). This constitutes the urban paradox, mentioned at the beginning of this article.

Table 5. Population at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2018 (%)

Country	Cities	Towns and suburbs	Villages
Slovakia	10.4	16.4	19.1
Czechia	12.0	12.9	11.6
Poland	13.4	16.0	25.3
Hungary	14.2	18.9	25.8
Slovenia	16.3	15.6	16.6
Finland	16.6	16.2	16.6
Sweden	16.9	17.0	20.4
Ireland	17.6	25.8	21.5
Croatia	18.3	23.5	30.9
Romania	18.6	24.9	45.5
Lithuania	19.4	28.7	35.4
Malta	19.5	15.0	-
France	19.7	19.2	13.7

Netherlands	19.8	12.4	12.8
Portugal	20.0	19.8	26.3
Cyprus	20.4	28.3	26.4
Denmark	20.8	15.1	15.1
UE-28	22.0	19.9	23.5
Estonia	22.1	20.4	29.5
Germany	22.4	16.1	17.5
Spain	23.2	26.9	31.0
Latvia	24.2	30.2	32.3
Luxembourg	24.2	25.1	17.4
Bulgaria	24.3	29.1	47.4
United Kingdom	24.7	20.3	21.5
Austria	25.5	13.5	14.2
Belgium	29.2	15.6	18.8
Italy	29.2	26.1	26.7
Greece	30.5	30.1	35.2

Source: Eurostat Data Explorer (2020)

In the Polish statistics, the indicator for populations at risk of poverty is calculated differently than in European statistics[5]. The results of this analysis methods are similar, although not univocal, contrary to those arrived at by the Gini coefficient or the S80/20 index. On the one hand, the results clearly indicate that the larger the city, the lower the poverty risk, on the other hand, however, this correlation is not linear. Looking at the data for 2008, 2015 and 2018 (cf. Table 6), it can be noticed that the figure for poverty risk for cities, in general, slightly increased between 2008 and 2015, to decrease by 2018. Exceptions to this pattern are found in the figures for metropolitan cities and those sized 100,000 to 199,000. In these two categories of cities, the rate of poverty risk decreased between 2008 and 2015 and then increased again by 2018. It

[5] The percentage of people with an annual disposable income below the risk of poverty threshold, which equals to 60% of the national median of annual disposable income after social benefits payments (*Dochody i warunki…*, 2019: 240).

is difficult to find a clear explanation for this phenomenon. In the case of the largest cities, it may reflect the influx of new inhabitants belonging to the urban middle and lower classes, attracted by an expanding labour market, but failed to succeed on the competitive labour and housing markets. For cities sized 100,000 to 199,000, in turn, the cause of this statistical pattern may lie in these cities' loss of their social-economic roles (cf. Śleszyński 2016), which influenced the situation of their inhabitants. By contrast, the significant drop in the percentage of at-risk populations in smallest cities and rural areas can plausibly be explained by the effect of social benefits payments and EU programmes. However, a precise analysis of the causes of such anomalies require more extensive research.

Table 6. At-risk-of poverty rate after social transfers by class of localities, 2008, 2015 and 2018

Indicator	Year of survey	Class of locality						
		Urban size (,000)						Rural
		Total	500 or over	200-499	100-199	20-99	< 20	
Risk of poverty rate	2008	11.9	7.2	8.8	11.9	13.0	16.8	24.7
	2015	12.5	6.4	11.5	9.4	13.9	17.2	25.2
	2018	10.8	7.0	9.1	11.9	13.6	13.5	20.8

Source: *Dochody i warunki*…, 2019: 95.

Therefore, residence in Polish cities is marked by a decreased risk of poverty, including extreme poverty. In this case, the data also indicate that the lowest incidence of extreme poverty is found in large and metropolitan cities, and the highest incidence in small towns and rural areas. This pattern is characteristic of the metropolises of the Central and Eastern European countries, in which inequalities are greater than in smaller urban centres and rural areas, but indicating a lower risk of extreme poverty (Table 7).

Table 7. Extent of extreme poverty, 2017 and 2018 by classes of locality

Indicator	Year of survey	Class of locality						
		Urban size (,000)						Rural
		Total	500 or over	200-499	100-199	20-99	< 20	
Extreme poverty rate	2017	2.4	1.5	1.1	1.8	2.8	4.1	7.3
	2018	2.8	0.9	1.2	2.7	3.1	5.1	9.4

Source: *Zasięg ubóstwa ekonomicznego*…, 2019: 5.

7. Discussion: the parasite syndrome or reduction in inequality

The question of inequality, despite concerns about the comparability of the international statistics by which it is measured, is comprehensively described on the global, continental and local scales. Available studies point to the key dimensions of inequality, from income inequality, through housing inequality and gender inequalities to that in access to public services (particularly health, education and transport). They also highlight the risks associated with the ever-increasing scale of inequality and raise the question of how to moderate degrees of inequality and restore equal opportunity.

Among the risks associated with the scale of inequality in the urban and metropolitan context, two are particularly significant: the commonness of inequality and its basic effect, viz. the creation of the modern *dual city* (Pobłocki 2017: 263). The question of inequality affects cities in every region of the globe. The analysis of available data shows that inequality most seriously affects cities located in the developing world (mostly in Africa), but it also appears in the US cities. However, the levels of wealth and poverty in these areas are decidedly different. This does not change the fact that in American cities, as in those of the developing world, a growing social polarisation may be noted (cf. Wnuk-Lipiński 2008: 59-60). Against this background, the situation of European cities concerning inequality is rather benign. This is the result of a different approach to the role of the state in the functioning of the market economy and the effect of socio-democratic doctrines that manifest as a drive to partially uncouple human life from market forces. This approach is not generally followed in

other parts of the world. This does not mean, however, that European cities have avoided inequality and its negative effects. The phenomenon of the *urban paradox*, referred to above and specifically applying to Western Europe, proof this best. Although cities accumulate wealth and growth multipliers, they also confront the most formidable challenges, including those relating to levels of social inequality. In this context, Central and Eastern European cities appear to be in a better position; this must be seen, however, in the context of their more difficult demographic situation, viz. the significant population decline that affects the majority of cities in the region.

The most striking symptom of urban inequality is the existence of slums (or, strictly, large areas of substandard housing). Approximately one billion current inhabitants of slums worldwide is affected by almost all forms of inequality and its negative effects: from insufficient income, through housing and sanitary conditions and access to public services, to various forms of criminality (especially organised crime, e.g. that associated with drug dealing or water distribution) – (cf. Davis 2009).

The existence of slums or impoverished districts is also the most obvious syndrome of the dual city, i.e. divided and polarised both spatially and socially. As indicated above, this condition is manifested in a mosaic of urban neighbourhoods, often in the form of cultural enclaves. In this context, the slums represent one side of cities and metropolises reality. The opposite side is formed by the wealthy communities, often guarded and gated, which only reinforces the existing spatial segregation. Social division, in turn, is expressed in the distinction between a metropolitan (transnational) class, the "people of the air", and the urban middle and lower classes, the "people of the street" (Raben 1991). It is important to note that these groupings are becoming more and more closed off from each other; their social networks have undergone encapsulation within their status group (Hannerz 2006: 293). One result of this is a phenomenon of the *parasite syndrome*. This term is characteristic of the pressure between the metropolitan class, living in their own encapsulated world, and the urban middle and lower classes who aspire to achieve a higher status. Their aspirations, in fact, cannot be fulfilled, and this results in frustration that, in turn, underlies social conflicts in the city. These conflicts, portrayed on the micro scale in the film *Parasite*, have, in fact, a much greater range. The protests known as "Occupy Wall Stre-

et" was indicative of this process. The protesters who took over Zuccotti Park in Manhattan in 2011, with their principal slogan "We are the 99%", clearly expressed and stressed the destructive role of increasing social inequality in the contemporary world (cf. Harvey 2012: 211-216).

8. Conclusion

Edward Gleaser (2011a: 593) wrote that to "ensure that the world's cities are going to be places of pleasure, as well as places of productivity, they need governments that can do a better job of providing the basics of city living: clean water, safe neighbourhoods, and fluid streets". The degree of access to these resources, as is argued in this article, is a key indicator of social inequality. The question, however, is whether it is really possible to reduce social inequality in general, and urban inequality in particular. It certainly is, but the political will to do so and a change in the behaviour of global business players is crucial. A key for solving the problem of inequality is the issue of equal access to public services, which would require a change in the model of their means of financing. In this context, it might be advisable to consider the proposals of the authors of a report by Oxfam. According to them, public services should be financed by state institutions, receiving their resources from an increase in taxes on the highest incomes, including both individuals and corporations (*Public good*…, 2019). This idea, like the proposal to tax speculative transfers of funds by the finance markets, is not new. In order to implement such actions, a global political consensus is needed, only to appear. Without such political will, individual projects undertaken to reduce inequality in certain cities, e.g. the model of "half-houses" in Iquique (McGuirk 2015: 92-99), the building of cable-cars as a part of the public transit network in South American cities (McGuirk 2015: 167-176), or additional taxes on the residents of gated communities in Buenos Aires (World Cities Report 2016: 35), will have only limited scope and local effects. These are obviously important and will point out paths for further action, but they will not solve the problem of urban and metropolitan inequality, which is created in large part by the logic of the global market, i.e. beyond the scope of the individual city and the reach of its authorities. Therefore, in regard to the importance of political will in the process of diminishing

inequality, it is worth recalling, in conclusion, that limiting inequality either within countries or internationally consist of goal 10 of the UN's *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, and is closely related to goal 11 of that *Agenda*, which calls for making "cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable". These goals will not be attainable unless radical action is taken to reduce social inequality.

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PRZESTRZEŃ Społeczna
Social SPACE

Ethno-linguistic identity of small ethnic groups in the Russian province: case studies of Poles and Azerbaijanis

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Abstract

Nizhny Novgorod is a large multicultural city, where more than 100 ethnic groups reside. According to statistics, it is characterised by the dominance of the Russian culture, which has a great influence on the minorities living in the region. Thus, the issue of self-identification of ethno-linguistic groups living in the city as well as the urgent need for identifying alternative factors of the preservation of the language and identity of small minority groups in a modern urbanised environment determine the relevance of the research. Poles and Azerbaijanis were chosen as two case studies in order to demonstrate a variety of factors employed in a self-identification process. These two groups differ greatly in terms of origin, religion, size of the group and support offered by the local authorities. Therefore, the aim of the study was to exemplify the ways different communities use to deal with the

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issues of self-identification and preservation of ethnic identity. The obtained results indicate that various factors mobilise national feelings of the groups and it is possible to preserve ethnic identities and native languages in a modern urbanised environment without the support of official authorities due to a complex approach, based on traditional values as well as modern tendencies, including pragmatic factors.

Key words: ethnic identity, ethno-linguistic group, heritage language, language policy, mobilisation of national feelings.

1. Introduction

Nizhny Novgorod is a multinational and multicultural city situated in the Volga Federal District. According to 2010 Population Census data (*Federal'naya sluzhba…*, 2013), 111 ethnic communities live in the city.

Polish and Azerbaijani ethno-linguistic groups were selected as a subject of this study, as they demonstrate differently directed tendencies related to both revival and assimilation of an ethnic community.

On the one hand, self-identification of both groups might have been negatively affected by the following assimilation factors (Nizamova 2009):

- a relatively small size of the community: 183 Poles, i.e. 0.015% of the total population) and 5614 Azerbaijani, i.e. 0,45 % of the total population (*Federal'naya sluzhba…*, 2013);
- duration of residence in Nizhny Novgorod;
- non-uniformity of the ethnic groups (members of the groups born in their native country, first generation residents in Nizhny Novgorod, and those born and grown up in Nizhny Novgorod).

On the other hand, the chosen groups operate in urban environment in a different way. While Polish ethnic community is a closed group, which is not visible in any way in the Nizhny Novgorod urban space (there are no Polish cuisine restaurants, Polish mass media, schools, etc.), i.e. it has no system of institutes, which would make the Polish group visible in the urban environment, Azerbaijani group is represented in the urban space through its mass media, restaurants and national grocery stores. The members of the group are easily identified by appearance among

other nationalities living in the city. Furthermore, the group has a powerful diaspora and, despite a small community, Azerbaijani as a mother tongue ranks seventh in the number of speakers.

The two groups also differ in terms of their origin, Poles being Europeans, while Azerbaijani coming from Caucasus.

All characteristics mentioned above make the Polish and Azerbaijani ethnic communities an attractive subject of the study for the purpose to answer the following questions:

- What ethnic identity do bilingual members of the community or those who have switched to the majority language claim?
- What does self-identification of the ethnic group hinge on in modern urban environment?
- Is the size of the group as relevant as the efforts made by diaspora in preserving ethnic identity?
- What attempts are made for revival of national feelings and mobilisation of ethnic identity?

2. Conceptual context

Migration to and population concentration in large cities inevitably results in co-existence of many cultures, including religions and languages within a confined space. The superdiversity of urban environment, which has integrated multiple ethno-linguistic groups, transforms, adapting to new conditions, changing the processes of acculturation and self-identification of groups and individuals. Thus, the relevance of this study is caused by the necessity to detect actual motives that help to preserve ethnic identity and language, as well as to mobilise national feelings of small ethno-linguistic groups within the constantly changing environment of a modern Russian city.

The co-existence of a large variety of ethnic communities within one territory occurs in line with specific acculturation strategies. Following R. Redfield et al. (1936), acculturation is understood in this context as a long-term direct contact of groups or individuals having different cultural traditions, which results in changes in

original cultural patterns in one or both cases. According to J. Berry (1997), within the framework of acculturation theory, a group or an individual simultaneously addresses the problem of preservation of their own cultural identity (to what extent the group or individual values and wants to preserve its cultural heritage and identity) and a problem of inclusion or non-inclusion into another cultural environment (to what extent the group is interested in a contact with other neighbouring groups). Depending on the decision taken the group or individual can follow one of the four acculturation strategies, viz. integration, assimilation, separation or marginalisation. Many studies have indicated that integration is the most preferred strategy, while marginalisation is the least preferred one (Regan et al., 2016).

It is worth mentioning that Russia has never been defined as a mono-ethnic society, a nation-state. The Russian state was originally formed as an imperial-type state, uniting under its rule various nations, ethnic groups, cultures and religions. Thus, the long-term coexistence within the unified political structures, unified systems of education and upbringing led to a convergence of mentality, especially among members of older generations (Nesterov 2017). Thus, multiculturalism in Russia is the autonomous coexistence of various cultures in single space, while maintaining their characteristics, traditions and customs (ibidem). V. Tishkov (2003) argues that the essence of an ethnic community (people, ethnos) is formed on the basis of cultural self-identification in relation to other communities.

Within the framework of studies devoted to self-identification processes, the issue of the application of native languages of ethnic groups becomes especially relevant. Social and cultural integration and identity formation processes are closely related to the language as a main marker of group affiliation (Redfield et al., 1936; Berry 1997; Noels 2013). Individuals demonstrate their own cultural identity as a discursive phenomenon (McAvoy 2016; Zotzmann, O'Regan, 2016), as well as their belonging to a specific group (Joseph 2004; Cashman 2005) through the discourse and language practices.

Following the opinion of N. Elias (1991), it can be assumed that identity is not "once and for all", but it results from the evolution within a specific context in which an individual finds himself/herself. Therefore, individuals may use various behav-

ioural strategies to demonstrate negative identity rejected by the majority or to make attempts to fully assimilate in majority society. Individuals with the most ambiguous ethnic identities are usually those who live outside the traditional place of inhabitancy (O'Connor 2017).

Urban and global subcultures, as well as various ethnic groups living side by side, influence ethnic self-identification in a city, viz. their self-ascribed identity defined by an individual depending on circumstances (García 2012). There is also another type of identity that can be found in urban culture – the imposed identity, realised in a specific context through ideology and language policy (ibidem).

J. Fishman and O. Garcia (2010) argue that there is no "true" identity, though there are more or less effective, obvious or hidden identities depending on the context. In a modern city all ethno-linguistic groups finally find themselves on an equal footing, constantly facing other subcultures and languages, accepting or rejecting elements of "strange" or "imposed" identity, that finally enables to consider ethnic identity in the urban environment as mobile, situational and multiple (Revina 2008).

Modern ethnic identity is a complex concept that affects both the group and each individual who considers himself/herself a part of this group; it is a part of multiple social identity, which in the context of a modern urbanised society is assigned an important place. Therefore, it can be assumed that in order to preserve ethnic identity in modern conditions a comprehensive approach, which involves alternative factors of group integrity, contribute to traditional factors, e.g. language, religion, or parental nationality, is required.

Thus, an increasing concern among scholars about the impact of the urban environment on self-identification of ethnic groups should be foregrounded (Vertovec 2006; Revina 2008; Nizamova 2009; O'Connor 2017). However most domestic studies devoted to the issue of self-identification are limited to the regions of compact minority groups or refer to native peoples of national and cultural autonomies (Sokolova 2004; Khilkhanova 2007; Nuksunova 2007; Nizamova 2009; Hantaeva 2010; Bedrik 2016), while no due attention is paid to disperse small nationalities in other regions. In this article, an attempt is made to fill the gap in Russian socio-linguistic research

by means of studying small ethnic communities in a region characterised by the dominance of the Russian language and culture.

3. Language policy in Nizhny Novgorod

Before analysing the cases of two minority groups in detail, it is essential to highlight the role of local authorities in promoting multiculturalism and preserving the native languages and cultures of minority groups.

In the context of urban multiculturalism, local authorities are called upon to support and promote the interests of ethnic groups living in the city through various activities conducted within the framework of language policy.

Based on the data provided in official sources, it can be concluded that the authorities of Nizhny Novgorod pursue a certain language policy that promotes free functioning of minority languages and is aimed primarily at interethnic and interfaith interaction in the urban environment. The elements of this policy are included in the overall national and ethnic political agenda and delegated to local self-government. For instance, the Commission on Social Policy and the Commission on Local Self-Government are responsible for dealing with the issues of interethnic relations. Moreover, the City Administration departments oversee language policy issues.

It is also worth stressing that a whole range of activities aimed at maintaining and developing cultural traditions of minority communities in Nizhny Novgorod are carried out regularly. In recent years, traditional interfaith and interethnic community clean-up events have been held (in the Victory Park on the Embankment of the Rowing Canal, in the Internationalist Square, etc.), which certainly strengthen interethnic communication in the city. Ethno-cultural festivals and festive events of national communities of the city are held annually (e.g. the ethno-cultural festival *Navruz*, the festive event of the National Cultural Centre of the Peoples of Dagestan and the Nizhny Novgorod branch of the Russian Children's Fund dedicated to the memory of Rasul Gamzatov, the ceremony of consecration of the Armenian Church of Surb Amenaprkich (the All-Saviour, etc.). Many schools celebrate Friendship Day and Tolerance Day.

It should be highlighted that the municipal program "The development of forms of public self-government, social activity of the population, interethnic and interfaith cooperation in the city of Nizhny Novgorod" for 2017-2019 has been aimed at implementing a set of activities (conferences, round tables, religious and national holidays' celebrations, sports events, educational programmes) in collaboration with national-cultural organisations and religious associations of the city.

Thus, the measures presented above demonstrate that certain attempts are being made to popularise the cultures of national minorities and facilitate their integration into the cultural space of the city. However, as authorities cannot support all the groups living in the city of Nizhny Novgorod, they have to prioritise preferring to collaborate only with those that make themselves visible in urban environment and have a powerful diaspora or another official form of organisation.

4. Materials and methods

Due to a relatively small size of the sample, questionnaire, as well as structured and unstructured interviewing were the key techniques employed in the study.

In order to answer the research questions, a survey was conducted in which 110 representatives of the Azerbaijani diaspora of Nizhny Novgorod took part. The sample included 40% of men and 60% of women in various age groups from 16 to 49. Continuous sampling method was applied to the participants, the Azerbaijani ancestry being the only selective criterion.

In order to get more accurate understanding of language practices of the Poles a questionnaire study was held, as a result of which 27 people in the age from 19 to 56 years, including 15 men and 12 women, 6 students of higher education institutions and 21 people with higher education. Twelve people answered the questions in person and 15 in social networks. People questioned remotely were the members of the Polish Culture Association "Polonez". Some questions varied depending on the native language of the respondent. Thus, in order to make the results more reliable some interviews were conducted with the members of the Polish community. These included a priest of a Polish Roman Catholic church located in Nizhny Novgorod; sisters of the church, citizens of Poland and Polish language native speakers; the

Head of the Polish Culture Association "Polonez", the Deputy Head of the Polish Culture Association, professor of the Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod, and 30 members of the Polish community.

5. Data and analysis

5.1. Poles

The history of the Poles in Nizhny Novgorod Region goes back to Dmitry Pozharsky who founded a monastery for the captured Poles in Purekh village granted to him (*Rossiysko-pol'skie…*, 2014). It also seems relevant to mention a flow of exiled Poles who passed through Nizhny Novgorod Region (Chernykh 2009) and partially settled there in the 16th to 20th centuries. Nizhegorodsko-Tyumensky highroad was an important transport pass in the Russian Empire (Varentsova, Varentsov, 2013), and a lot of prisoners conveyed to Siberia went through Nizhny Novgorod Province after the defeating the Polish uprisings in 1830-1831 and 1863. Since 1915, the Polish refugees have settled almost on the entire territory of Nizhniy Novgorod Province. Although more than 10,000 of Poles lived in the province (*Rossiysko-pol'skie…*,2014), there were no Polish hotbeds there. The dispersed distribution of the Poles may be considered one of the key factors relevant to the issue of native language loss or preservation. Over time, the number of Poles decreased and in 1970 there lived 907 people in Nizhny Novgorod Region who identified themselves as the Poles (*Narody permskogo kraya…*, 2014), only 615 in 2002 and according to 2010 Population Census data, 183 people identifying themselves with the Polish ethnic group lived in Nizhny Novgorod (*Federal'naya sluzhba…*, 2013).

Although the size of the Polish ethnic group is small, today there is a number of organisations providing support to the Polish language and other aspects of culture in the city. These includes:

- the Centre of the Slavic Languages and Cultures (in the Linguistic University of Nizhny Novgorod) – (*Centr Slavyanskih yazykov…*, n.d.); apart from the Polish language courses, the Centre arranges Days of the Polish Culture, Polish film festivals and meetings with the prominent Polish figres;

- the Polish Culture Association "Polonez" – Nizhegorodsky Regional Public Organization (*Nizhegorodskaya Poloniya*…, n.d.) which declares as its main aim to improve the Russian-Polish relations at the interpersonal communication level and to unite everyone who is interested in Polish culture, including history and language; the organisation also supports various events aimed at promotion of Polish culture and consolidation of the Polish community;
- the Roman Catholic parish of the Virgin Mary Assumption.

The study indicated that the Polish ethnic group is not homogeneous and consists of at least two subgroups, each having its own features. The first group constitute of the Poles who were born in Poland (first generation Nizhny Novgorod residents) – the Polish native speakers. They are mainly personnel and members of the church, both Russian citizens and persons without Russian citizenship. The second group constitute of the ethnic Poles, descendants of exiled Poles or later migrants; they have Russian citizenship, were born and grown up in Russia, and do or do not speak Polish.

The members of both groups were surveyed, and the results obtained demonstrate (Table 1) that all the Poles who were born in Poland and live in Nizhny Novgorod (whether they are the Russian citizens or not) identified themselves as Polish. Two of nine respondents claimed their native language to be Russian, which could be explained by a long period of living in the Russian Federation (over 20 years). There is an opposite tendency among the Poles born in Nizhny Novgorod: nearly 70% of them recognise themselves as Poles, although only to of 18 respondents declare Polish as their native language. However, it should also be noted that only three of 18 respondents of the second group were not interested in learning the Polish language at all. Therefore, the social demand for the Polish language is rather high in this group.

Table 1. Results of questionnaire inquiry of the Polish minority groups

Question	First generation residents of Nizhny Novgorod (9 persons)	Ethnic Poles (18 persons)
Age and sex	Males 3, females 6	Males 12, females 6
Education level	Higher 9	Higher 12 Incomplete higher 6
Employment status	Employed 9	Employed 12 Students 6
Russian citizenship	Yes 3 No 6	Yes 18
Ethnic identity	Polish 9	Polish 13 Russian 5
Native language	Polish 7 Russian 2	Polish 2 Russian 16
Polish proficiency	Can speak 9	Can speak 7 Cannot speak 11
Intra-familial communication language	Polish 7 Russian 2	Polish 2 Russian 16
Do you consider learning Polish/Russian interested? Do you attend language courses?	Speak both languages 3 Consider learning Russian: interested 3 Already learn Russian 3	Speak both languages 7 Consider learning Polish: interesting 5 Already learn Polish 3 Not interested in learning Polish 3

The interviews revealed the lack of cooperation between two central organisations aimed at consolidation of the Poles in Nizhny Novgorod, which probably precludes the development and self-identification of the Pole ethnic group. As the re-

spondents admitted, the administration of the church (Roman Catholic parish) has not vested due interest in creation of the parish-based Polish community over the years. On the other hand, the founder of the Polish cultural centre "Polonez", being an agnostic, declares his willingness to cooperate with the church. In September 2017, the parish received a new priest and, may be, the two organisations would be able at last to cooperation for the benefit of the Polish community.

The pragmatic aims of the community members connected with the revival of the national feelings and language should be highlighted. The majority of respondents speak Polish, learn Polish or consider it interesting and necessary, and this factor may be crucial for the preservation of the Polish language among the ethnic Poles of Nizhny Novgorod.

The evidences suggest that the increasing interest in the Polish language and culture in general is primarily associated with the growing prestige of the European Union and the Europeans in general. Besides, there is another incentive to learn Polish, viz. the acquisition of the Pole's Card, the main goal of which is to support relational, ethnic and lingual values of the Polish people in the Community of Independent States (CIS) and Baltic states, and, implicitly, to recruit migrant labour of similar culture in Poland. Thus, the Pole's Card gives the right of repeated entry in Poland and other European countries (a limited list) without a visa, 37% discount on rail transport in Poland and Germany, as well as possibility to work in these countries. Studies conducted in other regions of Russia confirmed such instrumentalist attitude of the Polish diaspora members to ethnic identification (Bedrik, Serikov, 2016).

5.2. Azerbaijanis

The first Azerbaijanis arrived in Nizhny Novgorod region in the early Middle Ages, when merchants and travellers were floating along the Volga. Since the development of the famous Nizhny Novgorod Fair at the confluence of the Oka and Volga rivers, Azerbaijani merchants opened their shops and representative offices there. Moreover, thanks to the efforts of the Tatar Ahun Samirkhan Sokolov, an Azerbaijani mosque was founded in Nizhny Novgorod. At that time, Azerbaijani were actively operating in Nizhny Novgorod. For example, the well-known Ali Mardan bey Top-

chibashev, who was the first chairman of the Muslim faction in the State Duma of Russia in 1906 and the chairman of the first All-Russian Muslim party Ittifak, which was created in Nizhny Novgorod in 1906. That was the first stage of Azerbaijanis integration in Nizhny Novgorod region.

Later, the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) caused a massive migration within the former state. The large industrially developed city of Nizhny Novgorod became a place of attraction for immigrants from the Caucasus. Thus, tens of thousands of migrants settled in Nizhny Novgorod.

The sharp changes in the socio-economic environment after the collapse of the USSR forced the members of the Azerbaijani elite to take measures to structure their community. The first Azerbaijan Cultural Centre, headed by Vidadi Mirzoyev, appeared in Nizhny Novgorod in 1995. Its main function was to develop relations between Azerbaijanis and members of other indigenous groups of Nizhny Novgorod to promote tolerance.

Today the following national organisations operate in Nizhny Novgorod, maintaining and developing the culture and language of the Azerbaijani ethnic group.

(1) The Local National Cultural Autonomy of Azerbaijanis (MNKAA) – an organisation aimed at supporting the Azerbaijani language and culture in general and the development of the Azerbaijani diaspora of Nizhny Novgorod. MNKAA exists since 7 July 2006. It has its own council that consists of influential and educated Azerbaijanis of Nizhny Novgorod. The Council controls the activities of the leaders of the autonomy and takes an active part in the life of the Azerbaijani diaspora of Nizhny Novgorod.

(2) The Azerbaijani Sunday School, where children can learn reading and writing in the Azerbaijani language. Adults could also attend the school.

(3) The newspaper "Azzeros", which, until 2011, was available both in electronic and printed form. Today, the traditional newspaper has transformed into an electronic one – the analytical portal "Azzeros", which contains headings: "in the world", "economy", "sports", "culture", "community", "ethnic issues", and "science".

(4) A youth organisation Local National Cultural Autonomy of Azerbaijanis (MNKAA). The Azerbaijani youth of Nizhny Novgorod hold round tables, conferences, participate in festivals not only in Nizhny Novgorod, but also in other cities of Russia. Currently, several members of the council are members of the commission of the regional coordination council of the United Russia party. The MNKAA takes an active part in all projects and forums conducted by the city and the local administration, as well as various public organisations, and it is the largest association of Azerbaijanis in Nizhny Novgorod and the region.

Thus, the Azerbaijani community is explicitly seen in urban environment demonstrating their culture, including traditions and language. They are perceived as a group of labour migrants that occupy a certain niche in economic realm of the city.

In order to answer the questions a survey it was decided who of the 110 representatives of the Azerbaijani diaspora of Nizhny Novgorod aged between 16 to 49 years of age select. The questionnaire questions and results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Questionnaire results of Azerbaijani diaspora

Do you have Russian citizenship?	Yes 79 % No 21 %
What is your ethnic identity?	Azerbaijani 97% Russian 3 %
What language do you consider native?	Azerbaijani 77 %, Russian 23%
Do you know the Azerbaijani language?	Yes 100%
What language do you speak at home? And in the company of people of the same nationality?	At home: Russian 10 % Azerbaijani 34% Both languages 56 % With friends: Azerbaijani 100%
Do you use Azerbaijani at work?	No 100%

Do you find it interesting / necessary to study the Azerbaijani / Russian language?	Both languages 100%
Do you watch films in Azerbaijani, do you listen to the radio?	Yes 61% No 39 %

All Azerbaijanis interviewed know their native language, appreciate it and are interested in its preservation and promotion. However, all respondents also speak Russian, and for 23% of them it has already become a mother tongue. Thus, it seems that a shift is being observed from Azerbaijani monolingualism to bilingualism, where Azerbaijani is the first language and Russian is the second one. A gradual loss of the everyday sphere of communication (which is, in fact, the only domain where the language still fully functions) can be looked upon as the first step towards a reduction of the number of native speakers as the family plays a decisive role in preserving the native language, ensuring its transmission from generation to generation.

Among the reasons to take care of the native language are the feeling of belonging to a powerful diaspora, religion and respect for older generations. Thus, despite the already noticeable collective lingual shift towards Russian, there is a high level of motivation among community members to preserve their native language and culture in general, which suggests that the vitality of the Azerbaijani language in Nizhny Novgorod, at least in the next generation, does not raise concern.

6. Conclusion

The presented investigation is devoted to the examination of two minority groups living in a large industrial city in the Russian province. The findings confirm the opinion of V. A. Avksentyev (2001) that ethnic groups are stable intergeneration social systems and the change of some elements of the systems will not necessarily result in loss of systemic features of the entire ethnic group. The evidence suggests that in the urban environment, under external factors, an individual and an entire ethno-linguistic group are able to maintain their ethnic identity, although some of its elements are transformed and adjusted to new conditions while others are lost. Individual and group identification is supported by the high status attributed to the

group, its sponsoring by powerful institutions, public organisations and representation in the urban public space and its social life.

Answering the questions raised in the study, the following conclusions can be formulated.

(1) If the language is lost, the self-identification relies on other factors, e.g. parental nationality, religion and culture in general, powerful diaspora, the increasing group prestige and related pragmatic factors. Bilingualism in modern urban environment is definitely not an obstacle for preserving ethnic identity.

(2) The evidence suggests that the size of the group does not play any significant role in preserving ethnic identity, while efforts made by community certainly do.

(3) A revival of national feelings depends primarily on the background and the image of the group.

With respect to the Polish ethno-linguistic group it can be concluded that ambiguous status of the ethnic group (who may neither be classified as indigenous ethnic group of Nizhny Novgorod Region nor as new migrants), the lack of explication in the city space, small size and a lack of developed diaspora exclude this group from the focus of official language policy as the city authorities tend to support and encourage the promotion of the groups that have significant representation in the city and strong associations (non-commercial organisations, diaspora centres, etc.). Therefore, the responsibility for preservation of culture, including and language and self-identification lies on the members of the group, public organisations, religious institutions and, probably, the mother state.

Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, enjoy official support and thus, the efforts of the members of the group are sustained by the efforts of the community; bottom-up tendencies are in line with the top-down ones. However, life in the foreign urban environment impacts language practices of the group under investigation.

In general, the study shows that even in case of small closed ethnic groups not supported by public authorities it is possible to preserve ethnic identity and language in the modern urban context. However, the factors that are deemed crucial for identi-

ty preservation (including language, religion, parental nationality, etc.) appeared to be unviable compared to the pragmatic factors in this case.

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PRZESTRZEŃ Społeczna
Social SPACE

Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem ekologicznym miast i regionów w kontekście pandemii COVID-19

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Abstract

Management of ecological safety of cities and regions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic

Social spaces are intertwined, but the manner in which they are related is ambiguous. Inter-spatial relations refer to the boundaries of their various stakeholders. From the point of view of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the environmental security of countries is important. The author refers to the concept of ecological security according to Poland's constitution in the context of the obligations of state authorities, the effectiveness and durability of these obligations. The aim of the development of cities and their regions should be the assessment of ecological safety in the context of civilisation challenges, e.g. social responsibility and sustainable development and the theory of environmental management and audit. The current epidemic crisis requires the development of new strategies for the development of cities. It is argued that cities do not develop in a sustainable way. Therefore the cities are not socially responsible. There is no real environmental management of cities. Hence there is no ecological safety in cities. This fact is sufficient to recognise a lack of ecological safety of the state. The author provides a definition of ecological safety. A model policy of ecological safety can provide more equitable solutions in the collective protection of human health and life and the natural environment.

Key words: environmental safety, COVID-19 pandemic, sustainable urban development, urban social responsibility, urban environmental management system (eco-management system).

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne, pandemia COVID-19, zrównoważony rozwój miast, odpowiedzialność społeczna miast, system zarządzania środowiskowego miastami (system ekozarządzania).

1. Wstęp

Przestrzeń społeczna jest ważna w kontekście odnajdywania się w niej jej interesantów, dokonywania wyborów, zajmowania pozycji, ograniczeń i zmian w czasie. Różne przestrzenie społeczne (jako byty społeczne) przenikają się, stając się od siebie współzależne. Zdaniem Sida Lu (2020), wchodząc we wzajemne relacje, przestrzenie społeczne często mają odmienne i zmienne formy społeczne. Przestrzenie społeczne mogą stać się pokrewne, symbiotyczne i opozycyjne, w zależności od ich interesantów, pozycji lub norm (Lu 2020).

Termin *przestrzenie pokrewne* odnosi się do przestrzeni społecznych o podobnych pod względem konfiguracji interesantach, pozycjach i normach. Przestrzenie pokrewne ewoluują samodzielnie, chociaż ich interesanci stosują podobne działania i doświadczają podobnych interakcji, tj. budują granice, zawierają sojusze lub konkurują (o dominację). Przykładowo, przestrzeniami pokrewnymi w kraju są rząd i samorząd (odpowiedzialni za bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne państwa), przy czym te dwie przestrzenie pokrewne nie muszą być ze sobą połączone lub znajdować się blisko siebie. Przestrzenie pokrewne między sobą wykazują wysoki stopień podobieństwa strukturalnego, są homologiczne pod względem stylów rządzenia i zarządzania, jak i ścieżek kariery ich funkcjonariuszy.

Termin *przestrzenie symbiotyczne* odnosi się do przestrzeni społecznych strukturalnie heterogenicznych, ale współzależnych, które przekształcają się przez wzajemną wymianę. Relacje symbiotyczne mogą tworzyć przestrzenie społeczne o różnych strukturach i regułach, ponieważ każda z przestrzeni jest konstytuowana przez wymianę z innymi przestrzeniami (władzy, zasobów, interesantów i informacji). Przykładowo, przestrzeniami symbiotycznymi są rynek i państwo (Lu 2020). Przestrzenie te mają inną strukturę, rządzą się różnymi regułami, mają różnych interesantów i różne stanowiska. Rozwój rynku i państwa staje się współzależny, w kontekście różnic organizacji funkcjonujących na rynku i samego rządu, jak też wymiany władzy lub zasobów w formułowaniu polityki rozwoju państwa (Harvey 2005).

Termin *przestrzenie opozycyjne* odnosi się do przestrzeni społecznych, które nie są pokrewne albo symbiotyczne, ale są ze sobą powiązane, pomimo kontrastowych różnic w ich interesantach, pozycjach i normach. Istnienie *inności* ma znaczenie

w kształtowaniu się tożsamości przestrzeni opozycyjnych, ponieważ *inność* dotyczy jednostek, grup i przestrzeni społecznych (Mead 2015). Przykładowo, demokracja i autorytaryzm są przestrzeniami opozycyjnymi (Gieryn, 1983). Współcześnie przestrzenie opozycyjne kształtują granice rozwoju i naturę demokracji (Lu 2020).

Typologia przestrzeni pokrewnych, symbiotycznych i opozycyjnych nie jest statyczna i wyczerpująca. Dynamikę przestrzeni społecznych kształtuje dynamika relacji interesantów. Dwie przestrzenie społeczne mogą być symbiotyczne lub pokrewne w danym okresie, ale długi autonomiczny rozwój może je od siebie oddzielić, a nawet spowodować zmianę na przestrzenie opozycyjne, natomiast z tego samego powodu dwie przestrzenie opozycyjne mogą stać się symbiotyczne lub pokrewne. Dzieje się tak dlatego, że w środowisku społecznym działają jednocześnie przeciwstawne sobie siły, zmierzając ku homogeniczności i dywersyfikacji; podobnie jak w środowisku naturalnym.

Z punktu widzenia relacji między przestrzeniami społecznymi jest ważne proste i oszczędne *zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem ekologicznym miast i regionów*.

Z punktu widzenia pandemii COVID-19 jej mechanizm przyczynowo-skutkowy jest ważny, ponieważ konsekwentnie łączy te dwie kwestie. W mechanizmie przyczynowo-skutkowym zarządzania bezpieczeństwem ekologicznym miast i regionów w kontekście pandemii COVID-19 niektóre przestrzenie społeczne mogą być dla siebie nieistotne, gdyż w ogóle nie mają relacji.

Z punktu widzenia wejścia w interakcje dwóch przestrzeni społecznych (miasta i regionu albo miasta i państwa) jest ważne zrozumienie ich relacji i sposobu zmiany tych relacji.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest ocena bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego miast i regionów w kontekście wyzwania cywilizacyjnego, jakim są odpowiedzialność społeczna i zrównoważony rozwój. Konkurowanie polskich miast z miastami globalnymi w sytuacji światowego kryzysu epidemicznego wymaga opracowania strategii rozwoju miast z punktu widzenia trzech przestrzeni społecznych: skuteczności i trwałości bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego miast i regionów oraz spójności wskaźników wzrostu ochrony zdrowia i życia mieszkańców, jak też środowiska przyrodniczego miast i regionów.

Teza jest następująca: miasta nie rozwijają się w sposób zrównoważony, ponieważ nie są miastami zarządzanymi środowiskowo, a zatem miasta nie są organizacjami odpowiedzialnymi społecznie, zaś w rezultacie brak jest bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego państwa.

W tym miejscu można podać następującą definicję *bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego*: jest to stan środowiska, który zapewniają władze publiczne przez jednoczesne użycie dwóch narzędzi: (1) ochrony środowiska oraz (2) ochrony zdrowia i życia człowieka. Skuteczność i spójność tych dwóch narzędzi dla zapewnienia poczucia bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego mieszkańcom miast i ich regionów można osiągnąć dzięki rzeczywistej koncepcji *odpowiedzialności społecznej* i *zrównoważonego rozwoju* przez wdrożenie rzeczywistego systemu *zarządzania środowiskowego*. Bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne pozwala na przebywanie w środowisku i na korzystanie z niego w sposób, który zapewnia rozwój, przez harmonijne łączenie inwestycji człowieka z bioróżnorodnością ekosystemów.

2. Konstytucyjność bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego

Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Ustawa 1997) stanowi, że Rzeczpospolita Polska jest dobrem wspólnym wszystkich obywateli i zapewnia ochronę środowiska, kierując się zasadą zrównoważonego rozwoju, oraz przestrzega wiążącego ją prawa międzynarodowego. Ochrona zdrowia i życia człowieka oraz ochrona środowiska są zatem ważnymi politykami współdziałania władz publicznych. Obywatele mają zaś prawo do informacji o stanie i ochronie środowiska, jak i do oczekiwania rzeczywistego wsparcia ich działań na rzecz ochrony i poprawy stanu środowiska przez władze publiczne.

Z punktu widzenia wartości, jaką jest środowisko, władza publiczna powinna prowadzić politykę zapewniającą bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne współczesnemu i przyszłym pokoleniom. Obowiązki władzy publicznej są zatem: po pierwsze, obowiązkami ustanowionymi ze względu na konieczność ochrony środowiska, po drugie zaś obowiązkami wprowadzonymi w celu ochrony innej wartości, ale wiążącej się z ochroną środowiska. Tym drugim obowiązkiem jest ochrona zdrowia i umożliwienie praktycznego korzystania z tej ochrony zdrowia, do których każdy obywatel

ma prawo. Obowiązek ochrony zdrowia jest nadrzędny nad obowiązkiem ochrony środowiska, ale obydwa te obowiązki dotyczą władz na wszystkich szczeblach administracyjnych organów władzy: ustawodawczej, wykonawczej i sądowniczej.

Termin *bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne* opiera się na spójności czterech konstytucyjnych obowiązków: (1) ochronie zdrowia obywateli, (2) ochronie środowiska, (3) zwalczaniu chorób epidemicznych i (4) zapobieganiu negatywnym dla zdrowia skutkom degradacji środowiska. Definicja bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego powinna zatem regulować generalnie konstytucyjne podstawy ochrony zdrowia i ochrony środowiska. Skuteczność i trwałość rozwiązań w kontekście powodów rozprzestrzeniania się i utrzymywania pandemii, jak i ochrony zdrowia i życia osób jest zależna od istniejących lokalnych warunków bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego. Obecnie bowiem dwa czynniki środowiskowe wpływają na opóźnienie powrotu mieszkańców miast i regionów do zdrowia w rezultacie zachorowania na COVID-19: brak czystego powietrza i brak wystarczających terenów zielonych (Bondy i inni, 2005; Franze i inni 2005; Nielsen, Hansen, 2007; Nardo i inni, 2010; D'Alessandro i inni, 2015; Kargarfard i inni, 2015; Lelieveld, Pöschl, 2017; Estol 2019). Pandemia COVID-19 zmienia więc rozumienie trzech obowiązków państw: (1) bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego, (2) odpowiedzialności społecznej i (3) zrównoważonego rozwoju.

Z punktu widzenia konstytucyjności ochrony zdrowia, bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne odnosi się, po pierwsze, do obowiązku zwalczania pandemii, po drugie zaś do obowiązku zapobiegania negatywnym dla zdrowia skutkom degradacji środowiska.

Z punktu widzenia konstytucyjności *ochrony środowiska*, bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne odnosi się do obowiązku podejmowania przez władzę publiczną rzeczywistych działań ochrony obywateli przed wystąpieniem ryzyka wynikającego z niezharmonizowanego rozwoju gospodarczego i społecznego z wymogami rozwoju ekologicznego.

Z punktu widzenia konstytucyjności *bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego* termin ten odnosi się więc do rzeczywistej jakości środowiska. Dlatego władze publiczne są zobowiązane do zapewnienia jakości środowiska odpowiednio do potrzeb obywateli.

Z punktu widzenia *polityki ekologicznej państwa* nowych regulacji wymagają: (1) zadania państwa, (2) prawa powszechne lub obywatelskie i (3) obowiązki władzy publicznej.

Konstytucyjna podstawa ochrony zdrowia ma szczególną wartość w stosunku do konstytucyjnej podstawy ochrony środowiska (Ustawa 1997: art. 68, 74, 81). Obydwa te obowiązki (ochrona zdrowia i ochrona środowiska) władz publicznych urzeczywistniają nie tylko ustanowienie, ale i doskonalenie krajowego prawa zamykania źródeł braku bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego, narażających mieszkańców miast i regionów na wpływ emitowanych zagrożeń (Han, Naeher, 2006; Nethery i inni, 2008; Zou i inni, 2009; Brauer 2010; Dias, Tchepel, 2018). Skuteczność i trwałość tych dwóch obowiązków wymagają bowiem niepodejmowania działań zakłócających społeczne poczucie ochrony zdrowia i życia ludzi oraz środowiska, jak również gwarancji zachowania poczucia bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego, a także kontroli regulującej to bezpieczeństwo. Przykładowo bowiem, globalna epidemia SARS w latach 2002-2004 zainfekowała ponad 8000 osób i zabiła 774 osoby, tj. 9,7% zainfekowanych (Anderson i inni, 2004), a epidemia MERS-CoV w latach 2012-2019 zakaziła ponad 2374 osób i zabiła 823 osoby, tj. 34,7% zakażonych (Al-Ahmadi i inni, 2019), zaś epidemia SARS-CoV-2 determinująca COVID-19 w latach 2019-2021 zaraziła ponad 146 560 631 osób i zabiła ponad 3 101 823 osób, tj. 2,0% zarażonych (Hopkins 2021).

Brak jest jednak sprecyzowania konstytucyjnego obowiązku zapewnienia polityki bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego przez władzę publiczną. Nie jest nią bowiem polityka ekologiczna państwa. Brak zaś skutecznego bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego państwa jest wystarczającym dowodem braku odpowiedzialności państwa i niezrównoważone zarządzanie ochroną zdrowia i środowiska. Brak polityki bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego oznacza również brak przestrzegania prawa człowieka do ochrony zdrowia i życia.

Definicja *bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego* odnosi się do stanu środowiska zapewniającego bezpieczne przebywanie w nim i umożliwia takie korzystanie z walorów i zasobów środowiska, które zapewnia rozwój człowieka (Wyrok 2005). Narzędziem zapewniającym bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne jest *ochrona środowiska*, zgodnie z konstytucyjną zasadą zrównoważonego rozwoju. Nakaz ten zawiera dwa obowiązki

władz publicznych wobec wartości, jaką jest dobro pokoleń (Wyrok 2009): (1) zapobieganie pogarszaniu się stanu środowiska i (2) poprawa stanu środowiska.

3. Globalne determinanty bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego miast i regionów

Zmiana polityczna i społeczna w 1989 r. wpłynęła na wypracowanie nowej filozofii i misji rozwoju miast nie tylko w Europie, ale i na całym świecie. Nowy światowy system ekonomiczno-polityczny i transformacje krajów przyczyniły się do przyspieszenia zmian urbanizacyjnych, a w rezultacie do rozwoju globalnych miast (Potsiou i inni, 2010). Pojawiło się nowe zjawisko urbanizacji: megamiasta (Korcelli 2009).

Pandemia COVID-19 pojawiła się w megamieście (Wuhan w 2018 r.) o powierzchni 8494 km^2 i o 11 mln mieszkańców. Wymuszone okresowe zamykanie gospodarek krajów, spowodowane pandemią w 2020 r., stało się ważną zmianą w projektowaniu strategii rozwoju miast i ich regionów, ponieważ wcześniej praca zdalna była tylko cechą organizacji międzynarodowych, obecnie zaś każda organizacja powinna być przystosowana do zdalnego funkcjonowania. Pogłębianie się pandemii w latach 2020 i 2021 ujawniło braki przygotowania miast na niepewność i nieprzewidywalność przepływów w kontekście dostępu do rynków i podaży żywności, energii, wody i innych środków konsumpcji. Przykładowo, Rosja wprowadziła limity na transport zboża, a Kazachstan, Serbia i Wietnam wprowadziły limity eksportu mąki, cukru, ziemniaków i oleju słonecznikowego (Bloomberg 2020), Unia Europejska złagodziła natomiast przepisy dotyczące importu warzyw i świeżych owoców z Indii (UE 2020). Rezultatem blokady granic i ograniczeń przemieszczania się osób są straty żywności i wzrost kosztów jej eksportu lub importu oraz narażenie niektórych krajów na brak samowystarczalności (CNN 2020; Pulighe, Lupia, 2020).

Ważne stały się trzy wartości: krajowa produkcja i dostawy żywności oraz ochrona zdrowia i życia ludzi. Globalne przepływy produktów żywnościowych na międzynarodowych rynkach, wcześniej logistycznie łączące rolnictwo, przemysł, transport i konsumentów, obecnie są niepewne i nieprzewidywalne. Gdy po raz pierwszy okazało się, że ponad połowa mieszkańców świata (około 3 mld) mieszka w miastach, uznano, że ten aspekt społeczny, jak też ekologiczny, organizacji miast

w epoce postindustrialnej wymaga nowych rozwiązań z punktu widzenia ochrony zdrowia i życia mieszkańców miast (Potsiou i inni, 2010; Lederbogen i inni., 2011). Obecnie ocenia się przepływy i ich dalsze ograniczanie w kontekście możliwości wzrostu do 6 mld osób mieszkających na obszarach miejskich w 2050 r. (ONU 2019).

Globalna pandemia jest ważnym argumentem dla badań bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego (Dobson i inni, 2020; Gatto i inni, 2020). Miasta, fizycznie i biologicznie wpływając na ekosystemy (na poziomie lokalnym, regionalnym, krajowym i globalnym), stały się ważnym źródłem trzech rodzajów zanieczyszczeń niebezpiecznych dla ekosystemów. Są to: (1) leki na COVID-19, (2) odpady medyczne i biomedyczne oraz zwłoki ludzkie skażone COVID-19, (3) ścieki skażone COVID-19 odprowadzane do sieci kanalizacyjnych i oczyszczalń ścieków z obiektów medycznych i gospodarstw domowych. Ograniczenia dostępności do tych trzech informacji utrudniają zdolność prowadzania wyczerpujących analiz.

Z punktu widzenia globalnego bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego uzyskanie skuteczności i trwałości rozwiązań w krajowej polityce bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego opiera się na jedenastu kwestiach: (1) użytkowania powierzchni ziemi, tj. przywracania do społecznego wykorzystania gruntów zdewastowanych i zdegradowanych, oraz kontrolowania użycia nawozów mineralnych, a także ochrony przed zakwaszaniem gleb, jak i ochrony przed pożarami upraw rolnych, (2) ochrony kopalin, (3) ochrony wód przed nieracjonalnym wykorzystaniem i emisją do nich zanieczyszczeń, (4) ochrony powietrza przed emisją zanieczyszczeń do powietrza i kontroli zmian temperatur, (5) kontroli wielkości opadów atmosferycznych, ich składu chemicznego i mokrej depozycji, (6) wzrostu uzyskiwania energii ze źródeł odnawialnych jako alternatywy dla energii wytwarzanych z paliw kopalnych; (7) ochrony warstwy ozonowej, (8) ochrony gęstości gatunkowej przyrody i różnorodności biologicznej, (9) zagospodarowania odpadów przemysłowych i komunalnych oraz zabezpieczenia miejsc gromadzenia odpadów przed pożarami, (10) ochrony radiologicznej i kontroli stężenia radionukleidów w środowisku oraz zagospodarowania odpadów promieniotwórczych, (11) ochrony przed hałasem.

Z punktu widzenia bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego miast ich przyrodę uważa się za determinantę dobrostanu mieszkańców. Polityka *rozwoju miast* jest jednak

prowadzona w kierunku uzależnienia organizacyjnego władz miast i ich agend (tj. jako relacji nadrzędności i podporządkowania) oraz jest determinowana przez różne systemy zarządzania miastami. Rezultatem różnych polityk rozwoju miast są różne zachowania kulturowe. W kontekście globalnej pandemii (COVID-19) zachowania te wymagają zmian.

Z punktu widzenia kultury rozwoju miast ważne jest utrzymanie i rozwój przyrody miast na poziomie porównywalnym z rozwojem społecznym miast. Procesy utrzymania i rozwoju przyrody miast są zatem również determinowane ich rozwojem ekonomicznym.

Model bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego miast mogą tworzyć cztery czynniki ekologiczno-społeczno-ekonomiczne (Klarin 2018): (1) kapitał przyrodniczy miast, mierzony ilością dóbr konsumpcyjnych, (2) kapitał wiedzy, mierzony indywidualnymi kompetencjami i umiejętnościami mieszkańców miast, (3) kapitał produkcyjny miast, mierzony wpływem na otoczenie i (4) kapitał techniczny miast. Stymulowanie tych czterech czynników w zarządzaniu publicznym powoduje wzrost albo obniżenie poczucia bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego państwa.

Przyjmuje się, że państwo stanowi potrójny system: ekologiczny, społeczny i ekonomiczny. Zakłada się zaś, że w tym potrójnym systemie rozwoju miast szczególne są aktywa miast i ich wewnętrzne organizacje: państwowe, prywatne i pozarządowe. Udział naturalnych dóbr publicznych i majątku rzeczowego na obszarach miejskich oraz nakładów finansowych na ich utrzymanie, a również produkcji i konsumpcji w miastach, jest jednak warunkiem koniecznym, aby obszary miejskie nie pozostawały w stagnacji, lecz dążyły do dawania poczucia bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego użytkownikom miast. W przestrzeni międzynarodowej mieszkańcy obszarów miejskich są bowiem szczególnie zależni społecznie i ekonomicznie od środowiska ich regionów.

4. Globalne (nie)bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne

4.1. Kontekst (nie)odpowiedzialności społecznej

Brak jest danych ilościowych i jakościowych o zasobach przyrody miast. Zasoby te miasta same powinny inwentaryzować, aby ich wewnętrzne organizacje

produkcyjne i usługowe mogły ponownie ustalić swój zrównoważony rozwój i swoją odpowiedzialność społeczną w celu zapobiegania zjawisku pandemii. Dwa terminy – *wzrost* i *rozwój* – są ważne, chociaż wydają się one pozornie antagonistyczne (Skowroński 2006).

Termin *wzrost* determinuje dążenie do przyrostu materii, tj. dążenie do rozszerzenia zdolności produkcyjnych gospodarki (Klarin 2018). Teoria *wzrostu gospodarczego* natomiast sugeruje, że *wzrost* jest wynikiem stanu wewnętrznego państwa, ale opartego na wiedzy (Romer 1986; Todaro, Smith, 2003).

Termin *rozwój* odnosi się do lepszego stan gospodarki, który szczególnie można osiągnąć w rezultacie rozszerzenia i realizacji wartości (ekologicznych, społecznych, ekonomicznych, instytucjonalnych i politycznych) oraz tworzenie zależnych od siebie nowych możliwości rozwoju, będących powodem dominacji państw rozwiniętych. Teoria *rozwoju* sugeruje natomiast takie stymulowanie gospodarki, aby dochodziło do poprawy dobrostanu społeczeństw, gdy gospodarki technicznie bardziej konkurencyjne stają się samowystarczalne i niezależne od globalnej integracji (Remenyi 2004). Termin *rozwój* stanowi o procesie zarządzania poprawnie ukierunkowaną zmianą, która zawiera cele rozwoju i zasoby do ich osiągnięcia lub stanowi o realizacji przyjętych zadań, tj. planów, polityk, programów i działań rozwoju podejmowanych przez instytucje i rządy (Lele 1991; Sharpley 2000; Klarin 2018). Politykę miast w kontekście terminu *rozwój* utożsamia pięć czynników rozwoju (Vázquez, Sumner, 2013): (1) transformacja strukturalna, (2) rozwój mieszkańców miast, (3) rozwój demokratycznego zarządzania miastami, (4) zrównoważony rozwój miast i (5) bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne miast.

Z punktu widzenia bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego państw promowanie *trwałości rozwoju* wydaje się trafnie określone, gdy są poznane aspekty środowiskowe miast, ponieważ trwałość rozwoju mogą umożliwić tylko ekosystemy podtrzymujące życie społeczeństw (Jenkins 2009; Sachs 2010; Shiva 2010).

Z punktu widzenia *strategii rozwoju miast* jest ważne określenie potrzeb rozwojowych miast i wpływu na ich regiony, przy wzroście bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego (w tym dziedzictwa przyrodniczego i kulturowego) w postępującym rozwoju cywilizacyjnym miast. Miasta mogą starać się o status zarządzanych środowiskowo orga-

nizacji, gdy jednocześnie są odpowiedzialnymi społecznie organizacjami i zrównoważenie się rozwijającymi.

4.2. Okoliczności (nie)zrównoważonego rozwoju

Pojęcie *ekorozwoju* odnosi się raczej do *płytkiego* ujęcia przestrzeni przyrodniczej miast. Brak systemu zarządzania środowiskowego miastami jest wystarczającym dowodem płytkiego ujęcia przestrzeni przyrodniczej miast. W rezultacie koncepcje zrównoważonego rozwoju miast wdrażane w krajach semiperyferii i peryferii, nie mogły być ocenione pozytywnie w skali globalnej, chociaż miały dobre rozwiązania procesów wdrażania tych koncepcji (Rionda i inni, 2002). Na poziomie mikroekonomicznym można raczej tylko rozpatrywać zrównoważony rozwój jako pewną filozofię ekonomii ekologicznej, opisującą procesy ekologiczne, społeczne i gospodarcze. Filozofia ekonomii ekologicznej jest jednak w opozycji do filozofii ekonomii środowiska, opierającej się na efektywności i optymalności ekologicznej (jako wartościach), koncepcja zrównoważonego rozwoju jest natomiast jej uzupełnieniem.

Przebieg rozwoju miast, który nie narusza ich bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego (tj. nieodwracalnie przestrzeni przyrody i dobrobytu mieszkańców miast), lecz godzi prawa człowieka i przyrody z prawami gospodarki w miastach, wyraża jednocześnie potrzebę zmiany orientacji globalnej strategii rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego z *płytkiego* rozumienia ekologii miast i ich otoczenia na rozumienie *głębokie* (Kozłowski 2000; Preisner 2000). W sytuacji pandemii jest ważna *elastyczność* rozwoju miast, rozumiana jako zaangażowanie się zarządzających miastami w sprawy wszystkich *jednostek* społecznych i gospodarczych, w kontekście ich wpływu na przyrodę i wymogu zachowania rodzimych ekosystemów miast i ich regionów.

4.3. Istota zarządzania (nie)środowiskowego obszarami miejskimi

Niezrozumienie i niewdrożenie zarządzania środowiskowego miastami i ich regionami jest niepokojącym zjawiskiem politycznym, ponieważ zarządzanie publiczne miastami nie rozwija wśród interesantów przestrzeni miast dwóch potrzeb: (1) ograniczania zużycia ekosystemów miast i (2) trwałości ekosystemów miast.

Współcześnie dziewięć inwestycji stwarza ryzyko wystąpienia szkód w środowisku miast i ich regionów (lub już jest rezultatem szkód): (1) odbieranie odpadów komunalnych od właścicieli nieruchomości, (2) eksploatacja instalacji wymagających uzyskania pozwolenia zintegrowanego i pozwolenia na wprowadzanie gazów lub pyłów do powietrza oraz pozwolenia na zbieranie lub przetwarzanie odpadów, (3) wprowadzanie na rynek produktów i prowadzenie odzysku lub recyklingu odpadów powstałych z tych produktów, (4) wprowadzanie ścieków do wód lub do ziemi, jak i pobór oraz odprowadzanie wód powierzchniowych lub podziemnych, a również retencjonowanie śródlądowych wód powierzchniowych, (5) zamknięte użycie mikroorganizmów i organizmów genetycznie zmodyfikowanych oraz zamierzone uwolnienie organizmów genetycznie zmodyfikowanych do środowiska lub ich wprowadzanie do obrotu, (6) międzynarodowy obrót odpadami, (7) gospodarowanie odpadami wydobywczymi, (8) podziemne składowanie dwutlenku węgla i poszukiwanie, rozpoznawanie lub wydobywanie węglowodorów ze złóż w granicach obszarów morskich w Polsce, (9) produkcja, wykorzystanie, przechowywanie, przetwarzanie, składowanie, uwalnianie do środowiska i transport substancji chemicznych oraz ich mieszanin stwarzających zagrożenie, a również środków ochrony roślin, produktów biobójczych, towarów i materiałów niebezpiecznych.

Działania ochronne powinny odpowiadać wymaganiom siedlisk i gatunków umiejscowionych w granicach administracyjnych miast i poza nimi. Inwestowanie w utrzymanie zagrożonej fauny i flory miast jest ważne w kontekście zapobiegania rozprzestrzenianiu się pandemii jako rezultatu straty i fragmentacji siedlisk i gatunków oraz handlu dzikimi zwierzętami. Brak jest jednak poprawnego inwestowania w zapobieganie zjawiskom utraty flory i fauny oraz wylesiania regionów, chociaż badania wykazują korzyści współistnienia człowieka, flory i fauny w ograniczaniu chorób odzwierzęcych (Dobsona i inni, 2020). Przykładowo, zagregowany trend liczebności dla 100 gatunków (tj. 100%) ptaków lęgowych uzależnionych od krajobrazu rolniczego jako miejsca gniazdowania lub żerowania dla Unii Europejskiej w 2000 r. wyniósł już tylko 84% w 2014 r. Tymczasem inwestycje jako koszty utrzymania zagrożonej fauny i flory są niższe od kosztów społecznych i gospodarczych związanych z reagowaniem po pojawieniu się patogenów, tj. koszty inwestycyjne są niższe

od finansowania publicznego jako odpowiedzi na współczesną pandemię (COVID-19).

Z punktu widzenia wpływu miast na ich regiony emisja zanieczyszczeń do powietrza jest szczególną przyczyną ginięcia wielu gatunków fauny i flory, wzrostu parowania wody, susz wyjaławiających regiony, zmian klimatu oraz problemem w rolnictwie ekologicznym. Przykładowo, Chiny, Indie, Stany Zjednoczone i Unia Europejska wytwarzają łącznie ponad połowę globalnej emisji zanieczyszczeń do powietrza. W Unii Europejskiej w 2015 r. emisja tlenków siarki wynosiła 2779 tys. ton, emisja tlenków azotu 7751 tys. ton, a emisja gazów cieplarnianych 4452 mln ton.

Z punktu widzenia narażenia mieszkańców miast na zanieczyszczenia w powietrzu, wodzie i glebie, zanieczyszczenia są rezultatem dziewięciu działalności gospodarczych: rekultywacyjnej, budowlanej, usługowej, rolniczej, leśnej, łowieckiej, rybackiej, górniczej i przetwórczej. Przykładowo, szczególne znaczenie mają wielkości wytwarzanych i odbieranych odpadów z gospodarstw domowych, ponieważ nadal nieznane są poziomy skażenia odbieranych odpadów komunalnych, gdy gospodarstwo domowe zostaje objęte kwarantanną wskutek pandemii (COVID-19).

5. Podsumowanie

Obecnie polityka bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego powinna być rozumiana jako podstawowa potrzeba jednostek i grup oraz przestrzeni społecznych.

Polityka otwartości gospodarczej zmniejszyła poczucie bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego. Obecnie jest ważne wykazanie różnicy między założeniami rozwoju bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego i jego poziomu przed pandemią a założeniami dla bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego i jego poziomu w trakcie pandemii oraz gdy pandemia zostanie opanowana.

Model odpowiedzialnego społecznie i zrównoważonego rozwoju miasta zarządzanego środowiskowo może zapewnić tworzenie bardziej sprawiedliwych rozwiązań w innych przestrzeniach społecznych: (1) zaspokajania podstawowych potrzeb i oczekiwań interesantów miasta, (2) integracji interesantów w kontekście odpowiedzialności społecznej miasta, (3) osiągania rzeczywistego zrównoważonego

rozwoju miasta, (4) tworzenia warunków bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego miasta w jego różnorodności kulturowej i przyrodniczej.

Punktem wyjścia w rozwoju miast powinien być konstytucyjny obowiązek zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego, opierający się na kosztach zapobiegania pojawieniu się pandemii i wzrostu zachorowań oraz zgonów z innych przyczyn niż spowodowane niesprawnymi systemami opieki zdrowotnej lub utratą działalności gospodarczej w rezultacie zamykania gospodarek.

Niniejszy artykuł jest pierwszą autorską koncepcją badań bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego państwa z punktu widzenia trzech koncepcji rozwoju miast: odpowiedzialności społecznej władzy publicznej miast, zrównoważonego rozwoju miast i zarządzania środowiskowego miastami i regionami. Te trzy koncepcje są interdyscyplinarne, a nawet transdyscyplinarne, łączą one bowiem różne przestrzenie społeczne za pomocą pięciu czynników przestrzennego rozwoju: ekologicznego, społecznego, ekonomicznego, instytucjonalnego i politycznego.

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Eseje
Essays

PRZESTRZEŃ Społeczna
Social SPACE

Negotiating space for posing selves within and beyond gender dynamics

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Abstract

This paper is about social space where contesting genders come into play with their negotiations. By *social space*, the anticipated communications are usually conceived as democratic and non-manipulative. Saying so, often there is a very thin line between what are defined as *public* and *private* spaces. The former US president Donald Trump, alongside his endless opinions that interested people across the world, once advocated extremely misogynist remarks and propositions as "locker-room" discussions. "Locker-room", without much exception, is a Western concept that is not much familiar in many societies of the Global South. But the connotation can go beyond a national border and his assertion, as a form of male-chauvinism, actually shocked not only the women across the world, but also anyone with democratic concerns about space. Taking a clue from the term, this paper examines the creative possibilities of gender negotiations in "public" spaces. In doing so, it combines strictly defined "academic" writing with probable creative forms of social-scientific essays. The paper ends up with a case-story of an "un-academic" piece that deals with atypical gender and class interplay.

Keywords: social space, gender, public-private, locker-room, negotiation.

1. Introduction

While I am not reducing that private and public spaces are sharply distinguished in the typically defined Western societies, and not in the Southern ones, I am

of the opinion that spaces are endlessly reconfigured through conversations. Saying so, I risk again of reducing the physicality of a space of a certain condition, and adding more value over human interactions. But there are specific merits of conceptualising private and public beyond their obvious and definitive entities. For example, men using urinals in a "public" place, for say in a terminal or shopping mall, can easily start what is defined as a "private" talk, "locker room talk", as Mr. Donald Trump dreadfully expressed. More often than not, however, white-collar males do not find enough reasons to initiate a discussion in a urinal or elevator for that matter. Keeping lips tight is an expected attribute from the "successful" middleclass men. In other situations, "strangers" may easily find a way to form a "partnership in crime", as gang-rapes take places around the globe. Considering the nature of "private" space, some males may still opt out of a discussion that involves sexual fantasies, like what happened in my case throughout my life.

My position is not to generalise male attributes, nor to even link certain aspects of their behaviour as integral to their sexual identity. Rather contrary, my intention is to underline in the tendencies where private and public spaces are not marked with the characteristics they are strictly defined with. This paper is not an attempt to redefine public or private spaces, nor is an assertion of my gender-role. Instead, this is a modest attempt of providing a perspective into the conversational aspects of human relationship across genders. Additionally, I have another mission to put forward, i.e. to tease and test the divisive practices between "academic" and "non-academic" writing. Line between "fiction" and "non-fiction" has long been a conversed issue among the creative writers; and I can take a break for the time being.

2. Fluid private in a public space

Readers are heterogeneous for sure, but the common understanding of homogeneity and heterogeneity often is misguided, especially in the era of *cultural globalisation*, and with the advent of cyberspace communication hype lately. There always are styles of representation that conform and configure a group of people to others. Without much unlearning of what we have learned through these structural set-ups, we easily fell into series of meanings – of the South, of the North, of the Southern

women, of the Northern men and so on. Yet, I opine that a form of homogeneity is prevalent too, first through colonialism, then through cultural globalisation, like in salutation or greeting anyone across the globe. Saying so, we cannot actually be ignorant of the space-specific tendencies and practices.

In a Bangladeshi public bus, for example, approaching someone of other gender may read indecent in context. Firstly, approaching any stranger, even from the same gender, may reveal shallowness of the initiator in strictly defined middleclass white-collar mannerism. Considering the disparity in the public transport system, desired "proper" behaviour is likely to shift to a degree, but would definitely be played in accordance with taste, and in relation with the space/habitus (Bourdieu 1984). If a conversation has begun between two co-travellers, seemingly among two same-sex persons, issues that are very likely to be in queries could easily disgust someone from the North. The list may include, but not limited into: place of origin, (kind of) job, (amount of) salary, marital status, religion, number of children, reasons for not having any in case that is what is revealed by the probing person. In a more willing dialogical conversation with consent, as it is defined in the psychosexual literature, this conversation can be elaborated to the extent where stories of their respective marriages can be illustrated, or plan of how they are approaching their offsprings marriage or education. But these issues disgust quite a few local people too. This is exactly where the question of "taste" comes in.

Considering all the complex aspects and factors involved, I have long been interested in the conversations among the women in defined public spaces (and I cannot interact with them in private spaces). A sense of assurance and trust is at heart of communication among women, a fact that can be said without much generalisation. There are obviously the professional insecurities and jealousies among the white-collar professionals, but that is also far more subtle than the way the male professionals keep on among themselves. More importantly, women across spaces (private and public) hardly make significant shift in their agendas or themes. If about household management issues or child-caring, they would effortlessly surpass the boundary of private and public. When they tend to talk about "sexualities", in most of the cases they do not bother to have a "private space"' or "locker room". That they have

to keep extraordinary cautious code of conduct in this regard, has to do with unwarranted male interventions. Not surprisingly, the binary of private and public is even more crucial for those who fantasise things undemocratically and disgorge them in the "locker room".

3. Gender "identity" and methodological issues

That I was born as a male, have been living a defined heterosexual male life, wear costume that is associated with male, never helped my cause to get in touch with verbal world of the women. In my case the attire was not that simple, as I had started wearing a few ornaments, typically defined as "feminine", long before male-ornaments became a global trend. Still my "performativity" (Butler 1990) at most could trouble the peer male-groups, and could not earn an open ticket for the women circles, with its gender-political insights, until some feminists, deliberately, extended their allies among the biological males. I think this is similar with the feminist movements around the globe.

Difficulties of potential solidarity still remain challenging even after an extended pursuit for allies – in conceptualising sexuality, conjugality, domestic labour and a few more. While I am cautious of not bringing issues like sexuality, I would like light on a couple of challenges that inter-gender solidarity faces. One obvious challenge lies in social class. No matter how extensive knowledge on social classes are being produced in academia, actual experiences go beyond any schematic understanding and manifest manifold sub-set tendencies among the members of an assumed class. This poses completely different problems for same-sex and cross-sex participants in a group of people – perhaps with a reworked sense of horizontality in case of the former, and lack of it in the latter. Second challenge is about narratives and their authorship. People in discussion often shuffle in using pronouns – from *we* to *I* – to claim authorship, like the politicians mostly do the adverse, to claim credibility. Posing authorship (Foucault 1969) in oral communication is tricky by nature, more so in a cross-gender setting, be it a phrase or a concept or a proposition. Weighing on meanings and readings at the recipients' end can reveal a lot of possibilities, as once a sweet death resonated (Barthes 1977). But in gender-political-situations, death

of the author eliminates agency, the utmost important for bringing in democratic atmosphere in the "locker rooms"; let us assume a cross-gender locker-room in this case.

4. A case-story: gender and positions at play

I would finish my essay with a "story" to further my observations about the negotiations in a given situation, combining with the active agency and intent. By story, I here do not refer to the enormous contesting meanings it entails across the disciplinary practices – fiction, news feature, health history, legal proceedings, to name a few. I instead intend to relate it with the long-standing dichotomy of social scientific and fictional writing styles, and the debate of portraying reality and fictionality. Specifically in social/cultural anthropology, ethnography has long been a hype, and has produced a significant amount of discussion about how ethnographic practices should be performed. Adding to that, distinction between "academic" and "non-academic" write-ups is another point of reference for polarised opinions, often are silenced though. This piece, written in Bangla, in 2015, was part of a series where my attempt was to melt strict borderline between fiction and non-fiction, academic and "non-academic". In other words, in this series, all the "characters" are living persons I keep on meeting around in daily lives in different social spaces (Chowdhury 2020). At the same time, I purposefully opted for denying the desired "academic" norms in organising an essay. I opine that issues like "space", among some others across the academic disciplines, should be explored in creative and explorative ways. This piece is modestly placed as an example of exploration of space where gender and class come into play in a defined "public" sphere with tentatively "private" manner. Apart from the stylistic challenge it poses, this tiny "story" further challenges our common understandings of kinship relations, household management, monogamous morals and, more importantly, the relationship between a "researcher" and "subject" too. Space could actually be reconceptualised here in many subtle ways.

5. Kinsfolks and catering

I talk to this very thin shopkeeper regularly, which I frequently do with different roadside shops. Sometimes the words get heavier than the items I buy. Usually I find shopkeepers are okay with that. However, my forgetfulness with their names causes discomfort. I try to know the names of these neighbours and keep them in my cell-phone, something that became possible with the smartphones. This is a simple trick to keep the name with the jobs they provide. Someone fixes water line or electricity, or someone recharge phone balance – I just keep on asking names of these working class people and fill in the phone. This is how I avoid picking the wrong name when needed.

First I was a little embarrassed because of these tricks. But later I have gradually learned to console myself with countless justifications. With the method, my phone should have stored this tinny shopkeeper's name. Not only she runs a four-legged tea-cum-cigarette shop, but also she, along with some extended family members around, recharges phone balance. She claims to be a very good candidate to be registered on my phone, but somehow I do not have her name. Let's imagine her name is Ayesha.

Labelling Ayesha as "thin" won't bring any debate whatsoever. She won't pass a bar of 40 kg by any means, but will remain at the verge of 35, I guess. With her smiling face, coloured with betel leaf, and a married life, it is very difficult to determine her age. Some customers of her shop may assume her even of 22/23, and again with her sick and laborious appearance, it sometimes feel even 40. Her shop in beside this avenue of Uttara I live in. These roadside shops often get "evicted" by the city corporation. These shopkeepers keep on negotiating with some politically influential person and they start again after a short break. Sometimes it takes longer break, sometimes some have to shift to another livelihood. This is how it works. Then, someday with my habit of seeing a fixed imagery, I may ask a legal shopkeeper about their whereabouts.

Ayesha's family may invoke serious curiosity. I have seen Ayesha, her mother-in-law, a "well-to-do" uncle-in-law, and a young-looking father-in-law until he got seriously ill. All running this four-legged shop at different times. Also I have

seen two or three children wandering around occasionally. I have never seen Ayesha's husband or any brothers-in-law around this shop. At least, they never took the role of shopkeeper. For a conversation, it is not an easy pick for me between Ayesha or her mother-in-law, as both of them are very sociable. Both offer me a free cup of tea, which I defer for the next time. Sometimes both are found together in the store. Together then they talk with me, and there is no tension who is being more generous to me.

Even the uncle is a great mix. He would offer me a betel-leaf every time which I am not at all comfortable with. Every time I have to say that and he smiles. Sometimes, I see him with a white *lungi* and white *kurta* riding on someone's motorbike. Sometimes he is seen in doubly-red mouth with betel-leaf and sometimes with doubly-black moustache, beard and neatly trimmed hair. He is an enigma and draws my eyes regularly. In this group, Ayesha's father-in-law is a tough buy for any kind of conversation. Before his illness, every time I tried, it never seemed easy to have a meaningful conversation with him. His composure and indifference were always hard to crack. Then he was hospitalised for being seriously ill. They suffered serious financial disaster. After recovering, he started sitting again, but not as the shopkeeper anymore. It was more kind of spending with the family beside the street. He almost stopped talking even in his own regular serene standard.

That day, Ayesha was telling about her country house and arrangement in Dhaka. In short, it was about her pre-marriage life, her migration to Dhaka, and the post-marital household. Her parents live in a village in Mymensingh. She came to Dhaka for searching a job. Abrupt contact, love, marriage with the real owner of this shop, her husband. She didn't know about her to-be-husband's profession. Some "shit job" (*dhanda-manda*) was what she knew at most. After marriage, Ayesha's groom brought her up in the "slum" where Ayesha's mother-in-law lived.

Ayesha was brought to the house, because her mother-in-law "accepted" this marriage and never accepted the "first" marriage of Ayesha's husband. Ayesha sounds indifferent in explaining that her mother-in-law is not willing to reconcile with her son's first wife. Ayesha finds two reasons on behalf of mother-in-law: one is that "wife" is not "good" (in this case, it should be read as hot-tempered), and the

other reason is that the marriage was without her (mother's-in-law) consent. That was a secret "marriage" by her husband. I was looking for words, at least to form a question about if she had known about the other marriage before she fell in love. Instead, I could formulate a question about the children of similar age. She explains, indifferently again, pointing at those two, that the second one is of her co-wife (*'Whose else? Of that lady, don't you see?'*). The children are unfazed too, busy together in eating cup-cake from this shop, staring for a second or two at me.

Ayesha lives with her mother-in-law in a single-room "slum" house. Her co-wife lives in another and her husband lives in two places as he wishes. As a compensation of non-consulted, unauthorised previous marriage, and as "son's responsibility", Ayesha's husband has taken charge of family's daily meals – of his father, mother, daughter, wife (Ayesha) and an unmarried brother. I am not yet sure if his responsibility entails expenditure only, or management too. Ayesha makes it clear. All they go to that co-wife's one-room house and have their meal. But no matter how close co-wife's daughter is with her, she won't go to her house. "Never", she confirms.

"Then how do you eat?" I had to ask. While I thought it as a tough question, Ayesha has a simple answer. "It's so close. My parents-in-laws take the tiffin-carrier with them. They have their meal and bring mine every time. Is it a big deal?".

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PRZESTRZEŃ Społeczna
Social SPACE

National and political activity of the Jewish prisoners from the Russian Army at the Freistadt Camp, Austria-Hungary in 1916 – early 1918

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Abstract

The article deals with the national and political activities of the prisoners Jews from the Russian army in Freistadt prisoner-of-war camp (Austria-Hungary) in 1916 – early 1918, the deployment of which was made possible by the assistance of the Ukrainian organisation of this camp. Mostly soldiers from today's Ukraine with Orthodox and Jewish beliefs, who were members of all classes, lived in the camp. There were also Jews in the camp who had been members of the Jewish revolutionary

parties before the war and, accordingly, had distinctly anti-tsarist political convictions. It was with this category that the Ukrainian activists of the camp hoped to cooperate in their organisational and educational work in the future, and these hopes soon came true.

The efforts of the members of the Jewish Educational Circle, founded in Freistadt, were to conduct a series of theatrical performances, concerts and various promotions of national educational content. From the outset, a Jewish organisation in Freistadt made efforts to extend its influence to other prisoner-of-war camps as well as to Ukrainian lands. To this end, a Jewish circle was established in the camp of captive Ukrainian soldiers from the Imperial Army of Rastatt (Germany), and a "Provincial Central Bureau of the Union of Jews in the Occupied Territories of Ukraine" was established in Freistadt. The authors stress that the captive Jews and Ukrainians were united by the common idea of a joint struggle against Russian great power and tsarist despotism. It was very important that the leaders of Jewish and Ukrainian organisations were aware of the urgency for political awakening of the peoples enslaved by the Russian tsarism (in particular, Jewish and Ukrainian), as well as the importance of Ukrainian-Jewish understanding. In the article, certain attention is paid to the activities of Aron Vaks, the Head of Jewish "initiative group", who was a consistent adherent of the Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement in Freistadt. Jewish-Ukrainian national and political as well as cultural and educational interactions at the Freistadt camp became a successful example of cross-ethnic understanding in the difficult conditions of camp everyday life between captive Jews and Ukrainians.

Unfortunately, in spite of mutual recognition of national and political aspirations of both Jewish and Ukrainian, the course of state and political transformations in Ukraine caused the Jewish organisation to distance itself first and then declare its rejection of the idea of Ukrainian independence.

Keywords: Jewish and Ukrainian prisoners, circle, educational work, Jewish national movement, Freistadt Camp, Austria-Hungary.

1. Introduction. Historiography and methods of research

While writing this article, problem-chronological, concrete-historical and comparative-retrospective research methods were used, the combination of these enabled to throw light on circumstances and reasons for stirring the Jewish prisoners to greater socio-political activities in the Freistadt prisoner-of-war camp, which was demonstrated by creation of a national Jewish organisation and political representation of Jewish prisoners expressing their interests in all camps of captured soldiers of the tsarist army in Austria-Hungary and Germany. At the same time, to comprehensively study this problem, research methods of "micro-history" were used, together with methodology of social determinism, which enabled to clarify the impact of so-

cial experience of prisoners (their socialisation) on their general psychological state in conditions of isolation.

Prior to introducing wide readership to the specifics of Jewish national organisations in the camps of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) from the Russian Imperial Army at Freistadt camp during the First World War, it is worth mentioning the names of well-known scholars who contributed to the Jewish POWs research issue. In particular, Petra Rappersberger (1988) made a comprehensive reconstruction of the history of the camp as a part of her thesis, based on the use of a wide range of sources, including archival ones. In turn, historian Fritz Fellner (1989) prepared an extensive article on various aspects of the camp life and its inhabitants.

In the mid-1990s, the study of particular features of Russian tsarist army staying in Austro-Hungarian captivity was supplemented by Russian researchers whose papers, however, referred to general aspects of military captivity in Austria-Hungary, so they did not focus on history of the Freistadt prisoner-of-war camp (Sergeev 1995, 1996; Vinogradov 1995).

At the same time, Ukrainian historians decided to study the peculiarities of the "national" camps in Austria-Hungary and Germany, and their efforts resulted in the publication of a number of articles and monographs on captivity issues. Ihor Sribnyak's (1999) monograph was important for understanding the circumstances of Ukrainian soldiers staying in Freistadt, which was prepared on the basis of elaboration of a wide range of sources discovered by its author in the Ukrainian archives. For the first time, this book provides brief information about the cooperation of the Ukrainian and Jewish national communities in the Freistadt camp (members of both communities endorsed the anti-monarchical notion, opposing the Russian Empire and its ruler).

In two years, the specifics of the functioning of Jewish organisations at the prisoner-of-war camps for Ukrainian soldiers in Austria-Hungary and Germany were detailed by a separate report at the 8th Annual International Interdisciplinary Conference on Jewish Studies in 2001 in Moscow (Sribnyak 2001). But the brief textual format of the articles asked by the organisers of the mentioned Conference enabled us to touch on some aspects of the topic in brief outline. Another paper, considering

its type of a review essay, also contained only general information concerning the everyday life of Ukrainian prisoners of war in Freistadt (Sribnyak 2002).

At the same time, the research on the peculiarities of keeping Russian soldiers in prisoner-of-war camps in Austria-Hungary was carried out by Verena Moritz (1999) whose study of this topic resulted in elaboration and defence of her dissertation project (Moritz 2001). Later, the researcher (on her own and in joint authorship with Hannes Leidinger and Julia Vallechek-Fritz) published a monograph and a number of informative articles on captivity (Moritz 2005, 2014, 2016; Leidinger, Moritz 2006; Moritz, Walleczek-Fritz 2013, 2014).

By publishing the given article, the authors introduce into academic circulation the still unexplored documents of the Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine in Kyiv (CDAVO of Ukraine), which relate primarily to the cultural and artistic component of Jewish prisoners' everyday life at Freistadt camp. Such an attribute of POWs' activism became possible thanks to the organisational and financial support on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary and the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (ULU) with Ukrainian and Jewish POWs' participation and efforts. These include posters of theatrical performances and programmes of musical evenings (in Hebrew and Ukrainian) of Jewish amateur groups that have developed activities in this camp. Information protocols, which were regularly completed and based on the results of the General Council of the Ukrainian Community "Independent Ukraine" meetings in Rastatt (Germany), are crucial for understanding the dynamics of Jewish national movement. In addition, other archival materials (statutory documents of the Jewish community, correspondence, etc.) were used, which clearly illustrate the variety of national and political actions carried out by members of the Jewish community, usually in cooperation with Ukrainian organisations.

In order to fully reconstruct the process of the origin and development of the Jewish national movement in Freistadt, the authors of this article also used materials from the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" collection of memoirs, which discussed the specifics of cooperation between Jewish and Ukrainian camp communities in this camp (Danylenko 1979; Okhrymovych 1979). In addition, it is worth mention-

ing that primarily the "initiative group" was founded at Freistadt camp that was aimed at preparing and establishing Jewish cultural and educational club which established a Jewish school, a theatrical troupe and an orchestra. Following these initiatives, another Jewish organisation, the "Primary (provisional) Central Bureau of Jews in occupied territories of Ukraine" was established and qualified to be the institution of Jewish national movement's political representation. Further on, two organisations worked jointly side by side with the Bureau of senior management holding membership of the Jewish cultural and educational club.

2. Presentation of the research problem

The military confrontation between the countries of the Triple Alliance and the Entente, which Russia was the member of, created entirely new political opportunities for Ukraine to intensify the struggle for the establishment of Ukrainian statehood, attracting attention of a wide range of the European community and getting into close contacts with the international community. The final defeat of the Russian Empire gave a chance for Ukraine's national self-determination and full self-realisation.

The result was the foundation of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine on 4 August 1914 in Lviv, which included a number of Ukrainian political emigrants (in August 1914, due to the Russian military advance and temporary occupation of Lviv the ULU relocated to Vienna). On 25 August 1914, the Union issued a "Europe's Public Opinion" proclamation, which argued that the sole protection for Europe from Russia's aggression could be an independent Ukrainian state, and that its creation was necessary to keep a political equilibrium for further peaceful development of Europe. The statement emphasised that the fight for the establishment of such a state was the main strategic task of the Union (CDAVO a: 1-1verso).

Stating clearly and unambiguously in its Programme the task of fighting for an independent Ukrainian state, the ULU applied for a monetary subsidy to the governments of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Plans of the latter to use the "national factor" in order to weaken the Russian Empire helped acquire the financial assistance for the Union, which directed them to conduct advocacy campaigns with a view to

acquaint citizens of European states with Ukrainian issues, using founded by the Union periodicals in English and French. At the same time, a considerable number of translated articles concerning Ukraine and its national-state aspirations were published (Pater 2000: 78).

Another area of activity of the ULU was the national-organisational rallying of captured Ukrainians from the tsarist army, the total number of whom in the camps of Austria-Hungary and Germany at the beginning of the First World War was more than 200,000 people (Narizhnyy 1942: 15). To this end, a separate camp (in Freistadt) was established in Austria-Hungary for the concentration of the captive soldiers of the tsarist army, Ukrainians by their origin (end of 1914). The following year, three more camps were Ukrainised in Germany: Rastatt, Wetzlar and Salzwedel. In the above-mentioned camps, educational departments were set up, whose members (civilians from the Galician intelligentsia) were instructed to carry out organisational and educational work among the prisoners (Sribnyak 1999: 72-129).

It should be noted that the beginnings of this work were rather complicated because of the complex nature of the separation of captive Ukrainians on a national basis due to the lack of their national consciousness. Moreover, initially the governments of Austria-Hungary and Germany did not consider it reasonable to create one-national camps, putting prisoners into them regardless of their national and religious affiliation. Another negative factor was that Austrian and German authorities left the administrative leadership in the barracks and camps in the hands of the sergeant majors and sub-ensigns of the tsarist army (from among the captives). Their overwhelming majority adhered to "Black Hundred" ideology (a generalised term and endonym for the right-wing monarchical parties and organisations which emerged in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century as a result of self-organisation of Russian society's radical and conservative circles to oppose the revolutionary movements and preserve the absolutist monarchy and zealously defended Russian imperial postulates (autocracy, orthodoxy and national character), passing on without hesitation to massacres of those prisoners who at least for a minute doubted the "truth" of this triad.

This was exactly the situation in Freistadt in the early summer of 1915, when the ULU's Department of Education was established. At its insistence, the Austrian commandant began removal of the "Black Hundred" Russian element from the camp, but this proceeded very slowly. Unfortunately, part of the Jewish captives at that time was under the influence of the Black Hundreds, which caused the Head of the Department of Education Roman Dombchevsky on 15 September 1915 to address a letter (№ 94) to the ULU Presidium explaining another circumstance that made it more difficult to carry out organisational work in the camp (CDAVO b: 52).

In the said letter, he pointed out that "we still have a large number of Jewish prisoners who in every aspect have different privileges, make use of others, interfere in our work, mainly music, and speak in a hostile way against those of our comrades who are becoming conscious Ukrainians. Those Jews venture insulting remarks [statements] against Ukraine. They do all of this because they have their shoulders" (CDAVO b: 52). Speaking of "shoulders", R. Dombchevsky obviously meant that they were supported and patronised by certain officers of the camp in matters of appointment to different camp positions.

Despite such an admonition concerning some part of Jewish POWs' attitude to the Ukrainian national idea, Educational Department did not prevent them from creating the Jewish initiative and educational circles (late October 1915) – (CDAVO c: 1a), hoping to overcome their moods in the future. Moreover, there were also Jews in the camp who, prior to war times, had belonged to the Jewish revolutionary parties and accordingly, had distinct anti-tsarist political beliefs. It was with this category that the Ukrainian activists of the camp hoped to cooperate with in their organisational and educational work in the future, and these expectations were soon came true.

The decisive change in the attitude of the majority of Jewish prisoners of war to the organised Ukrainian movement in the camp came primarily thanks to the efforts of the Head of the Jewish "initiative group", POW Aron Vaks[1], who proved to

[1] Aron Vaks, a member of the Socialist Jewish Workers' Party "Sickle" (1904-1909), led a revolutionary activity in Katerynoslav, and later probably belonged to the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. In 1914 he was mobilised into the Russian Imperial Army, captured and then imprisoned in the camp of Freistadt. He initiated the creation of a Jewish educational group in that camp and was

be a consistent adherent of the Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement in Freistadt. His position concerning this issue is fully reflected by the content of his letter (dated 4 February 1916), in which he addressed the ULU Department of Education. In it, A. Vaks, in particular, noted that he has already worked in the camp not only with Jews but also with Ukrainians – using for this purpose his speeches at the general prisoners' meeting in the camp's "Tea room" (buffet). In his letter, A. Vaks further stated that "the Jewish socio-political and national movement should go hand in hand with the Ukrainian movement" and that "mutual support for the two oppressed nations – Ukrainian and Jewish – in the fight against the oppressing and ruling nationalities should be taken into account" (CDAVO b: 95-97).

Recognising the importance of cooperation with Jewish POWs to defeat the Black Hundreds and dismantle the remains of the imperial consciousness in the minds of the campers, R. Dombchevsky, the Chairman of the ULU Educational Department, decisively supported A. Vaks's suggestions. The original of his letter was immediately forwarded to Vienna to the ULU Presidium with the accompanying postscript of R. Dombchevsky: "captive Vaks is a highly intellectual person, famous speaker, regarded Ukrainian affairs very favourably and supported ULU Educational Department' in its educational work" (CDAVO b: 97).

It is obvious that the ULU's Presidium willingly supported the development of the Jewish national movement in the camp, which was indirectly proved by reorganisation of the Jewish initiative group into "Primary (Provisional) Central Bureau of Jews on the Occupied Territories of Ukraine" (hereinafter – Central Bureau, CB) on 2-5 March 1916, which was functioning on the basis of its own "Draft Charter". A. Vaks was elected the Head (President) of the organisation, I. Shapyro (Nayyer) became his Deputy and D. Brodskyi (Debé) was elected First Secretary (CDAVO c: 1a).

The "Draft Charter" of the Central Bureau defined basic provisions to regulate the activities of Jewish organisations. In particular, its § 2 provided that "in Jewish

elected its Head. He worked with the ULU's Education Department in Freistadt. Until August 1916, he was the Head of the Jewish political organisation "Providence of the Central Bureau of the Union of the Jews in the Occupied Territories of Ukraine" at the Freistadt camp. He was then secretly transferred to sub-Russian Ukraine for revolutionary work. Further fate is unknown.

national issue, the CB stands for the need of the Jews in Ukraine to autonomise all aspects of life, where the particular national interests of the Jewish people are shown". It also contained provisions concerning consolidation of the Bureau's efforts with those political parties and groups that could contribute to its successful operation or to "rapproach the core programme goals" of the CB.

The § 9 of the "Draft Charter" described the position of CB concerning aspirations of the Ukrainian people to Ukrainian statehood "in Ukrainian issue, up to the creation of its detailed platform [the Bureau] stands for recognition of the full right of Ukrainian people to have their independent national and political existence" (CDAVO c: 6). Declaring such a right for Ukrainians, the CB, however, unconsciously or deliberately "failed" – using the phrase – "up to the creation of its detailed platform", as if in this future platform some other factors might appear or such a right may be taken away from Ukrainians, but here it concerned other details.

The CB set itself "immediate" and "further" tasks. The first, in particular, consisted of "expanding opportunities to work among Jewish prisoners from Ukraine in the camps of Austria and Germany", "transferring their political work to the occupied territories of Ukraine" and "developing their platform in Jewish and Ukrainian issues". The CB also identified its further ("broader") post-war tasks as agitation in Russian-dependent Ukraine (by Jewish agitators trained in Freistadt), whose activities were to "spread a network of organisations [...] under the ideological CB leadership until a Jewish regional representation was established there" (CDAVO c: 4-5).

In Galicia, the activities of the Jewish "agitators led by some CB members" were to be of a completely different nature; in particular to follow "in the direction of a deeper and closer understanding between the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples" (the latter was determined by the basic purpose of the CB activities). In order to achieve this goal, the CB planned to set up a publishing house in Galicia that would "translate from one language to another and vice versa the Ukrainian and Jewish works of writing", as well as translate and publish "scientific and non-fiction works that could be better known by intellectual groups with national-political tasks and points of contact of these tasks basing on mutual interests of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples" (CDAVO c: 3-4).

Finally, a Jewish national newspaper was to be published that would be "dedicated to Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement". In national and political terms, the PCB declared the need to "unite the public forces of Jews and Ukrainians in the fight against harmful to both of them Polish aspirations in Eastern Galicia and in general where circumstances demanded". Thus, recognising the ultimate goal of the Ukrainians – the creation of the Ukrainian state – the CB hoped to get moral and material support by the ULU, which was of paramount importance for the development of Jewish organisations. To this end, the Bureau was ready to testify facing Austrian and German factors, the full compliance of Jewish organisations in Freistadt (as well as in other camps) with Ukrainian interests which could be used "in full amount [...] for Ukrainian issue" (CDAVO c: 4-4verso).

In turn, the CB requested the ULU for assistance in transferring nationally conscious Jews (who came from Ukraine) to Freistadt from other Austrian camps (Jewish POWs' German centre became Rastatt) what had to be done beforehand by the members of the Bureau. Finally, the Central Bureau requested the ULU to include its members in those groups of prisoners who were assigned to work in the Ukrainian lands occupied by the Central Powers which, in A. Vaks's view, would have "good and useful consequences" for the development of national movement of both peoples (CDAVO c: 5-6).

A. Vaks assured that the CB would carry out educational work in Freistadt "in the direction of national awareness on the socialist background and in the direction of acquaintance with the Ukrainian problem in particular and in the synthesis with the Jewish one". At the same time, "the language of the organisation and the language of propaganda" was to become "modern Jewish language" (§12 of the "Draft Charter"), which fully corresponded the internal realities of Freistadt, where the Ukrainian language was "governmental" for all Ukrainian camp organisations. The Central Bureau built its relations with Ukrainian organisations on the basis of "mutual technical and moral assistance". This, in particular, was shown in the cooperative efforts of members of Ukrainian and Jewish organisations in the camp cooperative union "The Own Assistance", which made the latter protected "from the

prevalence of unorganised elements" (out of 417 members of "The Own Assistance" 112 persons belonged to Jewish organisation) (CDAVO c: 1a-2).

Moral support of the Jewish national movement accompanied material one – the Jewish group received money (membership tabs and charity contributions from commandant and ULU), so that between 1 November 1915 and 11 June 1916 it received 324.55 Austrian-Hungarian krones (kr) – (CDAVO c: 2). Another source of money for Jewish organisations was the deduction from the profits of the camp co-operative – "The Own Assistance" union, which was made possible by the informal joint efforts of the Ukrainian and Jewish organisations in the camp.

Considering that Jews were a part of the cooperative, the parties reached an agreement that up to 7 % of the net income would be paid to the needs of the Jewish educational group (from those that were sent by the general cooperative meetings to cultural and educational funds) in strict accordance with the number of Jews – members of the cooperative. The parties also agreed to mutually support each other's wishes – by jointly voting during the distribution of amounts according to Ukrainian and Jewish goals. According to these agreements, during the existence of the Jewish Educational Fund group, the Camp cooperative transferred to it 1158.69 kr (Okhrymovych 1979: 44-45).

The content of the programme documents of Jewish organisation and their political orientation met the interests of Ukrainian organised movement, so it is logical that the Bureau Presidium informally favoured the development of "Jewish affairs" in camps and provided all possible assistance which is proved by the expression of sincere gratitude by A. Vaks to the leaders of the Union, and the request of the "brotherly hand of help" recognising that it "will further strengthen our readiness together with the Ukrainian people to work for our common better future" (CDAVO c: 7).

Meanwhile, A. Vaks was trying to draw more attention of the Austria-Hungary's government to the Jewish national movement in the prisoner-of-war camps, and on behalf of PCB wrote a letter of 9 July 1916 (in German) to a top official of the Austrian Foreign Ministry consul Emanuel Urbas who at this time made an acquaintance trip to Freistadt. In the letter, the CB President mentioned, in partic-

ular, that unlike the situation in the Russian Empire, where the Jewish people are in a state of oppression, here in Freistadt – in the camp of Ukrainians POWs – Jews have every opportunity for their free expression of national will. Taking the opportunity, A. Vaks and his accomplices declared in a letter their "protest against the political and national oppression" of the Jewish nation in Russia (CDAVO c: 11-12).

In the mentioned letter, E. Urbas also drew attention to the fact that "the Jewish people and Ukraine to which we [the authors of the letter belong to], fight for national independence and have much in common in our aspirations". While developing this statement, the authors of the letter noted that the Jewish organisation in the camp and in Ukraine is preparing a joint action of the two peoples in their struggle for national freedom, and also expressed their belief that the efforts of the Jews to protect the oppressed peoples "will receive further development" and "new opportunities" (CDAVO c: 12).

In his reply letter, consul E. Urbas mentioned that he was aware of the terrible plight of the Jewish people in the Russian Empire, as well as their oppression by the tsarist government. He also noted that there was no discrimination on national grounds in Austria-Hungary, and that his government was resorting to various measures to improve the situation of the Jewish people. The organisational work carried out in the camp by members of the Bureau, as viewed by E. Urbas, was very useful for the Jewish people, approaching a time when they could be released from the oppression of the Russian Empire (CDAVO c: 10).

The dynamics of the Jewish national movement in Freistadt was really more than positive – founded by the CB activities "Sholem Aleichem Jewish Educational Circle" headed by the committee of six people led by Ye. Brodskyi (Holdvart) had every opportunity to develop all possible spheres of Jewish national life in Freistadt. It consisted of several sections (commission for the collection of historical materials, section of art, library and educational section). The latter (consisting of 17 people) provided educational work in the prisoner-of-war camp for Jewish prisoners, and in particular from 2 April 1916, a school was founded where they taught "Hebrew and Ukrainian languages, geography, history, mathematics, and German". It was attended by 51 students, and classes were held twice a week. The commission collected

"stories, impressions and facts" of the captives that characterised the attitude of the soldiers of the tsarist army and its command to the Jews at the front line and "the position of the Jew-reaper in the army during the war". The Jewish Circle Library exhibited 200 books (mainly in Yiddish), about 100 Jewish campers used its services (CDAVO c: 2). The latter circumstance is particularly noteworthy because the process of collection of such considerable number of books, finding financial resources for their purchase and sending them to camps was rather problematic. Nonetheless, thanks to some unknown philanthropists along with the assistance of the camp administration and the ULU Educational Department it became possible to establish a small library with a collection of Jewish books that appeared to be a great comfort for Jewish POWs.

Another important area of activities of the Jewish cultural and educational circle was the cultural and artistic sphere, and in summer 1916 a number of national literary evenings were held in the camp (30 June, 14 July, etc.), which included reports, chants, recitals, readings. Excerpts from Jewish literary works, solo songs and instrumental music were performed by camp musicians (CDAVO c: 12-14). These POWs' meetings were held in Hebrew but, taking into account that Ukrainians were also invited, Jewish cultural and educational circle leaders always arranged the improvised translations from Hebrew and Yiddish into Ukrainian.

Such a variety of cultural and national activities favoured a significant influx of new members into the Jewish organisation: for instance, if by 11 June 1916, the group numbered 112 members of Freistadt prisoners (CDAVO c: 7), then in a short time (by the end of June) its membership increased to 153 members (out of 216 Jews who were in the camp). Thanks to the moral and material support of the Ukrainians, the authority of the Jewish organisation steadily grew, which gave A. Vaks grounds to "soon have all the Jew prisoners of the camp as members of the organisation" (CDAVO c: 1).

All these meetings and presentation events required understanding and closer cooperative efforts of activists from among the Jews and Ukrainians, which became possible through holding joint meetings and reciprocal invitations to the meetings of Ukrainian and Jewish educational groups and members of both organisations. Multi-

cultural communication was simplified by the fact that practically all Jewish POWs understood or even fluently spoke Ukrainian. In contrast to it, Ukrainian POWs understood neither Hebrew, nor Yiddish that caused the members of Jewish circles to pass on to Ukrainian or Russian when Ukrainians were present. Very often, the Jewish interests were represented to the Ukrainians by A. Vaks, and every time the Ukrainian side met his requests concerning the use of camp premises for national performances and concerts given by the Jewish cultural and educational circle. The camp Commandant's office was also attentive to satisfy Jewish POWs' religious needs that resulted in having a separate place for joint meetings (Danylenko 1979: 28).

The cooperative efforts of Jewish and Ukrainian communities in Freistadt in summer 1916 were so successful that enabled to rally Jewish POWs in the prisoner-of-war camp for captive Ukrainian soldiers of the tsarist army in Rastatt (Germany). On initiative of the Freistadt CB representative (CDAVO c: 3) and with the consent of the ULU Department of Education and the General Council of the Ukrainian Community "Independent Ukraine" (Sribnjak 2020) in Rastatt, there, on 21 April 1916, the constituent assembly of the Jewish Educational Circle of the Rastatt camp was held. Representatives of all Ukrainian camp organisations and guests from the Freistadt camp were invited to the meeting. A representative of the Jewish group delivered a speech "aimed at uniting with Ukrainian organisations and common understanding of Jewish and Ukrainian problems" (Jewish Educational Circle 1916).

The purpose of the newly created Jewish organisation was to make its members "aware of the common interests of the Jewish and Ukrainian people" and their national awareness (of Ukrainians and Jews). The Jewish Circle in Rastatt got the status of the PCB regional branch and had to coordinate its activities with it, which was fixed in its Draft Charter and "Regulations", which had yet to be considered and approved by the General Council of the Ukrainian Community "Independent Ukraine". According to PCB President A. Vaks (message to the ULU of 11 June 1916), at the initial stage of its activities, the Rastatt Jewish Circle "was developing well", uniting 45 members (of 49 Jews who were in the camp) – (CDAVO c: 15).

It is confirmed by information from Protocol № 13 of "Independent Ukraine" GC meeting of 13 July 1916, mentioning the library and a reading room in the newly created Jewish organisation. With unanimous approval of the statute of the Jewish Circle, the General Council expressed its hope that the Jewish organisation would go "in common with our [Ukrainian] organisations in the camp" and at the same time defend the "national Jewish cause" (CDAVO d: 80-81). Obviously, having no information about this decision, PCB President A. Vaks on 20 July 1916 addressed the Presidium of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with a request to send to Rastatt two or three people "for organizational work". In his view, members of Jewish cultural and educational circle, Joseph Schapiro, Jankel Koiles and Ruvin Lifshitz were the best to accomplish such a mission. The Head of the Jewish organisation of Freistadt insisted that "the existence and prosperity of our organization in Rastatt" will depend on it (CDAVO a: 98).

But even earlier (14 August 1916), A. Vaks put an application to the ULU Educational Department in Freistadt, stating that, given his poor health, which had been "the result of continuous, intensive work for ten months", he is compelled to "cease his activities and resign from the co-operation in all institutions", including the Jewish organisation as well. From that point on, he withdrew his "moral responsibility for the course of events in the camp organisations", where he had been very prominent before. One can only assume that a great number of A. Vaks's speeches and presentations at the meetings led to his nervous overstress, which forced him to make a decision concerning his self-removal from all kinds of activities (CDAVO a: 149). It might be, that one of the reasons for A. Vaks' resignation was short-term tensions between Ukrainians and Jews but it looks more plausible that an idea expressed by Austrian military commandment at the Freistadt camp to the leader of the Jewish circle to secretly cross the border front line in order to revolutionise the rear of the Russian Army caused a temporary problem.

At this time, first divergencies of opinions occurred between the leaders of the Jewish and Ukrainian communities that were connected with numerical superiority of Jewish representation in the elected bodies of the camp cooperative union "The Own Assistance" which raised funds to initiate its commercial object – the "Tea

Room" buffet. Traditionally, the composition of the Board had included two members of a Jewish circle, but when in August 1916 the cooperative added one more (the third) delegate of the Jewish circle, it caused claims by Ukrainians, bringing the case to the conflict. In this situation, the meeting of the Jewish educational group (dated 12 August 1916) was forced to admit that this election was contrary to previous arrangements. At the same time, considering the numerical increase of the Jewish representstion in the cooperative, the meeting decided to increase the "quota" of Jews in it, remaining two members of the Jewish organisation and delegating one to the executive body of the union (board) – (CDAVO c: 10).

To find ways to resolve this conflict a joint "conference" of representatives of Ukrainian and Jewish organisations was held at the camp on 24 September 1916, having decided that "the recent conflict between the two organisations concerning the Tea Room events should be considered as an incident that have passed". The problem of increasing the Jewish representation in the leadership of the cooperative was decided to submit to the general meeting of all the shareholders, and eventually it was settled on compromise grounds (CDAVO c: 11). Finally, the participation of Jewish representatives in the work of the elective bodies of the cooperative union "The Own Assistance" and the distribution of its profits despite the aforementioned conflict was also an effective form of interaction between the two national organisations, facilitating mutual understanding of Jews and Ukrainians on the economic basis.

The joint "conference" also came to an agreement that in further educational activities, both communities would remain on the same foundations when "the whole Jewish organisation stands for the distinctiveness of the Jewish people – and recognizes the full right of national self-determination for the Ukrainian people". Also, the common desire of participants of the „conference" was "to make educational work possible to improve relations between the two peoples after the war as well". Concerning "the establishment of political relations between the two peoples after the war", the parties decide to leave "a free hand" at that moment (CDAVO c: 11).

Despite A. Vaks's withdrawal from participation in the social, political and national-organisational life of the camp, Jewish organisations created by his efforts suc-

cessfully continued their activities, emphasising the intensification of their cultural and artistic component. During the second half of 1916-1917, the Jewish National Theatre named after Jacow Gordin[2] was functioning in the camp, whose performances were prepared amateur actors. In particular, on the theater stage they performed (in Yiddish) a variety of performances, including "Birth" drama of four acts by Prylucka, "Our Faith" play of three acts by Sholem Aleichem, the first act of "The Idiot" play by J. Gordin's and the "God, Satan, Man" play. To facilitate the perception of the content of these performances by Ukrainians, the Jewish theatre took care of printing information for some performances with the libretto in Ukrainian (CDAVO c: 17-18).

Jewish actors and musicians willingly prepared theatrical and musical evenings, one of which took place in December 1917 with the following programme: the first act of J. Gordin's "The Idiot" play, "The Jewish Working Anthem", the "Memories of Shraer" Waltz, "Branka" (a monologue by Sholem-Aleichem), "Mourning chanting in memory of Shevchenko" by Prisowski, *Lezginka* and *Hopak*, declamations and marches performed by the mandolinists orchestra of J. Gordin (CDAVO c: 15-16verso) [the mandoline became widespread in the Russian Empire due to its accessibility, so that the art of playing this instrument became hereditary]. In early1918, the "Jewish King Lear" drama (of four acts) by J. Gordin was staged – according to existing tradition, it was performed in Yiddish, and the libretto with a programme was produced in Ukrainian.

As it had been before, all these cultural and artistic and educational initiatives of the Jewish educational circle were fully supported by the Ukrainian camp institutions. For example, from time to time joint "conferences" of the I. Kotlyarevsky Drama Society and the Jewish theatre members (who communicated in Ukrainian and Russian) were held, which discussed the use of props, costumes and scenery during Jewish performances. This assistance was all the more important to improve

[2] Jakow Gordin, 1853-1909 (pseudonym Jakiw Mykhajlowych, Ian, Ivan Koluczij) – famous Jewish playwright. Reformer of the Jewish theatre, he established vernacular Yiddish language on stage that led to his success among Jewish public circles, particularly intelligentia, and their interest in national theatre. He was subjected to persecution by the tsarist authorities that caused his departure to the USA.

the artistic level of performances, and, moreover, it favoured the influx of spectators from among Ukrainian POWs. These conferences and joint activities of the camp actors enabled to largely overcome false stereotypes in the perception of Jews by Ukrainians and vice versa, consolidating in their minds a positive vision in the attitude of the nations to each other (CDAVO e: 24).

Such close cooperation between the two camp organisations – Jewish and Ukrainian – were going on until the Act of full state independence of Ukrainian People's Republic was adopted by the superior body of the legislative power of Ukraine – the Central Council of Ukraine – (the IV Universal, 22 January 1918). However, after its promulgation in the camp, almost all members of the Jewish organisation in Freistadt – in violation of previous agreements – declared their rejection of this state-political act, in fact going along with the opponents of Ukrainian national statehood. In regard to this position of the Jewish organisation the Chief Ukrainian Council (the governing body of the Ukrainian camp organisation in Freistadt) decided to suspend (without the possibility to renew) the transfer of specified sums for cultural and educational needs of Jewish camp community at Freistadt camp.

After signing the Peace Agreement in Brest between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Quadruple Alliance (on 9 February 1918) and the appeal of the Ukrainian delegation to Ukrainian prisoners of war in Austria-Hungary to join national Ukrainian formations, members of the Jewish organisation in Freistadt declared their "neutrality" in the Ukrainian-Bolshevik confrontation and respectively their refusal to join the Ukrainian army. Moreover, the leadership of the Jewish educational group decided that those of its members who would volunteer to join the future Ukrainian division (it is the division of *Sirozhupannyki*), will be excluded from the Jewish organisation as having violated its national unity (Dubrivnyy 1964: 55).

Therefore, while planning to return in the aftermath of the First World War to Ukraine, Jewish POWs did not sympathise with supporting or defending the Ukrainian state. It seems plausible that Jewish public mood was formed by the apprehension that, despite born on Ukrainian lands, they did not consider Ukraine to be their Motherland. They preferred to foresee who would win in the Ukrainian-Russian con-

flict. They did not know what to expect from the newly established Ukrainian independence and subconsciously they chose the "Russian prospects", in spite of its Bolshevik "image".

The decision of Jewish national group led to the dissolution of all its hitherto relations with the Ukrainian organisation, but the final of Ukrainian-Jewish relations in camp dimension took place in mid-February 1918. That was when the camp was informed about registration in the list of volunteers to Ukrainian division, the conclusion of which was to continue in Ukraine (Volodymyr-Volynsky). According to the activist of the Ukrainian camp community P. Dubrivny, this news led to an immediate change in the moods of the members of the Jewish organisation, when all of them without exception, suddenly expressed their will to join this division.

Such a sudden change of Jewish POWs' aspirations was caused by the sole reason – their desire to use the Ukrainian division formation as a chance for rapid homecoming. Moreover, Jewish prisoners' apriori did not intend to fight for independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic, neglecting this opportunity by stating that Ukraine can only lay claims to autonomy as a part of democratic, federal Russia.

In response, the "Combat Authority", which was engaged in the formation of division, made a decision on the inappropriateness of admission of Jewish POWs to the ranks of the division. In doing so, the Board made an exception for the two former members of the Jewish organisation, who from the very beginning sympathised with the aspirations of Ukrainians and were expelled from the Jewish Educational Circle because of their "pro-Ukrainian" moods (Dubrivnyy 1964: 55).

3. Conclusions

So, despite the fact that at the initial stage of Ukrainian national educational work with Jewish prisoners of war at the Freistadt prisoner-of-war camp it was accepted with partional clear reluctance, the Department of Education did not resort to removing it from the camp. The point is that due to the efforts of the members of Department of Education at the beginning of 1916, a significant change was observed in their (Jewish) moods – thanks to successful Ukrainian actions in Freistadt Jewish prisoners began to cooperate with Ukrainian organisations, having the opportunity

to organise their own national life in the camp. This was made possible by the fact that the captive Jews and Ukrainians were united by the idea to jointly fight the Russian "great-powerness" and the tsarist despotism.

To a large extent, positive developments in the establishment of Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue were made possible by A. Vaks, a POW, whose activities formed the first Jewish cultural and educational centre. Through his efforts, the Jewish national movement in Freistadt acquired a distinct political sound that made it possible to establish a Jewish national political organisation in the camp. This became possible because of moral and financial assistance provided to the Jewish organisation by the Presidium of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine and by Ukrainian camp institutions. It was important that the leaders of the Jewish and Ukrainian organisations were aware of urgency for political consciousness of enslaved by Russian tsarism peoples (including Jewish and Ukrainian people), as well as the importance of Ukrainian-Jewish understanding.

In the spring and summer of 1916, the Jewish Educational Circle was able to develop its activities in the camp, organising national cultural and artistic events for the campers and conducting educational courses. The key to success in this work was the provision of regular financial assistance for the profits received by "the Tea Room" camp cooperative union. At the same time, Ukrainian organisation supported the Jewish circle through non-material promotion by giving a temporarily free camp space to prepare theater performances, concerts and various national actions along with educational content. It was largely because of this that the Jewish national movement went beyond Freistadt – when, in April 1916, a Jewish organisation was established in a prisoner-of-war camp for Ukrainian soldiers of the Tsarist Army in Rastatt (Germany).

Unfortunately, despite the declared mutual recognition of national and political aspirations of both peoples (Jewish and Ukrainian) at this time, the course and nature of state-political transformations in Ukraine caused the Jewish organisation to distance itself first and then to declare their rejection of the idea of Ukrainian independence. In its turn, such an unfriendly attitude of Jewish POWs to the idependency aspirations of the Ukrainians led to the cessation, and then a complete breaking-

off between the two communities, which in turn called in question their experience in the joint struggle against Russian despotism.

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Znaczenie *genius loci* a modernizacja Bazaru Różyckiego

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Podziękowania

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Abstract

The importance of genius loci and the modernisation of Różycki's Bazaar

The aim of the study was to investigate how the state of the bazaar development and the condition of the neighbouring buildings affects the perception of space by buyers. The research was carried out on the basis of the case study of Różycki's Bazaar in Warsaw. This facility was selected due to the modernisation carried out in 2020, which covered a part of the bazaar. At present, a collision of two stages of development is visible in the bazaar: wooden pavilions, the form of which has not changed since post-war times, and new tin pavilions, accompanied by greenery. In the analysed market place, a questionnaire interview was conducted among buyers, the questions of which concerned the attitude to the market, the assessment of architectural solutions of the not modernised and modernised part, and the possible impact of renovation of the buildings adjacent to the analysed bazaar. The study has shown that changes made to the architecture of retail spaces should take into account and preserve the genius loci. Three out of four buyers replied that one reason for doing shopping at the analysed bazaar is their sentiment for this place. Every individual element of the modernised part of the bazaar was positively assessed by the respondents. Aesthetic architecture did not create an attractive urban space, however. The space with new pavilions is depopulated. Design work with public urban space requires multi-faceted recognition. The design should be preceded by historical and local analyses as well as recognition the target group. The managers of old marketplaces should take care of their technical condition so that there are no long-term negligence that would reduce the comfort of the buyers. It is particularly important, and not requiring financial outlays, to react quickly to emerging vacancies, as they negatively affect the perception of the space.

Key words: bazaar, Różycki's Bazaar, public space, trade, genius loci.
Słowa kluczowe: bazar, bazar Różyckiego, przestrzeń publiczna, handel, *genius loci*.

1. Wstęp

Handel jest jedną z najstarszych i najistotniejszych działalności gospodarczych wpływających na rozwój przestrzenny miast. Zwiększenie popularności szlaku handlowego powodowało powstawanie nowych osad, zmniejszenie popularności prowadziło natomiast do utraty znaczenia ośrodków miejskich i degradacji ich przestrzeni (Zuzańska-Żyśko, Sitek, 2011). Place targowe, na których organizowano targi i jarmarki, wpływały na rozwój urbanistyczny nie tylko najbliższego sąsiedztwa, ale również całego miasta, koncentrując publiczne, w tym polityczne, życie miejskie (Kulawiak 2020).

Targowiska są jedną z najstarszych form sprzedaży dóbr (Szromnik 2014; Malinowska 2016). Pomimo powstawania nowych obiektów komercyjnych oraz rosnącej popularności handlu elektronicznego bazary są nieodłącznym elementem większości miast. Dane statystyczne pokazują, że od 2003 r. następuje zmniejszanie powierzchni bazarów przy jednoczesnym zwiększeniu przestrzeni sklepów wielkopowierzchniowych. Część badaczy twierdzi, że ta korelacja świadczy o narastającym kryzysie handlu targowiskowego i bazarowego (Zuzańska-Żyśko, Sitek, 2011; Bieszk-Stolorz, Felsztyńska, 2018). Inni autorzy są zdania, że popularność targowisk i bazarów rośnie. Mariusz Hamulczuk (2016) i Mirosława Malinowska (2016) wskazują, że niektóre bazary prowadzące wcześniej sprzedaż w wybrane dni tygodnia działają obecnie codziennie, a sprzedawany asortyment jest bardziej różnorodny (2016).

Stan zagospodarowania wielu bazarów odbiega od standardu nowo powstających przestrzeni handlowych (Jajszczyk 2007). Poprawa stanu technicznego wymaga nie tylko zgromadzenia środków finansowych, ale również prawidłowego wydatkowania pozyskanego kapitału. Miasta rzadko inwestują w lokalne bazary ze względu na ograniczony budżet. Stowarzyszenia, które często pełnią rolę zarządców, nie mają natomiast rezerw finansowych pozwalających na modernizacje.

Zgodnie z definicją *Słownika Języka Polskiego PWN*, bazar to „plac lub pomieszczenie ze straganami, budkami, gdzie sprzedaje się towary" (Bralczyk 2005a), targowisko zdefiniowano natomiast jako miejsce, gdzie odbywają się targi (Bralczyk

2005b). Historycznie wyraz *targ* oznaczał plac handlowy, na którym dokonywano wymiany towarowej w określone dni tygodnia (Zuzańska-Żyśko, Sitek, 2011). Obecnie wyrazy *bazar*, *targ* oraz *targowisko* są używane zamiennie, chociaż bynajmniej nie są one synonimami.

2. Cel oraz metoda badań

Celem pracy było zbadanie, czy zmiany dokonywane w architekturze przestrzeni handlowych powinny uwzględniać i zachowywać *genius loci*. Według *Słownika Psychologii Architektury* (Lenartowicz 2010), *genius loci* to zespół cech, które nadają określonej części środowiska człowieka unikatową jakość. Inspiracją dla przeprowadzenia badań była Andrzeja Suliborskiego (2001) koncepcja funkcji miejsca, opisująca istnienie korelacji stosunku ludzi do danego miejsca (i związaną z tym wartość) z formą architektoniczną. Koncepcja ta znajduje również odbicie w słowach Pawła Rybickiego (1979), który twierdzi, że przestrzeń społeczna miasta jest skorelowana ze znaczeniem, jakie nadała jej określona zbiorowość.

Osoba poruszająca się pieszo dokonuje oceny przestrzeni dzięki bezpośredniemu kontaktowi z nią. Tworzy w swojej świadomości mapę powstającą dzięki analizie danego miejsca. Każdy użytkownik postrzega przestrzeń osobiście – negatywnie lub pozytywnie (Orchowska 2014; Bierwiaczonek 2016). Kazimierz Sowa (2001) twierdzi, że miasta istnieją, ponieważ są podobnie postrzegane przez mieszkańców. Przytoczona myśl zainspirowała autorkę niniejszego artykułu do zbadania roli historii i *genius loci* w kształtowaniu architektury obiektów handlowych. W niniejszej pracy autorka rozważa, czy przestrzeń handlowa powinna odwzorowywać wcześniej istniejącą zabudowę oraz czy poprawnie zaprojektowana przestrzeń handlowa będzie zawsze uważana za atrakcyjną. Przeprowadzone badanie ankietowe miało na celu odpowiedź na pytanie, czy historia obiektu handlowego jest wartością, która powinna być uwidoczniona we współczesnym projekcie architektonicznym.

Jako przedmiot badań wybrano Bazar Różyckiego zlokalizowany na warszawskiej Pradze. Obiekt ten wybrano ze względu na przeprowadzoną w 2020 r. modernizację jego fragmentu. Obecnie bazar jest przestrzenią handlową o bardzo małym znaczeniu. Zmiana, która nastąpiła od lat 90. XX wieku, polegająca na

zmniejszeniu zasięgu oddziaływania tego obiektu handlowego, była motywacją do podjęcia badań. Miasto stołeczne Warszawa w swoich dokumentach strategicznych podkreśla rolę dziedzictwa niematerialnego. Władze miejskie podejmują działania polegające na remontach, modernizacjach i rewitalizacjach najważniejszych przestrzeni miejskich. Bazar Różyckiego jest najstarszym ośrodkiem handlowym znajdującym się w granicach miasta. Przeprowadzona modernizacja miała przywrócić bazarowi jego dawną popularność.

Na bazarze przeprowadzono dokumentowane oględziny w latach 2014, 2019 i 2021. Obecny stan bazaru przedstawiono na rycinach 1-4.

Postrzeganie przestrzeni bazaru przez jej użytkowników zbadano za pomocą ankiety papierowej, która była wypełniana przez ankietera czytającego pytania i zaznaczającego odpowiedzi. Była ona przeprowadzona w ciągu trzech dni roboczych 02-04.09.2021 na terenie Bazaru Różyckiego. Zawierała pytania zamknięte jednokrotnego wyboru oraz jedno pytanie otwarte pozwalające na uzupełnienie odpowiedzi. Przeprowadzono 91 ankiet. Respondentami byli klienci bazaru (powyżej 18 roku życia). Najszerzej reprezentowaną grupą były osoby z przedziału wiekowego 55-70 lat (66%), o wykształceniu średnim (45%) lub zasadniczym zawodowym (30%).

3. Proces powstawania Bazaru Różyckiego w kontekście historii Pragi

Ogromne zniszczenia na terenie Pragi spowodowane wojnami napoleońskimi oraz powstaniem listopadowym wywołały migrację ludności poszukującej miejsca zamieszkania nienarażonego na częste działania wojenne (Sołtan 2006). Władze miejskie starały się zatrzymać proces wyludniania Pragi oraz nakłonić mieszkańców do odbudowy budynków przez przyznawanie odszkodowań za utracone mienie, pożyczek oraz zwolnienia z płacenia podatków (Drozdowski, Zahorski, 1975).

W pierwszej połowie XIX wieku Pragę zamieszkiwała w przeważającej mierze ludność uboga. Handlarze ze względu na wysokie czynsze mieszkali w budkach zbudowanych przy kramach (Mórwaski 2006). Po powstaniu listopadowym władze Królestwa Polskiego podjęły prace porządkujące przestrzeń Pragi. Zniszczona sieć uliczna została ukształtowana na nowo, a główne trakty wybrukowano i uregulowano (Sołtan 2006). W 1839 r. prace porządkowe objęły targowiska i bazary, które zosta-

ły podzielone wedle rodzaju sprzedawanego asortymentu. Sprzedaż żywności odbywała się codziennie, handel innymi dobrami był natomiast możliwy dwa razy w tygodniu. Targowisko przy ul. Targowej, w wyniku reorganizacji, stało się jednym z głównych ośrodków handlowych zaopatrujących Warszawę w żywność. Szeroko zakrojone prace porządkowe polegające między innymi na usunięciu z terenu targowisk i bazarów ubogiej zabudowy mieszkalnej, podjęto dopiero w 1863 r. (Mórawski 2006).

W latach 60. XIX wieku poprawiono dostępność komunikacyjną Pragi dzięki zbudowaniu mostu łączącego Pragę z lewobrzeżną Warszawą oraz dwóch linii kolejowych. Linie kolejowe łączyły Warszawę z Petersburgiem i Moskwą. W 1875 r. oddano do użytkowania most kolejowy (Drozdowski, Zahorski, 1975). Powiązanie magistral kolejowych znajdujących się po obu stronach Wisły spowodowało, że Praga stała się punktem tranzytowym w wymianie towarowej pomiędzy Europą Zachodnią a Rosją (Morawski 2006). Konkurencyjne ceny praskich nieruchomości oraz bliskość dworców kolejowych wpłynęły na powstawanie nowych zakładów przemysłowych (Wójtowicz 1934; Faryna-Paszkiewicz 2008).

Nowa infrastruktura komunikacyjna spowodowała zwiększenie natężenia ruchu osobowego i rozwój przestrzeni handlowej znajdującej się w rejonie zbiegu ul. Wołowej (południowej części obecnej Targowej) i ul. Sprzecznej (Handke 2006). W piątki odbywały się tam targi końskie i bydlęce (Sołtan 2006). Badacze uważają, że funkcjonowanie targu trzody zapoczątkowało późniejsze powstanie Bazaru Różyckiego (Kulesza 2004). Potwierdza to odkrycie pracowników Muzeum Historycznego z 2002 r., którzy ustalili na podstawie zdjęć archiwalnych, że stałe targowisko od ok. 1870 r. było zlokalizowane na późniejszym terenie Bazaru Różyckiego.

Założycielem opisywanego bazaru był aptekarz i filantrop Julian Różycki (Sidorek 2009). Zgodnie z hipotezą Jerzego Kasprzyckiego (1998), po upadku powstania listopadowego rodzina Różyckich utraciła swoje nieruchomości znajdujące się na terenie Żoliborza, którego fragment został zajęty pod budowę Cytadeli. Różyccy zainwestowali otrzymane odszkodowanie w nieruchomość położoną przy ul. Brukowej na Pradze. Zakupiona nieruchomość sąsiadowała z Salą Ochrony dla Sierot. W latach 70. XIX wieku Julian Różycki został opiekunem ochronki. J. Różycki nabywał na-

stępne nieruchomości gruntowe zlokalizowane pomiędzy ul. Targową a Brzeską. Planował zabudowanie nowo nabytych gruntów kamienicami czynszowymi. Na powstanie bazaru miał wpływ Manas Ryba, przedsiębiorca żydowskiego pochodzenia, który namówił J. Różyckiego do oficjalnego założenia bazaru. Otwarcie nastąpiło w 1901 r. (Kasprzycki 1998). Według badaczy (Kulesza 2004, Sidorek 2009, Miller 2019), Bazar Różyckiego był zabudowany drewnianymi budkami. Teren zabudowywano stopniowo od bram wejściowych oraz wzdłuż głównych alej w kierunku jego centrum. W pierwszych latach XX wieku uporządkowano ul. Targową, likwidując kramy znajdujące się przy ulicy i urządzając skwery (Sołtan 2006).

W 1915 r. wycofujące się oddziały rosyjskie wysadziły mosty na Wiśle oraz spaliły dworce Petersburski oraz Brzeski (Terespolski), pogarszając dostępność komunikacyjną Pragi (Drozdowski, Zahorski, 1975).

Po pierwszej wojnie światowej przy głównej bramie Bazaru Różyckiego zbudowano pawilon w kształcie syfonu (Sidorek 2009). W 1919 r. zmarł założyciel bazaru, a w 1923 r. jego spadkobiercy rozpoczęli zbywanie nieruchomości gruntowych (Kasprzycki 1998). W dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym w kwartale położonym naprzeciwko głównej bramy bazaru znajdowały się jatki, w których handlowano mięsem końskim. Parterowe pawilony były rozmieszczone półkoliście (Elsztein 2008).

Działania wojenne prowadzone od 1939 r. spowodowały częściowe zniszczenia bazarów, a wprowadzone ograniczenia sprzedaży doprowadziły do czasowego zaniechania działalności bazarów. W 1943 r. wprowadzono zarządzenie pozwalające na prowadzenie działalności handlowej jedynie na Bazarze Różyckiego i pl. Szembeka (Mórawski 2006). W 1945 r. na Bazarze Różyckiego było czynnych około 200 sklepów murowanych i 500 budek drewnianych; było to największe praskie centrum handlowe (Drozdowski, Zahorski, 1975).

W czasie drugiej wojny światowej Praga została zniszczona w mniejszym stopniu niż lewobrzeżne dzielnice Warszawy. W okresie powojennym starano się szybko przywrócić dzielnicy jej dawną funkcjonalność. Wznowiono funkcjonowanie dworców, sklepów oraz obiektów kultury i uruchomiono połączenia tramwajowe. W 1946 r. odbudowano most Poniatowskiego, a w 1949 r. na fundamentach mostu Kierbedzia wzniesiono most Śląsko-Dąbrowski. Zbudowanie mostów poprawiło do-

stępność komunikacyjną Pragi i umożliwiło łatwiejszy dostęp do Bazaru Różyckiego mieszkańcom lewobrzeżnych dzielnic Warszawy.

W czasie Polski Ludowej Bazar Różyckiego stał się jednym z najważniejszych ponadlokalnych punktów handlowych. Upaństwowienie bazaru nastąpiło w 1950 r. Wobec kupców stosowano represje, które miały na celu zniechęcenie ich do prowadzenia handlu. W latach 70. XX wieku, dzięki złagodzeniu polityki wyjazdowej, asortyment sprzedawanych na bazarze dóbr został poszerzony o towary pochodzące z Europy Zachodniej. W tamtym okresie Bazar Różyckiego przyciągał kupców z całej Polski (Faryna-Paszkiewicz 2008; Sidorek 2009).

W latach 90. XX wieku zmniejszyła się popularność Bazaru Różyckiego. Początkowo było to spowodowane powstaniem Jarmarku Europa, który działał na Stadionie Dziesięciolecia. Bliskość nowo powstałego ośrodka, różnorodność oferowanych tam produktów i konkurencyjność cen doprowadziły do zmniejszenia obrotów na Bazarze Różyckiego. Powstawanie hipermarketów wzmocniło to zjawisko przez zmianę przyzwyczajeń społecznych prowadzących do spadku częstotliwości dokonywania zakupów żywnościowych (Kozarzewska 2019).

4. Stan zagospodarowania Bazaru Różyckiego

Zły stan techniczny Bazaru Różyckiego jest wynikiem licznych zaniedbań. Przeważająca część przestrzeni sprzedaży, położonej na nieruchomościach gruntowych należących do spadkobierców Juliana Różyckiego, nie podlegała modernizacjom ani remontom. Główna brama bazaru jest zlokalizowana przy ul. Targowej. Bramę okalają murowane, otynkowane pawilony. Pozostały teren jest zabudowany zespołami drewnianych, zielonych straganów oraz zadaszeń wykonanych z blachy falistej. Nawierzchnię stanowią płyty betonowe. Układ głównych alejek jest zbliżony do linearnego (ryc. 1 i 2).

Podczas przeprowadzonych oględzin stwierdzono zły stan techniczny zabudowy sąsiedniej. Zlokalizowanie w pobliskich budynkach wielorodzinnych wielu lokali socjalnych wpłynęło negatywnie na sytuację finansową wspólnot mieszkaniowych. Degradacja zabudowy spowodowała zwiększenie liczby zjawisk patologicznych i wzrost przestępczości w sąsiedztwie.



Rycina 1. Część Bazaru Różyckiego zlokalizowana przy głównej bramie
Źródło: zdjęcie własne autorki, 03.2021



Rycina 2. Opuszczona przez kupców część Bazaru Różyckiego
Źródło: zdjęcie własne autorki, 03.2021

W 2019 r. władze Warszawy zleciły opracowanie projektu modernizacji części bazaru położonej na miejskiej nieruchomości gruntowej. Wiosną 2020 r. rozpoczęto prace, które zostały zakończone w grudniu 2020 r. (Ludwiniak 2021). W ramach projektu wzniesiono 44 pawilony o elewacjach z zielonej blachy falistej (Sarniewicz 2020; Czeredys 2021). Alejki wyłożono nowymi, szaro-zielonymi płytami betonowymi (ryc. 3). W ramach drugiego etapu realizacji projektu wykonano zieleniec wraz z placem zabaw dla dzieci (ryc. 4).



Rycina 3. Zmodernizowana część Bazaru Różyckiego – nowe blaszane pawilony
Źródło: zdjęcie własne autorki, 09.2021



Rycina 4. Zmodernizowana część Bazaru Różyckiego – zieleniec oraz plac zabaw
Źródło: zdjęcie własne autorki, 09.2021

5. Wyniki badania ankietowego

W celu znalezienia odpowiedzi na postawione pytania badawcze przeprowadzono ankietę wśród klientów bazaru. Zastosowano technikę wywiadu kwestionariuszowego ze względu na chęć porównania dwóch przestrzeni: części bazaru, która nie uległa przekształceniom, oraz części, która została odnowiona. Ankieta zawierała pytania zamknięte oraz jedno pytanie otwarte. Pytania podzielono na cztery grupy. Pierwsza część zawierała trzy pytania na temat analizowanego bazaru. Ich celem by-


ło zbadanie opinii ankietowanych o bazarze. Część druga i trzecia dotyczyły odpowiednio niezmodernizowanej (trzy pytania) i zmodernizowanej (sześć pytań) przestrzeni bazaru. Poprzez odpowiedzi badani wyrażali swoje opinie co do obecnie istniejącej zabudowy oraz możliwych przekształceń. Ostatnie pytanie ankiety odnosiło się do sąsiedztwa bazaru.

Respondenci często wspominali ruch panujący na bazarze za czasów PRL. Niejednokrotnie pytali również, czy są plany ostatecznego zamknięcia bazaru. Kilka osób podkreśliło swój osobisty związek z tą przestrzenią miejską poprzez, na przykład, krewnego prowadzącego w przeszłości stragan. Prowadzone badania skłoniły sprzedawców, którzy obserwowali pracującego ankietera, do podjęcia rozmowy. Sprzedawcy stwierdzili, że modernizacja nie przyniosła oczekiwanego skutku oraz że odczuwają brak stabilizacji ze względu na brak informacji co do przyszłych losów bazaru.

Przeprowadzone badanie wykazało, że obawy klientów co do likwidacji bazaru wynikają z ich sympatii do tej przestrzeni miejskiej. Ponad 90% ankietowanych na pytanie „Jak określi Pan(i) swój stosunek do bazaru?" wskazało odpowiedź „zdecydowanie pozytywny" (27%) lub „raczej pozytywny" (66%). Jedna osoba odpowiedziała, że „nie ma zdania". Żaden z respondentów nie wybrał odpowiedzi „zdecydowanie negatywny". Jedynie co osiemnasty ankietowany określił swój stosunek do badanej przestrzeni jako „raczej negatywny". Otrzymane wyniki zaprezentowano na rycinie 5.

Pytanie „Czy kiedykolwiek interesował(a) się Pan(i) historią bazaru?" ujawniło, że sympatia kupujących nie przekłada się na zainteresowanie jego przeszłością. Jedynie siedem ankietowanych osób (8%) wskazało odpowiedzi „zdecydowanie tak" albo „raczej tak".

Powody dokonywania zakupów na bazarze zbadano w krótkim sondażu, którego wyniki przedstawiono w tabeli 1. Analiza wyników wykazała, że więcej osób przyznało, iż jednym z powodów dokonywania na bazarze zakupów jest „sentyment do bazaru", niż że interesowało się jego historią.



Rycina 5. Stosunek kupujących do Bazaru Różyckiego

Źródło: opracowanie własne

Tabela 1. Powód dokonywania zakupów na Bazarze Różyckiego (%)

Wybiera Pan(i) dokonywanie zakupów na bazarze ze względu na?	Tak	Nie	Nie wiem
dogodną lokalizację	64	29	8
niskie ceny	54	41	5
szeroki asortyment	44	41	15
zaufanego sprzedawcę	55	42	3
sentyment do bazaru	74	13	13

Źródło: opracowanie własne

Tematem pytań z części drugiej był fragment Bazaru Różyckiego, który nie został odnowiony. Na pytanie „Jak Pan(i) ocenia czytelność układu pawilonów na bazarze w części niezmodernizowanej?" niemal połowa ankietowanych odpowiedziała, że uważa układ za „raczej czytelny" (45%). Następną szeroko reprezentowaną grupą były osoby, których zdaniem układ był „zdecydowanie czytelny". Takiej odpowiedzi udzieliła co czwarta pytana osoba. Zaskakująco wielu badanych stwierdziło, że „nie ma zdania". Zrobił to niemal co dziesiąty ankietowany. Dwóch respondentów wskazało, że układ jest „raczej nieczytelny". Co siódmy ankietowany

odpowiedział, że układ pawilonów jest „zdecydowanie nieczytelny". Kilka osób spośród tej grupy stwierdziło, że pierwszy raz robi zakupy na bazarze.

Bardzo dużą zgodność respondentów odnotowano w pytaniu dotyczącym wpływu zamkniętych pawilonów handlowych na atmosferę bazaru. Zdecydowana większość odpowiadających wskazała, że mają one wpływ „raczej negatywny" (51%) oraz „zdecydowanie negatywny" (34%). Odpowiedź „nie mam zdania" wskazał co siódmy ankietowany.

Aby zbadać, które elementy bazaru powinny być najpilniej odnowione, przeprowadzono wśród ankietowanych sondaż. Jego wyniki przedstawiono w tabeli 2.

Tabela 2. Przekształcenia przestrzeni zwiększające komfort kupujących (%)

Co poprawiłoby Pana(i) komfort podczas robienia zakupów?	Tak	Nie	Nie wiem
remont posadzki	69	23	8
wprowadzenie zadaszeń nad alejkami	64	19	18
odnowa straganów	66	32	2
zmiana układu alejek	22	78	0


Źródło: opracowanie własne

Przekształceniami, które wskazało najwięcej respondentów, były „remont posadzki", „odnowa straganów" oraz „wprowadzenie zadaszeń nad alejkami". Część ankietowanych uważała, że nawet remont któregokolwiek z elementów nie poprawi komfortu robienia zakupów.

Pytania części trzeciej, dotyczącej zmodernizowanego fragmentu bazaru, częściowo odpowiadały pytaniom z części wcześniejszej. Powtórzenie pytań miało na celu porównanie, jak użytkownicy postrzegają obie przestrzenie. Cel ten nie został w pełni zrealizowany, ponieważ aż 43% ankietowanych nigdy nie była w zmodernizowanej części bazaru. Bardzo wielu badanych wyrażało zdziwienie, że jest ona już otwarta, oraz pytało, gdzie znajduje się wejście. Na pytania części trzeciej udzieliło odpowiedzi jedynie 52 ankietowanych.

Niemal wszyscy respondenci ocenili, że układ pawilonów jest „zdecydowanie czytelny" (88%) albo „raczej czytelny" (8%). Podczas rozmowy wiele osób podkreślało, że alejki są szerokie i dzięki temu poruszanie się jest bardzo komfortowe. Odpowiedzi respondentów wskazują, że przestrzeń piesza została ukształtowana prawidłowo.

Z przychylną oceną spotkała się estetyka nowo powstałych pawilonów. Przeważająca część respondentów określiła, że ocenia je „zdecydowanie pozytywnie" (58%) albo „raczej pozytywnie" (15%). Negatywnie wygląd stoisk ocenił co czwarty badany, odpowiedź „raczej negatywnie" wybrało osiem osób, a „zdecydowanie negatywnie" wskazało czworo ankietowanych. Wprowadzenie na teren bazaru zieleni zostało ocenione pozytywnie przez 83% badanych. Pozostali respondenci nie mieli zdania.



Rycina 6. Atrakcyjność przestrzeni zmodernizowanej części Bazaru Różyckiego

Źródło: opracowanie własne

Respondenci pozytywnie ocenili układ alejek, estetykę pawilonów oraz wprowadzenie zieleni. Mimo to przestrzeń zmodernizowanej części bazaru, ich zdaniem, była nieatrakcyjna. Dla ponad połowy badanych przestrzeń bazaru była „zdecydowanie nieatrakcyjna" (54%). Odpowiedź „raczej nieatrakcyjna" wybrało 28 ankietowanych. Jedynie dwie osoby uważały przestrzeń za „raczej atrakcyjną" (ryc. 6).

Wyniki ankiety potwierdzają spostrzeżenie Williama H. Whyte'a (1959), który stwierdził, że zaprojektowanie przestrzeni publicznej, która nie przyciągnie ludzi, jest zdumiewająco częste.

W celu dania możliwości uzupełnienia odpowiedzi zadano respondentom pytanie otwarte: „Jakie elementy Pana/Pani zdaniem powinny ulec zmianie?". Tylko nieliczni ankietowani udzielili odpowiedzi spójnych. Zdaniem respondentów, architektura pawilonów powinna być efektowna. Wyrazili oni również zdziwienie, że modernizacja nie zapewniła nowych miejsc postojowych. Zdaniem jednej osoby pawilon w kształcie syfonu powinien zostać zrekonstruowany. Odpowiedzią mało precyzyjną, ale często padającą, było dodanie elementu „wprowadzającego życie do bazaru". Nieliczne odpowiedzi na zadane pytanie otwarte potwierdzają stwierdzony przez badaczy (Martyka, Wantuch-Matla, 2020) niski poziom edukacji architektonicznej całego polskiego społeczeństwa.

Respondentów, którzy odpowiedzieli twierdząco na pytanie, czy interesowali się kiedyś historią analizowanego bazaru, zapytano, czy – ich zdaniem – nowa forma architektoniczna bazaru powinna odwoływać się do przeszłości Bazaru Różyckiego. Wszyscy ankietowani odpowiedzieli twierdząco („zdecydowanie tak" 29%, „raczej tak" 71%).

Podczas odpowiedzi na ostatnie pytanie ankiety, „Czy przeprowadzenie remontu sąsiadującej zabudowy skłoniłoby Pana/Panią do częstszych zakupów na bazarze?", większość respondentów wyraziła swój entuzjazm co do możliwości przeprowadzenia remontu. Reakcja ankietowanych koreluje z odpowiedzią na pytanie z części pierwszej, gdzie badani wskazali, że dokonują zakupów na bazarze ze względu na jego dogodną lokalizację. Prawdopodobnie większość osób biorących udział w ankiecie mieszka w najbliższym sąsiedztwie bazaru. Ponad połowa badanych wskazała paradoksalnie odpowiedź „zdecydowanie nie" (54%). Odpowiedź „raczej nie" wskazał co szósty ankietowany (16%). Respondenci prezentowali dwa stanowiska: robienie codziennych zakupów, na których częstotliwość nie wpływa stan otoczenia, oraz dokonywanie jednorazowego zakupu (np. zakup sukni ślubnej).

6. Zakończenie

Wyniki przeprowadzonego badania ankietowego potwierdziły założoną hipotezę badawczą, zgodnie z którą zmiany dokonywane w architekturze przestrzeni handlowych powinny uwzględniać i zachowywać *genius loci*. Modernizacja przeprowadzona w części Bazaru Różyckiego nie przyniosła oczekiwanych skutków. Przestrzeń, w której znajdują się nowe, blaszane pawilony, jest wyludniona. Przeważająca część straganów nie jest obecnie wynajęta. Wszystkie pojedyncze elementy zmodernizowanej części Bazaru Różyckiego zostały ocenione przez respondentów pozytywnie, jednak estetyczna zabudowa nie utworzyła atrakcyjnej przestrzeni miejskiej. Wszyscy respondenci, którzy interesowali się historią Bazaru Różyckiego, uważali, że zaproponowana nowa forma architektoniczna powinna się odwoływać do historii miejsca. Trzech na czterech ankietowanych odpowiedziało, że jednym z powodów dokonywania zakupów na bazarze jest sentyment do tej przestrzeni handlowej. W czasie prowadzonych wywiadów większość respondentów wspominała czasy świetności bazaru. Wynika więc z tego, że praca projektowa z publiczną przestrzenią miejską wymaga wieloaspektowego rozpoznania. Projektowanie powinno być poprzedzone sporządzeniem analiz historycznych i lokalizacyjnych oraz określeniem grupy docelowej.

Zarządcy starych bazarów powinni dbać o ich stan techniczny, aby nie doszło do wieloletnich zaniedbań, które obniżają komfort osób kupujących. Szczególnie istotne, a niewymagające nakładów finansowych, jest szybkie reagowanie na powstające pustostany, wpływają one bowiem na negatywne postrzeganie przestrzeni. Modernizowane oraz nowo powstające targowiska i bazary powinny być oddawane do użytkowania etapami. Pozwoliłoby to na dostosowanie kolejno oddawanych etapów do zapotrzebowania społeczności lokalnej na punkty usługowe oraz do poziomu aktywności lokalnych przedsiębiorców.

Pełne wykorzystanie zalet handlu bazarowego wymaga zapewnienia nie tylko atrakcyjnej formy przestrzennej, ale również sprzyjającego środowiska makro- i mikroekonomicznego (konkurencyjności małych punktów handlowych). Formą realizacji tych postulatów mogą być zintegrowane działania samorządowe.

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